“The Scenario Matrix presented in this article is more of a strategy to achieve results than just guessing the future. Now a decisive moment has come in the history of modern Kazakhstan, and much depends on the actions that will be taken in the coming months,” Kairat Moldashev, an expert from Kazakhstan, notes in an article, written specifically for CABAR.asia.
What actually happened? Who was involved? What awaits us? Such questions have been tormenting the people of Kazakhstan and not only since January 4 this year. On January 2, a peaceful rally was held in Aktau because of the increase in gas prices and, in general, because of dissatisfaction with the socio-economic policy. Residents of other regions came out in support and according to the comments of eyewitnesses, at first these were peaceful rallies, where people themselves held back more aggressive compatriots. However, on January 4 distribution of weapons to protesters, looting and violence against civilians, police and military begun in some regions.[1] Much has already been written about the chronology of these and subsequent events. Therefore, skipping the question of what happened, let us dwell on the discourse on these events in order to classify the participants in the events, and possible scenarios for the development of the situation in Kazakhstan.
Who participated?
On the question of who participated, one must clearly distinguish between peaceful participants in rallies, organized groups of instigators of violence, the so-called “terrorists” and robbers. Civil activists or other participants in a rally who came out to express their dissatisfaction in a peaceful way should not be put on a par with members of organized groups who came to incite violence, or robbers. The presence of well-organized groups that seized the initiative at some point is hard to deny. They could be classified as terrorist, since actions aimed at intimidation, the use of violence, and organization are clearly traced. However, the use of the term “terrorist”, especially the term “international terrorist”, requires caution and further investigation of what happened. At the moment, we can only speak of well-organized instigators who disrupted peaceful protests and caused the state of emergency to be declared.
The work of the instigators was also facilitated by the use of forceful methods of dispersal and arrests of civil activists long before the unrest began in Almaty and other southern regions. Such measures had the opposite effect, leaving those who took part in peaceful rallies without constructive leaders and in an embittered state. The questions of how organized groups of instigators with weapons got there, who is behind them and what was their goal, remain open. In addition, robbers or looters simply took advantage of by the situation that developed from January 4 to 6. Here, the term robber is more appropriate than marauders, since the term marauders is applied to people who carry out theft on the battlefield, in enemy territory, or from the dead or wounded. The correct use of terminology is very important when covering events.
In the discourse of Akorda, the division between the participants can be traced already from the first addresses of the head of state. On January 5, the President of Kazakhstan gives a signal that it is necessary to distinguish between the participants in the events and points to “individuals who call themselves” participants in the protests.[2] In a January 7 address, Tokayev thanked “the inhabitants of the regions who ensured the peaceful order of the protest.”[3] Organized groups in the text of the appeal dated January 5 at the beginning are referred to as “hooligan elements” and “conspirators”. However, already on January 6, the rampant participants were defined as terrorists, and a counter-terrorist operation began.[4]
It is too early to say that there was an invasion by some mixture of local and foreign terrorists. Perhaps this discourse was needed to justify the introduction of the CSTO troops in the first instance. However, according to expert Ikboljon Koraboev, such a discourse can lead to excessive emphasis on security issues in foreign and domestic policies. In domestic policy, this will untie the hands of law enforcement agencies, and in foreign policy, we may lose the results of a multi-vector approach and openness. Yes, it must be admitted that there were organized groups of instigators with weapons. Perhaps we will find out the whole truth in the future. But it is important to understand that this was not the main point in the January events. The main point was that, for the first time in the history of independent Kazakhstan, a huge number of people went out to the streets across the country, said “enough” and demanded “drastic changes”. At the moment, while analyzing the discourse of Akorda, one can say that the head of state has shown that he perceived – where hope has appeared, if the moment is not missed, and dozens of years are not lost.
What awaits Kazakhstan?
Now, when the situation is moving towards normalization, the question of what will happen next is acute. How will the January events affect the future of Kazakhstan? The decision on the price of gas was made for six months, and a package of political and economic reforms was also promised. Without going into details of individual decisions, I would like to present my analysis based on the planning of possible scenarios. Although scenario analysis is mainly used in strategic business planning, its use in political economy helps to visualize possible scenarios at the country level, based on the reforms and steps that are being taken now or will be taken in the coming months.
The scenario matrix identifies two key aspects of uncertainty and four possible scenarios.[5] In the context of the ongoing events in Kazakhstan, the main aspects are (1) political and administrative reforms and (2) the redistribution of resources and income. Political and administrative reforms are promised, but everyone is waiting to see how significant they will be. Also, it is expected that there will be a redistribution of resources or assets accumulated by a narrow circle of people who are close to those in power, but it is not certain what it will be and how this process will affect the redistribution of income received as a result of ownership or control over these assets. Figure 1 presents these aspects with plus and minus signs and shows four possible scenarios.
