In December 2021, Central Asia was the focus of foreign press about India’s revised approach to the region, Iran’s increasing role, the threat to GBAO’s autonomy status, Uzbekistan-South Korea cooperation, and the forecast for 2022.
A strategic bulwark: On third India-Central Asia Dialogue
India’s The Hindu newspaper reports that India must redouble its efforts toward Central Asia in order to counter rivalry in the “Great Game.
The third India-Central Asia Dialogue convened by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on Sunday is one in a series of timely connections to the region by New Delhi this year, spurred in some measure by events in Afghanistan.
The dialogue has been held a month before leaders of all five Central Asian Republics (CARs) come to New Delhi as chief guests for the Republic Day celebrations, and a month after National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s “Regional Security Dialogue” with his CAR counterparts to discuss Afghanistan.
Among the issues discussed on Sunday were extending “immediate” humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, increasing trade, and improving connectivity. It is significant that the CAR Foreign Ministers chose to come to New Delhi, an indicator that India’s outreach to Central Asia, a region neglected by South Block for several decades, is being reciprocated. The joint statement, that they share a “broad regional consensus” on Afghanistan, is apt, given that, like India, all the Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan worry about the threat of terrorism, radicalisation, narcotics, and refugees. However, unlike India, most of the CARs maintain bilateral talks with the Taliban regime; Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have reopened missions there.
Trade between India and Central Asia has long languished below $2 billion, with all sides keen to grow this. In addition, India’s $1 billion Line of Credit for projects in Central Asia, and connectivity initiatives such as Chabahar port, the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline were all part of the dialogue.
While the strengthening of India-Central Asia ties and a revival of their traditional, historical and cultural links are much needed, it is also important to recognise the geopolitical cross-currents that complicate such efforts. While Russia continues to wield influence in the CAR governments, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and $100 billion trade (by some estimates) have made it a central figure in the region. The U.S. has also been seeking a foothold in the region, especially after Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India’s land connectivity to Central Asia is hampered by Pakistan which is building strong links and transit trade agreements with each of the CARs. The alternative route, via Iran’s Chabahar, has received a setback after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, and the development of the Indian-managed Shahid Beheshti terminal there continues to suffer due to the threat of American sanctions. While India has strengthened ties with other parts of Asia, it must now redouble its efforts towards Central Asia if it is to counter the ‘Great Game’ rivalries playing out in the region, and reclaim its shared history with countries that are an important market, a source for energy, and also a bulwark against the threats of extremism and radicalisation.
The Arab News: Arab world should respond to Iran’s Central Asia outreach
Saudi Arabia’s The Arab News notes that Central Asian countries have changed from being wary of Iran to being friendly. Tehran’s relative success can be attributed to its shrewd diplomacy, its rivals’ apathy and regional geopolitical factors.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Iran faced a quagmire in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Approximately 110 million Muslims, predominantly Sunni, were no longer under the clutches of the Kremlin. The ethnically diverse peoples posed many challenges for Tehran, while also offering opportunities. The leaders of the newly independent countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus were concerned about Iran’s ambitious sectarian interventions in neighboring countries.
Iran’s use of the Persian language, besides other cultural and commercial tools, proved successful, increasing the projection of its soft power in Central Asia. Tehran’s mercenaries did not embark on converting the region’s peoples to Shiism for fear of annoying Russia. Not only did they depend on Russia, but they were also aware of Moscow’s intolerance toward any form of radicalism, whether Sunni or Shiite. They also feared anti-Iranian actors from the Middle East entering the region on the pretext of protecting Sunni Islam from revolutionary Shiite Iran. Even Uzbekistan’s tiny Shiite minority of Iranian descent was left alone. On the other hand, despite its predominantly Shiite population, Azerbaijan, which is located in the South Caucasus region, was gently approached in the garb of religious tourism. Baku’s secular leadership always remained watchful of Tehran’s aspirations.
Despite its common Persian history and culture with Iran, Tajikistan has long viewed Tehran as a player on both sides of its civil war. Iran was even alleged to have instigated a failed coup in 2015. Suspicions about Iran’s ambitions are etched in the Tajik establishment’s mindset. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan and Iran have a dispute over Turkmen natural gas exports.
To bypass its differences with nearly all Central Asian countries, Iran chose to appease Russia and China, two global powerhouses and regional juggernauts. Not only did this spare the countries from Iran’s project of sectarian expansion and domestic interference, but it also allowed Tehran to join every regional forum, such as the Economic Cooperation Organization and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These forums provided Iran with vast opportunities to interact with the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan simultaneously.
