July 2022 was rich with political events in Central Asia: analytical materials included the topics of the countries’ balancing act between Russia and the West, security and human rights concerns, mass protests, and the IV Consultative meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia.
Kazakhstan: Trapped between Russia and the West
Nargis Kassenova, director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, discussed the growing challenges for Kazakhstan’s position as an open entrepreneurial nation, friendly with both Russia and the West, amid deepening geopolitical division in Eurasia. Her article for Politico assesses the recent events in Kazakhstan-Russia relations that highlight the clashes as Kazakhstan is trying to keep and strengthen its ties with the rest of the world, while not irritating Russia.
On July 4, President Tokayev reassured European Union leaders they could depend on his help in overcoming their current energy crisis. Just the next day, a court in Novorossiysk — Russia’s Black Sea port — ordered the month-long closure of an oil pipeline coming from Kazakhstan, which sends supplies to Europe. Ostensibly, the shutdown order was in response to violations of oil spill regulations. However, when Tokayev later instructed the government at an urgent Cabinet meeting to prioritize the development of the Trans-Caspian corridor, bypassing Russia for Kazakh oil, the court revised its decision, substituting the suspension with a fine instead. This reversal has now raised suspicions that the court’s actions, as well as earlier disruptions caused by damage to the loading facilities from a storm in March and the search for World War II mines in the port aquatoria in June, were politically motivated and part of a sanctions tit-for-tat between the West and Russia over the war in Ukraine.
The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum held in June also demonstrated the tension between the two countries. In his speech, Tokayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s position of favoring the principle of territorial integrity over the that of self-determination, as well as the non-recognition of the quasi-state territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. He noted that the preference for self-determination could lead to the emergence of hundreds new countries, resulting in chaos — which could be seen as a polite invitation for Russian elites to imagine the consequences of such a development for their multiethnic country. Moreover, Tokayev spoke of international cooperation and making Kazakhstan attractive for investment. He said the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) should adopt a more proactive and flexible trade policy toward Asian and Middle Eastern markets, and that Kazakhstan could play the role of a buffer market in this new setting. He also wishes to develop better linkages between the EEU and China’s Belt and Road Initiative too.
Dr. Kassenova states that Kazakhstan is now focused on containing the damage by recalibrating its foreign policy. For now, however, Kazakhstan is trying to benefit from the reorientation of trade routes, but in a way that Russia sees benefit too. It’s positioning itself as an open entrepreneurial merchant nation, a good neighbor and useful partner. For this balancing act to work, however, the country needs a buy-in from all key parties, which isn’t going to be easy — although, if goodwill is shown all round, it’s still not impossible.
Tokayev’s visit to Saudi Arabia
Caspian News wrote about Tokayev’s first official visit to Saudi Arabia on July 23, during which he sought to strengthen relations with the Kingdom and other Gulf countries. Thirteen cooperation documents have been signed during the visit in several sectors, including energy, trade, stock exchange, investment, media, culture, sport, and agriculture. The two countries’ top officials discussed plans to develop the petrochemical industry, nuclear energy, the production of green hydrogen, and other areas, including space exploration.
Tokayev described Saudi Arabia as “one of Kazakhstan’s leading strategic partners,” and said that his country was ready to offer special conditions and a wide range of preferences for Saudi investors in various promising areas of mutual interest. In his turn, Mohammed bin Salman expressed satisfaction with the level of relations between the two countries and noted the great potential for further strengthening and developing these ties. He expressed the interest of Saudi companies in investing in the Kazakh agriculture sector. According to the Saudi Crown Prince, this area is of particular significance amid the global food crisis.
President Tokayev also described the diversification and expansion of transit-transport and logistics opportunities to be the second important direction, including the Trans-Caspian corridor, connecting China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. He also expressed his country’s readiness “to become one of the stable, long-term suppliers of high-quality wheat, flour, and oilseeds” to Saudi Arabia.
