“The Georgian experience could be an even bigger lesson for Akorda, as social mobilization in Kazakhstan has grown significantly amid the ongoing economic crisis. Georgia’s experience can serve as a good example for institutional reforms in Kazakhstan’s security sector, more fundamental police reforms, and foreign policy diversification”, – says Kamila Smagulova (Kazakhstan), participant of the CABAR.asia School of Analysts 2021.
Diplomatic relations
The diplomatic relations between Georgia and Kazakhstan were established on the 23rd of July, 1992, after both countries became independent in 1991. The current Kazakh Ambassador to Georgia is Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov since 2018, yet there has been no appointed Ambassador from Georgia to Kazakhstan by then.
One of the most important pillars of diplomatic relations between two states is Kazakhstan’s position of non-recognition on one fifth of Georgian territories in South Ossetia and Abkhazia occupied by Russia since 2008.
Despite the pandemic and current crisis in the region, the officials of the two countries have organized state meetings over the last two years to strengthen and enhance mutual cooperation. Namely, on June 21st Georgian Prime minister Irakli Garibashvili met President Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev at Qatar International Economic Forum in Doha. Transport and logistic opportunities of future cooperation were discussed during this meeting. Tokayev has highlighted Aktau and Kuryk ports in Kazakhstan, alongside the potential of Batumi port.
Later the Georgian PM visited Kazakhstan and met Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov. As a result, officials signed the 2023-2026 Roadmap on expanding mutual trade turnover; Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Digital Development, Innovation and Aerospace Industry of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia and Memorandum of Cooperation between “Georgian Railway JSC” and “NC Kazakhstan Railway JSC ”.
State and society: comparison and contrast
The two countries certainly differ in terms of political systems, as there is now a presidential form of governance in Kazakhstan and a parliamentary system in Georgia. When juxtaposing Kazakh and Georgian society, polarization might be a core similarity. This notion encapsulates political, social, religious and cultural matters. For Kazakhstan, polarization is a relatively recent phenomenon being discussed, whilst Georgia has used this frequently since Saakashvili presidency.
Polarization in the case of Georgia is majorly related to political choices and loyalty. Citizens are open in declaring themselves either pro-government or opposition. It is more common for them to either prefer voting for the ruling Georgian Dream party or United Movement opposition party. For Kazakhstan, with the major ruling party that was rebranded from Nur Otan to Amanat on March 1, polarization based on political party-loyalty or voting patterns is not relevant.
Polarization among Georgian citizens also involves being modern (Westernized) versus preserving traditional (Christian) values. In the case of Kazakhstan, there is also a clash between modern and traditional beliefs. Yet, more common cultural or value-based polarization is mainly based on first language people use, dividing the public to Kazakh-speaking and Russian-speaking, which also pre-determines their political and social values. Such a tendency, nonetheless, is less common for Georgia, where the majority of the population speaks the state language, except ethnic minorities in such regions like Samtskhe Javakheti.
In terms of regional identity and linkage, it is worth noting that these days Georgia tends to to shift from being related to the “South Caucasian” bloc, towards European or “Black Sea” description. At the same time, for Kazakhstan intra-regional “Central Asian” identity is yet to be explored.
When it comes to more commonalities, both societies are likely to experience polarization after the Russian invasion of Ukraine or January unrest, especially Kazakhstan. Apart from this, both countries have downturns in their democracy indicators. According to Freedom House data for 2022, Georgia is considered a partially free country, with a 58/100 score, yet this indicator declined over a year from 60/100. In comparison to this, Kazakhstan scored only 23 out of 100 within this year.
Independent judiciary is still an issue for both countries, even in Georgia with relatively higher freedom and democracy rates with current cleavages between ruling party and civil society. This is also used as an explanation of what has deprived Georgia of EU candidate status this summer. An important note here is that their Freedom House indices might be criticized in terms of accuracy and reliability, so should not be seen as one absolute measure, but given in this case as an example of potential indicators.
Despite differences in democracy values and the rate of civic participation, both states equally suffer from rentier capitalism and ideological gaps between state and society.
Economic partnership: status quo and future prospects, challenges for cooperation
The economic relations between Kazakhstan and Georgia started in 2006, when Kazakhstan began actively investing into the Georgian economy. Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed support towards Saakashvili’s reforms on the eve of his presidency in 2000s.
Later on in 2021 on March 26th based on the joint initiative of Kazakh Embassy in Georgia Kazakh-Georgian Economic Union, legal entity, was created to promote relations between two states, increase trade and investment flow. In this context, existing free trade agreements that Georgia shares with China and European countries might be an essential trade corridor for Kazakhstan in the future for diversifying its export routes. Considering there is a free trade agreement between two states, there might be a huge potential for Kazakhstan in the future to transport its goods via Georgia, as the country with huge logistic potential.
