President Biden’s administration is trying to use the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in Central Asia to its advantage, said Parviz Mullodzhanov, Ph.D., a political scientist, orientalist and independent researcher from Tajikistan. An important US motive is the desire to block the flow of sanctioned goods to Russia through Central Asia, Parviz Mullodzhanov said commenting on the outcome of the first C5+1 summit.
CABAR.asia: How significant was the first summit of Central Asian and U.S. leaders in Washington for the region? How can we assess the agreement of the region’s presidents to meet, given the heightened tensions between Moscow and Washington? Is it an important sign? Or should we not attach much importance to this event?
This meeting is important because it represents one of the major trends that has recently gained relevance – the direction toward closer relations with the West and the preservation of opportunities to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy.
Now, the geopolitical balance in the region has been upset – mainly because Russia is essentially up to its neck in the war in Ukraine. Most of its resources and attention are increasingly directed toward an ever-increasing confrontation with the West; as a result, the geopolitical balance that existed in the Central Asian region not so long ago, when several relatively equidistant players competed in the region, is being upset.
Now, China is gradually becoming the main external player in the region, de facto pushing Russia into a secondary role; in addition, other regional and global players are trying to fill the emerging geopolitical vacuum, thus creating an atmosphere of uncertainty for the Central Asian countries. For the latter, this new turn is actually disadvantageous; the countries of the region would prefer to maintain the previous status quo, when they could more or less successfully pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, maneuvering between Russia, China and the West. Therefore, Central Asian countries are now seeking to rebalance the geopolitical situation in the region and maintain good relations with all major external players and partners.
In this sense, the summit in New York is another step in this direction for them. By strengthening relations with the West and the United States, the countries of the region thus avoid the danger of becoming overly dependent on one geopolitical partner, in this case China.
At the same time, on the whole, it was a rather ordinary meeting; contrary to some heightened expectations and overly optimistic forecasts voiced shortly before the summit, nothing breakthrough happened there.
But despite this, a meeting without Russian representatives with the American president is not an important sign?
In fact, such 1 + 5 summits (Central Asia plus the EU, or China, or Saudi Arabia) are now happening quite regularly. This also indicates that Russia is no longer playing the role it used to play. In other words, first, it is less relied upon as a key guarantor of economic and political stability in the region. Secondly, in the new conditions, the countries of the region look less to Moscow in their relations with other partners.
By initiating this meeting of Central Asian presidents, President Biden is trying to weaken Russia’s influence in the region or at least maintain the current status quo. To what extent will he succeed?
In fact, the weakening of Russia’s position in the region is not so much the merit of Biden or anyone else, but of the Russian leadership itself. Moscow’s influence in the post-Soviet space has been sharply reduced because Russia has engaged in a long-term war of attrition in Ukraine and open confrontation with the West. As a result, its financial and military resources are no longer
Thus, we can assume that Biden is more afraid of the growing influence of China or Iran, Turkey, for example?
For the U.S., the former status quo, when Moscow could no longer and Beijing could not yet unambiguously dominate the region, would be most beneficial. The region of post-Soviet Central Asia itself is not so important to Washington; the U.S. and the West traditionally view it through the prism of their relations with Russia and China.
From this point of view, one of the reasons for the summit in New York is the Americans’ desire to cut off the flow of sanctioned goods to Russia, a significant part of which, in their opinion, passes through Central Asia. Thus, according to the results of 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Uzbekistan increased by 23% and reached almost $10 billion. Last year, Russia and Kyrgyzstan traded $3.4 billion for the first time in the history of bilateral relations. The US and the EU believe that a significant part of this sharply increased trade turnover between Central Asia and Russia is accounted for by dual-use goods that help the Russians to continue the war in Ukraine.
Therefore, the U.S. is now trying to engage in dialog with countries in the region to convince them not to help Moscow circumvent international sanctions. Apparently, under pressure from the international community, the countries of the region will further introduce stricter controls and restrictions on the possible traffic of sanctioned goods through their territory. However, it is unlikely that they will be able to completely block this flow, because, first, they do not want to finally spoil relations with Moscow, and second, as a rule, trade in dual-use goods under sanctions brings significant profits to its participants. As international experience shows, because of this, most countries under international sanctions more or less successfully circumvented them. There were always large or small companies that agreed to help rogue countries circumvent sanctions in exchange for additional economic benefits and revenues.
Then what does President Biden have to offer the region? Especially since he faces a very difficult election in the near future and his possible successor may radically revise foreign policy in terms of more isolationism.
Economic cooperation projects have been proposed. At the same time, neither Democrats nor Republicans plan to invest directly in Central Asia. However, it should be taken into account that in addition to direct investments and grants, there are also significant funds that are channeled to the region through international financial organizations and foundations in which the U.S. is one of the main sponsors. These funds support many education, technical development and health programs in Central Asia.
This means that the development of such important sectors of the economy and society as education, health care, agriculture, and ecology depends to a large extent on good relations with the international community and donor countries such as the United States.
Moreover, the level of relations with developed countries largely determines the international rating of the countries in the region. Cooperation with donor countries ultimately reduces the level of criticism from international organizations, primarily in the area of human rights and media freedom. In particular, donor countries can provide aid without imposing strict conditions on the democratization of society. In other words, the old rhetoric about the need to develop democracy will remain, but its intensity will be reduced, and sanctions for violations of international obligations will be imposed only in extreme cases.
The West is ready to make some concessions to the countries through which the Russians are now trying to organize the supply of sanctioned goods to Russia. The main goal is to find channels to circumvent sanctions and cut off the flow of dual-use goods to Russia. Therefore, the U.S. and its allies are now holding such meetings and consultations not only with Central Asian countries, but also with other states, such as Turkey, the republics of Transcaucasia and so on.