Kyrgyzstan: 2 Years On, No Justice for Azimjon Askarov
An article by the Human Rights Watch argues that Kyrgyz authorities have yet to conclude an effective investigation into the death of the human rights defender Azimjon Askarov or provide redress for his decade of wrongful imprisonment. Askarov died on July 25, 2020, in what the country’s prison service said at the time was a Covid-19-related complication. He was convicted in an unfair trial on politically motivated charges following the June 2010 inter-ethnic conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan.
The article states that the unresolved deaths in custody of two men in June 2022 raise renewed concerns over allegations of mistreatment and neglect in detention in Kyrgyzstan. On June 10, 2022, a well-known political analyst, Marat Kazakpaev, charged with high treason in April 2021, died in detention in Bishkek in somewhat similar circumstances. On June 18, 2022, Bakyt Asanbaev, a bank official held in the security agency pretrial detention center in Bishkek on corruption charges since April 30, was found hanged in a jail cell. Following Asanbaev’s death, Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov established a commission to study the circumstances of these two deaths in security agency pretrial detention centers which has yet to issue any conclusive opinions on the two deaths.
The article concludes that the Kyrgyz authorities should comply with their international human rights obligations and promptly complete an effective, independent, and impartial investigation into Askarov’s death, granting compensation to his family and posthumously ensuring his legal rehabilitation.
Tajikistan Strengthens Cooperation with Partners to Address Security Challenges
Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) discusses internal and external security challenges faced currently by Tajikistan, as well as the measures the government is taking to strengthen its capability, including through bilateral cooperation with partner countries.
In recent months, Tajikistan has been dealing with protests and violence in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). The article states that apart from launching a security operation to control the region, the Tajikistan government is also trying to address the economic causes of the discontent. The Tajik government ministries have been asked to focus on creating more jobs and employment in the region. Investment in the region is being encouraged. A Chinese company is commissioning work on the GBAO’s road link to Xinjiang of China.
On the other hand, the country has been facing tense situation on the border with the Kyrgyz Republic as violent clashes there resulted in loss of life and property on both sides. The most recent clashes have reportedly occurred in early June 2022, after the two countries had agreed in April to pull back some forces from the frontier. Among the causes of contention are the access to water resources and use of roads, which crisscross each other’s territory in border regions.
Finally, the collapse of the Ghani government in Afghanistan in mid-August 2021 and the subsequent takeover of Kabul by the Taliban have brought new challenges for Tajikistan. Soon after the takeover of Kabul, President Emomali Rahmon said that Dushanbe wanted to see all ethnic groups of Afghanistan represented in the cabinet along with a ‘worthy role’ for Tajiks. He said Dushanbe would not recognise a government that is disregarding the interests of Afghans, including indigenous Tajiks and Uzbeks. As the Taliban are now consolidating their position and a growing number of countries are establishing contacts with them, it is to be seen how Tajikistan deals with the system in Kabul.
The article also overviews Tajikistan’s relation with strategic partners, such as Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan, and concludes that the exchange of visits between Tajikistan and Russia as well as Uzbekistan indicates that the countries are willing and cooperating to augment Tajikistan’s security capabilities. To further strengthen its capacity in facing Afghan challenge, it is likely that Dushanbe will reach out to its partners in South Asia.
Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan and terrorist threat in Tajikistan and Central Asia
Security threats in Tajikistan were also discussed in an article by SpecialEurasia, according to which Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan (the Movement of the Taliban of Tajikistan – TTT) was formed in northern Afghanistan to unite people from Tajikistan under the Taliban brand and overthrow the Government in Dushanbe. The leader is Mehdi Arsalan, aka Mohammad Sharipov, a native of the Nurabad region of Tajikistan who had previously moved to Afghanistan, where he fought in the ranks of the Afghan Taliban.
The establishment of the new organization highlights how the security situation in Central Asia linked with Afghanistan has deteriorated since the Taliban took power in Kabul in August 2021.