Former ambassador of Georgia to Kazakhstan and Chairman of Kazakh-Georgian Economic Union Giorgi Jakhutashvili highlighted that despite years long economic and strategic partnership and cultural exchange, there are still numerous opportunities for cooperation in investments and trade in particular. Despite constraints of COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020 there have been partnership points established. Namely, companies such as Halyk Bank Georgia, Batumi Oil Terminal, Rompetrol Georgia, Air Astana office in Georgia, Wagon GK, Parmigiano Group and Georgian Partners operate on Georgian and Kazakh markets for enhancing investment, trade and cultural connections between two states.
Within the growing economic and trade cooperation, Fly Arystan air travel company (subsidiary of Air Astana) has launched direct flights to Kutaisi from Nur-Sultan, Aktau and Atyrau on May 2, 2021. Prior to this Air Astana had three direct flights from Almaty to Tbilisi. Kazakh citizens therefore got an opportunity to travel directly to the Black sea, so the rate of tourism from Kazakhstan to Georgia has significantly increased.
Over the last year Kazakhstan was one of the leading investors among other Central Asian states to Georgia. In 2018 it increased to almost 40 million US dollars, but after a downturn during the pandemic it shrunk by 2021.According to Prime Minister Smailov, mutual efforts and cooperation has led to an overall increase of trade turnover within the last year. The share of Kazakh exports to Georgia reached its peak over the last years in 2020, whilst by 2022 the share of Georgian imports to Kazakhstan has doubled.
There are some existing external barriers for limitless/borderless or direct bilateral economic cooperation between two states. Namely, on March 14, Russia banned exports of wheat, meslin, rye, barley, and maize to the countries within the Eurasian Economic Union except for Belarus. The ban was to remain in force until June 30. However, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were later allowed to import Russian grain with the permission of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture. Due to Russia's moves, Kazakhstan was also forced to impose interim quotas on wheat and bread flour exports.
Trans Caspian International Transport Route and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
In the current realm there is a growing necessity for the development of the Middle Corridor for cargo and resources transportation between two states. Trans Caspian International transport route, might be a significant part of Kazakhi-Georgian cooperation for the next decades. This opportunity to strengthen economic relations in fact go beyond bilateral agreement between two countries, but has a capacity to enhance collaboration between South Caucasus with its logistic potential and resource-rich Central Asia, involving other regional actors such as Turkey, Azerbaijan and China.
Kazakhstan has earlier planned to transport 3 million tonnes of oil through the Georgian corridor in 2022. Today “Georgian Railway JSC'', “NC Kazakhstan Railway JSC '' and “NC Aktau Sea Commercial'' are regular members of this TITR Association since 2013. At the same time, infrastructural constraints still remain, which was stated at the meeting of Kazakh and Georgian Prime ministers. Thus, Prime Minister Smailov has proposed a 2022-2025 Roadmap for solving these issues and further development.
In addition to this, Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC), operating for two decades with constant external and internal limitations, is currently described as the potential alternative way towards the West bypassing Russia for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia. Earlier in 2008 BTC was evaluated as an opportunity for “geopolitical re-orientation”.
Since Russia has put restrictions on Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) which accounts for up to the vast majority of Kazakh oil exports, BTC is projected as one of the most reliable ways for diversifying oil exports for Kazakhstan. However, political acceptability remains a big question here. Namely, up to 1,8 thousand kilometers long BTC is more costly for high oil transports in comparison to CPC.
The notion of “South Caucasus as the corridor to Europe for Central Asian states” is, however, not only relevant in the current geopolitical situation. It has already been described so back in 2008 during the Russian invasion of Georgia, since Black Sea was one of those geographic factors that has always made Georgia attractive for bigger political actors. One of the major differences between 2008 and 2022 is that earlier transport and resource routes from East to West faced risks due to security issues in the South Caucasus, whilst currently Russian invasion to Ukraine has created much wider constraints.
Institutional reforms and lesson-learning
There is a potential experience transfer and room for cooperation, such as promoting human rights and democracy. Despite similar administrative and economic challenges Kazakh and Georgian think tanks or activists as a whole face, civic society in Georgia remains resilient and might still somehow influence political decisions. It necessitates Central Asian states like Kazakhstan to actively engage in transferring relevant practices.
