The foreign press analytical publications of the last month of 2022 discussed Tokayev’s first weeks in his second term as the president of Kazakhstan, challenges for Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary system, crackdown on journalists and activists in Tajikistan, changes in Turkmenistan’s isolationist foreign policy, developments in regional integration by Uzbekistan, as well as annual reviews and take-aways by regional experts.
Kazakhstan finally floats state oil firm, revives privatization drive
An article by Eurasianet discusses the results of the flotation of Kazakhstan’s state-owned “KazMunaiGaz” (KMG) oil and gas company on the stock markets. KMG’s initial public offering (IPO) was the largest ever on Kazakhstan’s stock market in terms of the number of bids received and final sales volume. However, the results indicate that investor appetite for buying into major Kazakh companies may not be as high as Astana would wish, since investors snapped by only 3% of shares, while KMG offered 5%. Still, KMG raised some $330 million from the sale of 18.3 million shares. Before the IPO the fund owned 90.4 percent of KMG’s shares, while Kazakhstan’s central bank owned 9.6 percent. Foreign individuals and companies received 4.3 percent of the shares, while 48.5 percent went to private citizens of Kazakhstan and 47.2 percent to Kazakh companies.
This marks the relaunch of what the government bills as its People’s IPO program, conceived to create a class of retail investors in Kazakhstan. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for the revival of the People’s IPO last year, as a chance for all citizens to “have the opportunity to share in the national wealth.” The KMG is only the third company to complete an IPO since that scheme was announced in 2011. The two others are oil transportation company KazTransOil and power company KEGOC. It is believed that the IPO “demonstrated the high potential of Kazakhstan’s securities market, as well as a significant increase in investment literacy and activity among citizens of Kazakhstan”.
Tokayev’s First Weeks in a New Term: What Can We Make of His Recent Visits?
Caspian Policy Center analyses Tokayev’s first days in his second presidential term. Just eight days after Tokayev’s next seven years as Kazakhstan’s President was affirmed, he made his first official visit of his term to Moscow. The following day, he embarked on a two-day visit to France. This visit was significant, not only because it was the first official visit by a Kazakh leader in seven years, but also because it symbolizes the rearranging of alliances with Russia’s war in Ukraine, the article states.
During the visit to France, Tokayev and Macron signed a joint statement, emphasizing both countries’ commitment to key facets of the United Nations (UN) Charter, highlighting the importance of upholding the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The statement went on to reference concern over Ukraine directly: “France and Kazakhstan are gravely concerned about the situation in Ukraine, its humanitarian consequences and the impact on the global economy and the food security of the most vulnerable countries.”
Nevertheless, Kazakhstan still does have to manage cordial relations with neighboring Russia. Before visiting France, Tokayev paid his first official foreign visit of his second presidential term to Moscow. There, Tokayev stated, “This is my first foreign visit after this event and that in itself has political significance and, of course, a certain symbolism. […] For Kazakhstan, Russia is and has always been a strategic partner.”
However, the article highlights that his subsequent visit to France, along with the recent increased engagement with the EU and China demonstrate that Kazakhstan values its sovereignty most. That is, Kazakhstan intends to sustain stable relations with neighboring Russia, all the while using this moment to take some steps to lessen its dependence on Russia by nurturing relations with other entities.
Can Kyrgyzstan’s Parliament Withstand Intense Government Pressure?
The democratically elected Kyrgyz legislature — long known for being more lively and independent than its counterparts in a super-authoritarian neighborhood — is experiencing a challenging period, as discussed in the article published by Eurasia Review. “The risks of a strengthening authoritarian regime are getting bigger, incidents of judicial abuses are increasing, and public discontent against this background of legal violations is intensifying,” said Tattuububu Ergeshbaeva, the head of an association of lawyers called “Tandem”.
The lawmakers who have fallen under pressure recently are mostly from the group of 16 that voted against ratification of the deal in November to resolve Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s long-contested border. Some of them have been evicted from office, while others’ family members were fired from their jobs. One of the lawmakers, Emil Zhamgyrchiev, was detained and prevented from crossing the border with Kazakhstan as the state prosecutor asked the Supreme Court for permission to reverse a 2020 judicial acquittal won by Zhamgyrchiev in a corruption case related to duck meat imported from China.