Terrorism has become a severe threat in Tajikistan. Indeed, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Tajikistan stated that the number of terrorists and extremists has increased over the past six months. Tajik security forces registered in the first half of the year 720 crimes related to extremism and terrorism. According to Rahmon, this is 106 illegal acts more than in the first six months of 2021. Among the threats to Tajik security, there is also the Islamic State Khurasan (ISKP) since the group started a jihadist propaganda campaign in the Tajik language to influence people in Tajikistan, especially the young generations dissatisfied with the Government, and to recruit foreign fighters to conduct local violent attacks.
As the author states, Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan, like other terrorist groups, might exploit local socio-economic problems fuelled by the latest demonstrations and protests such as in Kazakhstan, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, and the Republic of Karakalpakstan. Furthermore, Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan might support the Taliban’s fight against the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan led by Ahmad Massoud and discourage Tajik authorities from supporting him.
Turkmenistan Under Serdar: Has Anything Changed?
The Diplomat article on Turkmenistan argues that four months into Serdar Berdimuhamedov’s presidency much remains the same, although there have been changes too. In terms of political freedom and human rights, there has been no change under Serdar’s leadership. The security services are still the most powerful agency in the country, controlling and censoring anything critical of the regime. Moreover, Serdar did not bring in his own cabinet team and after his inauguration kept almost all senior-level government officials in place. Finally, Turkmen embassies around the world have not changed their policies of not processing passport renewals to Turkmen residing abroad.
As for what got worse during Serdar’s presidency, the article mentions women’s rights and internet access. At the beginning of April 2022, most beauty salons for women were ordered to close for various sanitary reasons. Moreover, women working in the public sector were told not to use false eyelashes, fake nails, lip fillers, or botox. Women working in the public sector were also told to dress “appropriately” in traditional Turkmen dresses and not wear jeans or short skirts. Meanwhile, the internet was completely shut down at the beginning of April, a period in which people could not even use unblocked websites due to low speeds.
The article talks about inflation dropping over the last couple of months since Serdar took over the country as positive attributes of Serdar’s presidency. Moreover, the article states that Serdar partially resumed international travel for Turkmen citizens leaving and entering the country.
Why the world should pay attention to unrest in Karakalpakstan
The author states that although the constitutional changes and the violent suppression of the protests have shown that the president’s reform agenda might be just a facade, the fact that he swiftly abandoned the constitutional reform proposals signaled that he may eventually return to his initial progressive trajectory. A key factor that will determine which path the Uzbek leader will take will be how the international community responds.
As such, Hess states that Mirziyoyev may not be a democrat, but he has – at least until very recently – proven to be someone the world, including the West, can do business with. His reaction to Karakalpakstan’s unrest will determine whether this came from conviction or convenience. To maintain at least some influence over a seemingly remote but crucially important country, and to ensure the wellbeing of the people of Uzbekistan, the West should do everything it can to help bring Mirziyoyev back on the path of reform and progress.
Uzbekistan Protests: Will China Be a Spectator?
An article published by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) analyzes China’s official position toward the Karakalpakstan protests that took place in early July as a response to the constitutional reform draft that would remove the autonomous region’s right to a referendum and possible sovereignty.
The article states that the official Chinese discourse on the protests in Uzbekistan has so far remained meagre, focused on the traditional topos that China uses to deal with the demonstrations that cyclically emerge in Central Asia – external interference and disinformation. The voices that have conveyed the Chinese position have also been somewhat limited. Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stands out as the only diplomat to briefly comment on the protests at the end of the traditional ministerial press conference on 4 July after being urged by media representatives. To the date of the article’s publication, July 12, official comments from the Chinese ambassador to Uzbekistan, Jiang Yan, have remained absent, as well as any notes on the protests on the Embassy’s website.