Even if there is a considerable difference between the level of democracy in both states, this can mostly be examined as the question of political will, that makes Georgia an outlier of all former Soviet states to make a breakthrough and reforming one of the most essential institutions in a short amount of time and in a long term way.
Across the former soviet bloc (if it is now correct to call it so, at least in case of Georgia), Georgian police reforms alongside Baltic states remain the most successful cases, whilst Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states still remain in a contrasting position. For Georgia police reforms were one of the building blocks for curbing corruption on the eve of Saakashvili’s presidency. Such a set of reforms might seem attractive and to-be-achieved by many Central Asian states, yet the question of political acceptability remains.
In the case of Kazakhstan, like in most Central Asian states, there is still a way to go, considering low public trust towards police officers and rumors about high rate of corruption. Furthermore, January-2022 unrest has shown that the existing distrust towards government and even police has significantly increased. Within the framework of President Tokay constitutional reforms and rhetoric of Jana Kazakhstan (“New Kazakhstan”), institutional reforms in the security sector and more fundamental police reforms would be an asset.
Considering the 2003 Rose Revolution or 2008 war, the Georgian case might be an even bigger lesson to learn for Kazakhstan, as social mobilization has significantly grown after the 2010s (2011 Zhanaozen events, 2019 Presidential Transfer, 2022 January unrest). The major arguments might necessarily fall into the difference between existing political regimes. At the same time, considering different foreign policy trajectories and historical background of how soon Georgia was ready to de-sovietize, it might be challenging to do a linear comparison between two states. In this sense, Georgian experience in promoting human rights, democratic values and transparency can be an essential case for Kazakhstan government and civil society at equal extent.
Alternative ways of cooperation
There are different cases when Kazakh NGOs or CSOs have studied Georgian experience. For instance, Kazakh Human Rights organization “Erkindik Qanaty” (or Wings of Liberty) has recently organized a trip to Tbilisi. They visited Transparency Georgia, ISFED, Rights Georgia, Human Rights House Tbilisi and many other organizations specialized in observing elections, human rights advocacy and promotion. Eurasia Foundation (Social Innovations in Central Asia Program) also have had study trips for experience exchange to Georgia. On June 24-26th SICA organized “Think Tank Leadership Workshop '' Eurasia Foundation (supported by USAID and Hertie School) in Almaty. What is important is that one of the honored guests was Advisor to Georgian PM Natalie Jaliashvili.
Not only do Georgian and Kazakh CSOs cooperate in the NGO sector, but also on an academic level they do belong to similar research networks. For instance, the PONARS research network involves scholars all over the world or Caspiana, the new digital platform for sharing research information between scholars of South Caucasus and Central Asia.
There are some other examples of Georgian think tanks which can be used as lesson-learning for Kazakhstan and might contribute to future cooperation. The case of Georgian Reforms Associates (GRASS) might serve as a case of tackling Russian disinformation and propaganda. Even though the major language of such analytical centers has been English for a whole, GRASS has recently started publishing its memos and briefs in Russian to raise awareness among predominantly Russian speaking audiences.
Another example where using language as a tool to tackle propaganda, disinformation and raise awareness on NGO level is the Economic Policy Research Center, which has gained exclusive right from publishers to translate different science fiction (non-fiction) to state language. For Kazakhstan this might be the great case of focusing on translating popular science fiction into a state language.
Conclusion
Growing geopolitical tensions and the need to diversify trade partners and routes should push the two countries towards even greater cooperation. The intensification of bilateral meetings at the level of political elites, business communities and the institutionalization of economic cooperation in the form of the Kazakh-Georgian economic union and the roadmap of cooperation contribute to the growth dynamics of trade, investment and even tourist flows between the countries. Nevertheless cooperation between Georgia and Kazakhstan may not be completely bilateral due to global and regional constraints.
Today, bilateral cooperation must be extended beyond the shared historical past of former decades under Soviet rule. This should be based on existing trade, economic and even cultural bilateral partnership and agreements. Therefore, further analysis must be directed on patterns beyond the shared “post-soviet” past, which is now assessed more critically than ever before after multiple statements from Russian officials questioning the territorial integrity and sovereignty of both countries.
Both Georgia and Kazakhstan are in an ambiguous position where government agenda and civil society agenda may not coincide. At the same time, the latter appears more realistic and outcome oriented in terms of strengthening bilateral cooperation. The Georgian experience could be an even bigger lesson for Akorda, as social mobilization in Kazakhstan has grown significantly amid the ongoing economic crisis. Georgia's experience can serve as a good example for institutional reforms in Kazakhstan's security sector, more fundamental police reforms, and foreign policy diversification.