The darkening political climate in Bishkek raises the question of whether the Kyrgyz parliament might someday look more like the rubber-stamp versions seen in its authoritarian, super-presidential neighbors in Central Asia. But activists believe that is unlikely for the moment, thanks to Kyrgyzstan’s relatively free elections, which mean the president cannot realistically hope for a legislature stuffed with allies. “The parliament has lost some powers. It can no longer make big decisions like firing the government,” one of the activists said, “But there are at least two opposition factions inside it, and they don’t intend to be silent.”
Kyrgyzstan: Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
Human Rights Watch published a submission to the UN in advance of the 94th Pre-session of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“the committee”) and its review of Kyrgyzstan to highlight areas of concern regarding the government of Kyrgyzstan’s compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The submission addresses articles 2, 19, 24, and 28 of the Convention, covering violence against girls, abduction of girls and women for child and/or forced marriage, access to education during the Covid-19 pandemic, protection of education from attack, and barriers to education for children with disabilities.
The publication extensively covers the situation in Kyrgyzstan in the above-mentioned areas and offers recommendations to the Committee to address these issues. Specifically, the submission notes that despite a strengthened legal and policy framework, domestic violence remains a pervasive problem in Kyrgyzstan and significant gaps in protection of women and girls persist. Also, HRW stated that the government should take further action to protect victims and those at risk of abduction for forced marriage, and ensure accountability for perpetrators and for authorities who fail to adequately respond to reports of “bride kidnapping.” The submission also analysed the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the border conflict with Tajikistan in terms of children’s access to education. Finally, the submission urged the government to guarantee access to quality inclusive education for children with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of reasonable accommodations, in line with the government’s international obligations.
Tajikistan: Respected journalist sentenced to 21 years in prison
The Eurasianet article reports that the Supreme Court in Tajikistan has sentenced a widely respected 65-year-old journalist to 21 years in prison on charges of incitement to overthrowing the government. Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva was accused by the authorities of being a leading figure behind the political turbulence that rocked her native Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, or GBAO, earlier this year. State propaganda has previously alleged that the veteran reporter and activist hatched the purported plot, for which no credible evidence has been produced, at the behest of an unnamed foreign government.
Mamadshoeva’s brother, Khursand, was last week sentenced to 18 years in prison on related charges. Her ex-husband, Kholbash Kholbashev, a former senior official in the border service, has been given a life sentence. The campaign of repression is the culmination of a violent government crackdown in the GBAO in May-June that was unleashed in response to protests.
The article also mentions that last week, the Supreme Court sentenced Faromuz Irgashev, a 32-year-old Pamiri lawyer who attempted without success to run in the 2020 presidential election, to 30 years in prison. When unrest first broke out in GBAO in February, Irgashev acted as an intermediary between protestors and the authorities, assisting in defusing the tensions. One result of negotiations was approval for the creation of a 44-person commission involving all sides of the unrest to investigate the root of the tensions. By May, 10 members of that commission had charges filed against them on the grounds that they had allegedly formed a criminal consortium.
Tajikistan Unveils 2023-2037 Green Development Policy
Silk Road Briefing reports that Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has introduced the “Strategy for the Development of the Green Economy for 2023-2037”, with the goal being to implement regulatory reforms, ensure the efficient use of natural capital, attract investments, introduce modern and innovative technologies, and strengthen international cooperation in the green economy. The amount of funding for the “Strategy for the Development of the “Green Economy” in Tajikistan for 2023-2037” is estimated at 21.5 billion somoni (US$2.1 billion), the Ministry said.
The Green aspect is part of a drive to further prioritize the greater diversity and competitiveness of Tajikistan’s national economy, which also calls for wider digitalization, intensive industrialization, application of innovative technologies and human development, and ensuring the sustainable and qualitative national economic development, the article states.
The President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, has stressed it is important to ensure GDP growth is maintained at 7% of per annum, and to double the GDP per capita during the next 5 years, given the increase of Tajikistan’s population to 11 million. The country aums to establish more than 870 industrial enterprises, reach an industrial output of TJS 95 billion (US$9.5 billion) and to double its exports. As at the end of 2022, Tajikistan’s GDP per Capita (PPP) is US$3,185 against a GDP value of about US$8.6 billion. GDP growth is currently running at 7.4%, while the country is embarking on significant infrastructure connectivity projects to improve links with China and the EAEU Central Asian countries in particular, the article reports.