Since America’s exit from Afghanistan in August, Iran’s interactions with the countries of Central Asia have become much more beneficial. While Pakistan is a vocal backer of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, its other neighbors, including Iran, have suspicions. The overlapping interests in Afghanistan amid the threat of a resurgence of violent extremism provide Tehran with a unique opportunity to not only pressurize Kabul, but also to sound politically correct to the rest of the world.
Uzbekistan is keen on a rail link with Afghanistan, which will eventually connect it to the Arabian Sea through Iran via its Chabahar Port, which is operated by India. While Iran’s port is hardly beneficial for Afghanistan as of now, the Uzbek railway link project is also in its infancy. Nonetheless, Iran will continue to portray itself as the shortest route for the influential and relatively populous Uzbekistan to reach the Arabian Sea.
Azerbaijan has become more worrisome for Iran since the liberation of its territories, including large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, from Armenia last year. Tehran is faced with the threat of ethno-nationalistic separatist tendencies among its own Azeri Turkic population.
On the sidelines of the 15th ECO summit last month, Iran signed a gas swap deal with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Ashgabat will export 1.5 to 2 billion cubic meters of gas to Iran annually for re-export to Baku through the Iran Transmission Line Network. Despite Iran’s fraught gas relations with Turkmenistan since December 2016, it is trying to portray itself as the region’s energy hub. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, both Caspian Sea rim states, do not need a third country for energy connectivity. Iranian-Azeri relations are beset with serious irritants that need resolving before the two can accept energy dependency. For instance, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Tehran continued to supply Yerevan with petroleum.
After America’s exit from Afghanistan, Iran finds its policies and interests converging with the militarily assertive Russia and economically emphatic China in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moscow and Beijing may not agree with Tehran’s premises, but pragmatism prevails in their rapprochement. However, Tehran’s interests do not converge with Islamabad’s on Kabul, or with Ankara’s on Baku and Yerevan. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan will compromise on Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, as these countries are vital for stability in Central Asia and the Caucasus, respectively.
To conclude, Iran’s policies toward Central Asia can be largely deemed successful, but they fall short of delivering it the grand economic, political and strategic anchor it desperately seeks. It is about time that the Arab states sought deeper linkages with the Central Asian and Caucasus nations bilaterally, as well as through a series of multilateral forums.
Who is hindered by the status of GBAO autonomy, and can the Tajik authorities eliminate it?
Pamir Daily News writes about attempts to dissolve the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan. Statement by Davlatzod Hakim, regional deputy from the Darvaz district of GBAO, at the session of the local parliament on December 24, 2021 about the possibility of separation of this administrative unit from the region has once again exposed the threat to the autonomous status of the Tajik Badakhshan and caused a huge resonance among the population of GBAO.
The text, which he literally read off the paper, came amid a deteriorating situation in the region that began after the killing of a local resident, Gulbiddin Ziyobekov, during a State National Security Committee’s special operation in the Roshtqala District on November 25.
The killing led to spontaneous demonstrations by Pamiris in Khorog and outside Tajikistan November 25-28. Protesters demanded punishment for Ziyobekov’s killers and the resignation of the oblast’s leader and regional security agencies. However, one month after the start of the rally, none of their demands has been met. Moreover, without any explanation or legal basis, Internet access in GBAO is still disconnected.
Against this background, Davlatzoda Hakim stated, without giving any specific facts, that the residents of Darvaz and Vanj districts do not feel safe in Khorog. And in case the instability continues, they see the future of their district as part of another province.
Obviously, it’s impossible to make such a political statement in conditions of the authoritarian regime of Tajikistan without the support of special services. Moreover, the deputy’s statement came after Saimumin Yatimov, head of the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan, had threatened at a meeting with representatives of the protesters on December 14 that they would take the Vanja, Darvaz and Ishkashim districts out of the GBAO.
It is believed that with their actions the Tajik secret services either want to reduce “excessive” civil activity in Gorno-Badakhshan, or go ahead in order to finally liquidate the status of the autonomy.
It is impossible to implement such a solution within the framework of the existing legislation. The status of Gorno-Badakhshan is enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution of Tajikistan. Amendments to the Constitution can be made through a referendum, which is appointed by the president with the consent of at least two-thirds of the total number of deputies.
But it must be understood that for the population of GBAO, the existence of autonomy, even in its current formal form, represents a vital necessity. This is the only way to preserve their ethnic identity.