Could the rapprochement between the Central Asian authorities and the United States lead to at least a minimal liberalization and easing of the pressure on civil society that has been observed in the region in recent years?
I don’t think it will have any impact. Maybe there will be some formal gestures, but in general the real situation will probably not change. This can be seen in other countries with which the U.S. has much closer partnerships, such as Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries. The close cooperation between the West and these states has no effect on the level of democratization in them.
In other words, close cooperation or proximity to the U.S. does not necessarily mean that a country or region will move in the direction of democratization.
Of course, external factors also influence the course of events, and sometimes in a significant way. However, it is internal factors that play a crucial role in determining what changes will occur in a country or region.
For many years it was Moscow that was the guarantor of security for the region, first of all, from a possible threat from the south. Especially since the level of combat capability of the region’s armies raises big questions. For this purpose, the three states of the region joined the CSTO, an organization created by Moscow. But we see that in Armenia, Russia’s CSTO ally, disappointment is growing. They believe that Russian peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh have failed to protect the region’s residents from Azerbaijani aggression and are dissatisfied with Putin’s mediation. The embassy in Yerevan has been blockaded, and Prime Minister Pashinyan has announced that Armenia will ratify the Rome Statute on joining the International Criminal Court, which demands Putin’s arrest. Do you think all these events are affecting the mood of the elites in CA? Do they not think that they need to look for new guarantors of security?
Recent events, starting with the second Karabakh war in 2020, have dealt a significant blow to Russia’s prestige as a key guarantor of security in the post-Soviet space. If before 2020 Russia maintained exactly this image in the eyes of the leaders and population of the post-Soviet countries, now there is no such confidence. The fact remains that a CSTO member country has suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of an external actor – that is, a state that is not a member of the bloc. And the main question in this regard is to what extent Moscow’s actions were in line with its allied commitments to Armenia, which was considered one of the most pro-Russian post-Soviet countries.
For many critics, the situation looks like Russia actually sacrificed Armenia for a number of reasons of geopolitical nature. For example, because in the current circumstances, preserving partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan turned out to be much more important for Moscow than honoring its allied commitments to Armenia. Most likely, the Russian leadership did not like the coming to power in 2018 of Pashinyan, who was considered a protégé of the collective West. It is quite possible that Moscow chose a wait-and-see attitude at the beginning of the second Karabakh war in the hope that military setbacks on the front would lead to the fall of the Armenian government headed by an unwanted prime minister.
Simply, no one expected that the defeat of the Armenian Armed Forces would be so swift and crushing; therefore, when Moscow finally decided to intervene, it was too late – the war had already been definitively lost by Armenia, burying at the same time Russia’s reputation as a reliable ally. Now the situation is further aggravated by the fact that on the wave of post-victory euphoria Baku has now started talking about cutting a corridor through the south of Armenia to its enclave Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and further to Turkey.
Thus, the fall of Karabakh and Armenia’s defeat is a severe blow to Russia’s influence and image; consequently, it has also affected the level of confidence in Russian security guarantees both in Armenia and other post-Soviet countries. It is not a matter of doubting the strength of Russian weapons or the effectiveness of its leverage; but, in light of recent events, there is no guarantee that Moscow will not once again sacrifice its allies for any “higher” geopolitical considerations, personal sympathies/antipathies or political preferences.
Consequently, against the backdrop of the Karabakh events, many of Russia’s allies, including those in Central Asia, are legitimately questioning the extent to which Russia will be faithful to its allied commitments rather than its interests in the face of new serious challenges.
Thus, the problems of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space do not lie in the intrigues of the “collective West,” as one often hears on propaganda channels. There are miscalculations in long-term planning and in assessing the situation – it appears that strategic analysis in Moscow is not very good or, more likely, its effectiveness is reduced due to the dominance of ideology or because they listen only to their analysts, who say what they want to hear at the top.
China, the other most important partner of the region’s ruling elites, has also worsened relations with the United States. What is China’s position on a possible rapprochement between Central Asia and Washington?
China is hardly positive about it. But Beijing’s reaction looks rather restrained. Then, the Chinese are well aware that, in principle, the 1- 5 format is of a consultative nature and is a rather routine event that will not really affect the state of relations between China and the region. As mentioned above, there have been many similar meetings in the region over the past year, China 5-plus-1, Russia 5-plus-1, Saudi Arabia 5-plus-1. Now the US is meeting.
Relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have once again escalated. Moscow once again urged to avoid escalation of the conflict. Could President Biden be a more effective mediator in resolving the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan?
It is unlikely that Dushanbe and Bishkek will choose the West as a mediator because it would clearly complicate their relations with Russia and China. It is another matter if the dialog takes place under the auspices of the UN or the Security Council, of which both the United States and Russia are members. This idea, in any case, looks more realistic. But, most likely, the negotiations will continue in a bilateral format.
Each country in the region has its own nuances in its relations with the US. What they have in common is a desire to maintain good relations with Russia, but not at the expense of worsening relations with the West. No one wants to be drawn into a destructive conflict with the international community following Moscow.
Existence in the international field is an important resource for all Central Asian countries, a guarantee of their status and legitimacy. A modern state must be a member of the international community and must respect international law in order to be considered fully legitimate.
No one wants that, and so no joint interests or long-standing partnership with Russia can force Central Asia to spoil its relations with the West. At the same time, no one will deliberately antagonize Moscow by bringing in the U.S. or the EU as a mediator to resolve local conflicts and disputes.