Turkmenistan lifts it head
The feature article of Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road by S. Frederick Starr talks about how in recent months Turkmenistan has emerged from its self-imposed foreign policy shell. It argues that under its new president, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan has launched a very active, though still cautious, foreign policy. As events unfold, Turkmenistan has decisively lifted its head, and will henceforth be a significant factor in regional and continental affairs and not simply a perplexing outlier.
According to the author, the new government in Ashgabat reconsidered Turkmenistan’s long-held isolationist interpretation of its neutral status and replaced it with multi-sided engagement designed to enhance the country’s economy and security. This new approach is evident in Turkmenistan’s recent actions at both the regional level within Central Asia and the international level. At the regional level, Ashgabat has greatly expanded its relations with both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan – Kazakhstan because it is a potential consumer of Turkmen gas, and Azerbaijan because it is the most promising corridor for Turkmen gas to Europe. Then is the regional and international context of Turkmenistan’s recent demarches to Japan, the European Union, and the United States while maintaining “close but complex” relations with Russia.
The article concludes that Turkmenistan has moved away from the isolationism that prevailed in Ashgabat since the United Nations endorsed it as a neutral country back in 1995. In its place, the country’s new President has proposed what might be called “engaged neutrality.” The new approach is about a focus on the transport of both energy and goods, in regional and continent-wide economic integration, and in macroeconomic reforms at home.
Turkmenistan Becoming Focus of Intense Geopolitical Competition
The Jamestown Foundation article argues that Turkmenistan is becoming the object of intense geopolitical competition between outside powers from the West and East, which want the country to become more closely linked to them, and Moscow, which hopes to maintain Turkmenistan’s neutrality to other actors.
On December 6 and 7, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, who stressed that Moscow views Ashgabat as “our closest friend and strategic partner,” words that Meredov reciprocated. Then, on December 11, Terhi Hakala, the EU’s special representative for Central Asia, traveled to Ashgabat to take part in celebrations of the International Day of Neutrality, marking the 27th anniversary of Turkmenistan’s declaration of that status. On December 14, President Berdimuhamedov together with his father, the former president, hosted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at a resort on the shores of the Caspian. That summit, which was originally scheduled more than a year ago but was delayed, has worried Moscow, which feared that it would become an occasion for Turkey to gain a more established foothold in Central Asia at Russia’s expense.
The article concludes that Turkmenistan appears likely to continue to insist on its neutrality to not outrage Moscow. Yet, Ashgabat is sure to increasingly redefine that position to mean that it will look beyond the Kremlin for partners. That would be acceptable in most capitals, but it will not be in Moscow, which not only wants Turkmenistan to remain neutral but also to do so in the way that Russia prefers.
Uzbekistan-2.0: Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy
The Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst released an analytical paper by Farkhod Tolipov, who compares the two periods of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy under Islam Karimov and Shavkat Mirziyoyev and examines priorities and challenges in Uzbekistan’s foreign relations. The author states that despite Karimov’s slogan “Turkistan is our common home,” indicating an embrace of the wider region, territorial and water disputes in Central Asia overshadowed intra-regional affairs. But since Mirziyoyev came to power, Uzbekistan has taken dramatic steps to overcome such regional discord, instead emerging as a leader in building cooperation both on the region-wide level and through the budding alliance with Kazakhstan.
For example, Mirziyoyev managed to unfreeze the regional format of interaction between the five Central Asian states by initiating a special mechanism, the Consultative Meetings (CMs) of presidents. This format proved to be relevant and functional; four meetings have already taken place within the framework, which is gradually evolving towards institutionalized regional integration. He also signed several important strategic partnership documents with other important players in the region, including the U.S., Russia, China, Turkey, India, the EU, and Azerbaijan.
Tolipov believes that Tashkent’s foreign policy suffers from an excessive insistence of neutrality which seems to be a de facto foreign policy principle. However, this is a special type of neutrality because it contrasts with Tashkent’s eagerness to play a leading role in Central Asia and an active role on the international arena, especially when it comes to the situation in Afghanistan or its initiatives at the UN.