This is a red line that no one will allow official Dushanbe to cross. It seems that any encroachment on autonomy will have the most serious consequences for peace and stability in Tajikistan. Dushanbe is well aware of this, but probably wants to probe the ground once again.
The Diplomat: Mirziyoyev Meets Moon: South Korea, Uzbekistan Aim to Deepen Special Strategic Partnership
The online edition of The Diplomat wrote that a possible free trade agreement and hopes for supplies of rare earth metals underscore the strengthening of relations between South Korea and Uzbekistan.
In welcoming Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev last week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in called him “brother.” Moon remarked that his first summit of 2021 took place virtually with Mirziyoyev and his final summit was during Mirziyoyev’s in-person visit from December 16-18.
The two leaders signed a joint statement on deepening the special strategic partnership, and a handful of agreements related to health care, development, and foreign affairs cooperation for the 2022-2024 period, as well as memorandums related to developing dialogue on energy, smart city and smart farm developments, ICT, electric vehicles, and diversification of rare earth supply chains.
This was Mirziyoyev’s second state visit to South Korea, the first having taken place in November 2017. Moon made the trip to Uzbekistan in April 2019 when the two countries elevated their ties from a strategic partnership to a special strategic partnership. A number of other officials have made bilateral visits in the past five years, underscoring a relationship that may not make headlines but is nevertheless important for both partners. The two will mark 30 years of relations in late January 2022.
Uzbekistan and South Korea, per the joint statement, have made progress on a free trade agreement, with hopes to sign it in the coming year. South Korea also expressed support for Uzbekistan’s pursuit of World Trade Organization membership. Uzbekistan started negotiations to join the WTO in 1995, though the process stalled definitively after 2005. In 2020, Uzbekistan resumed its pursuit of WTO membership, though in tandem with its arguably more active flirting with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
2022 look ahead: Central Asia will cement its turn against the West
The Japanese business daily Nikkei Asia notes that while 2021 may seem like a momentous year, the truth is that we have yet to see the full effect of the Taliban’s seizure of power in Kabul. This will only emerge as potential opposition forces organize themselves, the regional geopolitics fall into place and the unfolding economic catastrophe starts to bite.
At a wider level, the impact of the American withdrawal from the region will also be felt as the region is pushed closer toward Russia, Iran and China as those three powers continue to square off in an anti-Western geopolitical alignment.
But the problems inside Afghanistan will pale in comparison with the larger geostrategic shifts taking place in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal.
While many in Washington were at pains to deny it, there was little hiding the fact that the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was more about enabling the U.S. to focus more attention on the Indo-Pacific. It seems clear that policymakers in Washington have decided to leave the morass of middle Eurasia to others.
This does not mean that the West has completely withdrawn from the region. The U.S. and Europe will continue to be major investors and providers of aid and other forms of support across the region. But it does mean that Central Asia will receive less attention from Washington and Brussels.
Expect China and Russia to step in and take active advantage to affirm their increasing control of the Eurasian heartland.
Bordered by China, Russia, Iran, all of which suffer varying degrees of Western sanctions, Afghanistan and Central Asia will be almost entirely surrounded by countries whose relations with Washington are hostile.
That will likely result in a very hard-nosed form of geopolitics dominating regional discourse. Relationships will be entirely transactional and based around ensuring stability at whatever cost.
At the same time, we are likely to see a fairly cynical approach as to how this is achieved, with China and Russia increasingly refusing to go against each other. Unlike in the past, the confrontation with the West has escalated to the point that Moscow and Beijing see a greater strategic utility in keeping differences — Russia’s 2008 intervention in Georgia, for example — out of public view.
The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet early next year, the first such in-person summit for President Xi in almost two years, is a reflection of how close the relationship has become.
At an economic level too, the continued economic tightening resulting from COVID-19 is likely to strengthen Beijing’s hand in Central Asia, where many regional economies are already bound to China through investment and trade links.
The current COVID-related stasis favors Chinese trade, which is increasingly delivered through online platforms that are becoming ubiquitous across the Eurasian space and can be delivered along rail and road routes that extend outward from China.
In contrast, shipping goods into China is becoming ever harder, though raw materials seem able to continue to flow without too much difficulty.
The net result is an increasingly one-way Belt and Road Initiative, which will only serve to strengthen China’s economic ties across the region and make countries more dependent on Beijing in ways that will ultimately not help their own economies to diversify.
This is likely to be the story of 2022 for Afghanistan and Central Asia: a potentially unstable Afghanistan alongside a strengthening of Beijing and Moscow’s hands across the region. That is when the gradual freezing of the West from the Eurasian heartland will really start to harden.