Figure 1. Scenario Matrix
In the upper right corner, the most favorable scenario is indicated, which shows sustainable development in the context of democratic reforms, with the implementation of significant political and administrative reforms and a fair redistribution of resources and income. With a diametrically opposite development with an unfair redistribution of resources and income, and with cosmetic reforms, Kazakhstan will face stagnation and increased protest moods. If the country’s leadership undertakes significant political and administrative reforms, but at the same time the concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a narrow circle of people remains, then democratic reforms will not lead to sustainable and equal development and social justice. With a more equitable redistribution of resources, development is possible in the medium term, but with further strengthening of authoritarianism, the so-called social contract, through which Kazakhstan has already passed in well-fed years.
In order to understand which scenario Kazakhstan will follow, an impact diagram is needed for each aspect of uncertainty. Figure 2 shows the events or decisions that will positively or negatively affect the resource reallocation aspect. Significant socio-economic reforms are needed for positive shifts in this aspect. First, it is necessary give a correct assessment of the situation, including the real number of unemployed and number of people who live below the poverty line.[6] It is necessary to reconsider the approaches to calculating the minimum subsistence level and social benefits. It must be admitted that for many years the growth of wages of workers did not keep pace with the rate of inflation. The growth of inflation is often associated with the existence of monopolies and oligopolies in many areas of activity, which, coupled with corruption, makes it difficult for the emergence of import-substitution industries. Populist manual price containment measures are often used by the government and akimats instead of identifying real problems. For example, issues such as the existence of intermediaries who do not add value but have connections and control over the market may have more of an impact on pricing than simply increasing aggregate demand.
Figure 2. Reforms by the aspect of redistribution of resources
In general, the reforms now announced by the president and the (slightly) renewed government stem from the accumulated problems. The main question is how they will be implemented. The issue is fair redistribution, not only in terms of increasing social benefits, but also in transparent privatization, which will enable more people to have shares in assets. The de-monopolization of markets and the creation of conditions for small and medium-sized businesses should also be one of the first priorities. The main point is not to step on the previous trap of cumbersome government business support programs and concentrate more on reducing administrative barriers, transparency in decision-making and predictability in the implementation of policies.
Figure 3 shows events or decisions that will positively or negatively affect the political-administrative reform aspect. Restrictions on freedom of speech undermine people’s confidence in journalism in general, as those sources that convey truthful information to the population that are inconvenient for the political regime are primarily persecuted. Censorship opens the way to unverified information and rumors and gives rise to complete distrust and ignorance of official sources. Restrictions on freedom of assembly and violent suppression of rallies lead to the accumulation of protest potential. If we talk about the demands of the protesters, then one of the main is the election of akims of regions and cities of republican significance. Electiveness of rural akims with a meager budget, who are accountable to appointed top-level akims, will not have a significant impact on this situation.
Figure 3. Aspect of political and administrative reforms
The sounded slogans “Shal ket” must be interpreted not only in relation to a specific person, but as a speech against the super-presidential system, which gives rise to a cult of personality. Strengthening the role of parliament and holding fair elections is already an imperative to avoid deja vu in a few (dozens) years. Also, one of the priorities should be a radical reform of law enforcement agencies, with the renewal of the composition and changes in the talent development framework (system). Without these reforms, it will be impossible to reduce protest moods and ensure confidence in the authorities.
Conclusion
It is very difficult to predict the future of a country and trying to do so using strategic planning tools has its drawbacks. Not everything is considered, not all aspects are covered. But there is a history of many countries, political regimes and other facts that suggest with a very high probability that if people in power are accountable to the people and there are opportunities for the free development of business, then the country will have sustainable development. The scenario matrix presented in this article is more of a strategy for achieving results than just guessing the future. This is a decisive moment in the history of modern Kazakhstan and many things depend on the actions that will be taken in the coming months.
[1] https://www.kt.kz/rus/reviews/kak_gromili_almaty_rekonstruktsiya_boyni_v_gorode_ot_1377927627.html
[2] https://www.akorda.kz/ru/obrashchenie-glavy-gosudarstva-kasym-zhomarta-tokaeva-k-narodu-kazahstana-503036
[3] https://www.akorda.kz/ru/obrashchenie-glavy-gosudarstva-kasym-zhomarta-tokaeva-k-narodu-kazahstana-70412
[4] https://www.akorda.kz/ru/kasym-zhomart-tokaev-provel-zasedanie-soveta-bezopasnosti-605452
[5] Wulf, T., Brands, C., & Meissner, P. (2011). A scenario-based approach to strategic planning. Tool Description – Scenario Matrix, Leipzig.
[6] https://informburo.kz/novosti/prezident-porucil-vyyavit-skolko-grazdan-realno-nuzdaetsya-v-trudoustroistve-v-kazaxstane