Moscow frequently tests the strengths and weakness of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy through information attacks, to which Tashkent consistently responds with corresponding counter-messages. However, this strategy has its limits; Russian propaganda still dominates Uzbekistan’s information and media sphere, which cannot but affect public opinion and create ideologically and morally biased perceptions in society, the author maintains.
A Productive Week for U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations
Caspian Policy Center reports that On December 12, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister, Vladimir Norov met with U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken in Washington D.C. (Vladimir Norov was dismissed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan on December 30 – ed.). Blinken emphasized to Norov, “The United States’ unwavering support for Uzbekistan’s independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.” Also on the agenda was discussing U.S.-Uzbekistan bilateral ties in the midst of “a shifting geopolitical landscape in Central Asia,” as well as the importance of both countries’ supporting the people of Ukraine and Afghanistan throughout their ongoing crises.
Following Norov’s meeting with Secretary Blinken, the second annual Strategic Partnership Dialogue between the United States and Uzbekistan took place in Washington on December 13. Headed by Norov and U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Donald Lu, this meeting sought to enhance bilateral cooperation, especially in the areas of security and economy. Both sides discussed ideas for collaborative initiatives in digital economy, transport, water resources, agriculture, and environmental conservation. They also planned for the 2023 meeting of the Council of the Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) that will take place in Samarkand
With Lu and Norov agreeing to reconvene the U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue in 2023, it is clear that both countries see the value in nurturing the relationship, the article believes. The United States has demonstrated its vested interest in Central Asia this year through various high-level meetings, visits, and the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). It is a positive sign that the United States has shown its dedication to fostering relations and promoting greater regional connectivity, the article concludes.
Discussing an Eventful 2022 in Central Asia with Bruce Pannier
The Diplomat discussed the 2022 outcomes in Central Asia with Bruce Pannier, a journalist covering Central Asia since 1995, author of RFE/RL’s Central Asia in Focus newsletter, and host of the Majlis podcast.
According to Pannier, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and talks by prominent Russian political figures questioning Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity have helped Tokayev to gain support at home and consolidate his power. Meanwhile, the problems that caused the January unrest remain unresolved. Regarding the snap presidential elections in November, Pannier notes that fewer people voted in 2022 than in 2019, when Tokayev was elected for the first time, which is sign many people did not see any purpose in casting a ballot. Tokayev easily won but the second highest number of votes went to “none of the candidates,” more than 5 percent of total votes, more than 400,000 people. That’s a vote against Tokayev’s government, the expert states.
Discussing the border clashes, in case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as peaceful border demarcations, in case of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Pannier states the difference between the former and the latter is that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s military powers are nearly equal, while Kyrgyzstan does not match military capabilities of Uzbekistan. Also, there is not much interest in settling the issue from the leaders, especially from Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon, whose domestic popularity rises every time there is a conflict on the Kyrgyz border. And the tense border gives the Tajik government a reason to maintain increased troops level in northern Tajikistan, where Rahmon has been generally unpopular since he first became leader in 1992.
In terms of future developments in the region, Pannier particularly focuses on possible challenges to the regional cooperation, as Russia’s power in the region diminishes, and the five countries looking elsewhere to fill in gaps in trade, financing, and security, often looking at the same potential sources.
2023 outlook: Central Asia is not out of the woods yet
Raffaello Pantucci, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, also provided his conclusions of 2022 in the region for Nikkei Asia platform.
According to Pantucci, the past year’s uncertainty remains on the horizon for the coming year, with the potential for violence to boil over, geopolitics to come crashing down around regional states or internal pressures to escalate once again. The biggest question that still hangs in the balance is what will happen next in fellow former Soviet republic Ukraine. With little sign of an end to its conflict with Russia in sight, Central Asia will continue to find Moscow a complicated partner with which to engage over the coming year. Meanwhile, attention from Europe and China continues to increase in the region.
There has also been little international condemnation or fallout from the instability seen earlier this year in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the continuing crackdown in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region or violent border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The general attitude taken by outside powers, including the usually accusatory Western ones, is to simply move past these issues, hoping the governments will be able to handle them, Pantucci argues.
But the raft of incidents this year exposed a dangerous risk. The large-scale violence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was a shock to most observers. While things appear to have settled down, the unrest underscored that there are potential issues bubbling under the surface, even in the region’s traditionally more stable countries, which could lead to widespread problems. The Taliban rule poses a more present and clear danger to the region as well.