In the Chinese press and media, the authors observe that the central topos standing out in the available Chinese comments on the protests in Uzbekistan refers to China’s consolidated concept of external actors’ interference as being responsible for the protest outbreak. This element has also emerged from the Chinese narrative on the conflict in Ukraine. Only by examining the short article by Huanqiu, the use of the expression ‘malicious foreign forces’ remains a prominent artifice to link the protests to the presence of external actors. This narrative de facto disqualifies the idea of political instabilities arising from a problematic relationship between government and society.
Unsurprisingly, in the few sentences by Zhao, the conception that Mirziyoyev’s presidency is a requirement for maintaining national ‘tranquillity and unity’ stands out as a narrative to which the Chinese political elite expresses its support. The Chinese description of the protests hinges, in fact, on the issue raised by Mirziyoyev of social-media-conveyed foreign disinformation on the Constitutional amendment and the autonomy of Karakalpakstan. Therefore, China’s position is reduced to that of an external supporter of the work of Mirziyoyev’s government, and no active role for the country is considered. The protests remain interpreted as an ‘incident’ under the management of the national government. Neither China nor any other regional actors – be they states or multilateral organisations – are mentioned.
Finally, the authors also note that the journalists and the experts called to write and comment on the protests are all based in Russia. This decision may signal that, from the Chinese perspective, Moscow remains central when discussing Central Asian security.
Trouble brews in Central Asia
In his article for The Straits Times, Raffaello Pantucci provides a big overview of the tumultuous events of the past year in Central Asia. As the author notes, only Turkmenistan, which has just seen a power transition from a tried and tested leader to his young son, appears unaffected. There is no evidence of instability in the country at the moment, although it is impossible to know what is really going on because of the lack of information. Food prices are reportedly high, inflation has long been a problem, while the population is still struggling amid a Covid-19 crisis. Each other Central Asian country struggles with its own issues or recovers from recent unrest.
In terms of outside players, Pantucci states that the United States and Europe have made efforts to connect with the region, but distance, prioritisation and local governance issues have often meant that it has ended up being nothing more than a distracted partner. Instead, Central Asia has found itself stuck with regional superpowers which are locked in a geopolitical struggle with the West and tend to see the world in entirely transactional terms.
These regional powers are also not interested in trying to manage the problems in Central Asia. Moscow continues to take a paternalistic attitude towards the region, while China is an entirely disinterested regional hegemon – increasingly the most consequential economic and political partner – but only willing to just watch as problems play themselves out. Iran is preoccupied with too many domestic problems. The result is a Eurasian heartland in turmoil.
Central Asian Leaders Meet Amid Russia’s ‘Declining Role’ In Region
One of the main political events of July in Central Asia was the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of States of Central Asia held in the resort town of Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan. The presidents of the five Central Asian countries met to discuss political and economic cooperation after violent unrest in three countries in the region and a change in attitudes toward Russian influence in the former Soviet countries.
In this regard, RFE/RL Kazakh Service interviewed Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, the founding director of the Center for Governance and Markets at the University of Pittsburgh, about Russia’s future role in Central Asia.
Dr. Murtazashvili states we are seeing greater steps towards regional cooperation and that may include the creation of a body at the regional level that can facilitate that kind of cooperation without the reliance on external third parties, although using the term integration might be premature.
“I think, what the countries of Central Asia now are beginning to realize is that they have greater power when they work together, especially vis-a-vis Russia or China or the United States”, Dr. Murtazashvili pointed out. As such, she believes that it’s very important that this mechanism exists for conflict prevention, mediation, and providing a room for the leaders to discuss issues. Turkmenistan’s presence is also very important since it is the first time that the county is joining the agreement.
Dr. Murtazashvili also thinks that Russia’s influence is declining in the region. The first reason for that is a moral perspective and understanding that the Ukrainian scenario could just as easily apply to Central Asia and specifically Kazakhstan. Another issue is that Russia’s military performance has been very weak, and it can question Russia’s ability to protect and support Central Asia. In addition, there is Russia’s economic decline. Russia, being a very important economic actor in the region, has demonstrated vulnerability both during the pandemic and under the anti-war sanctions.
As such, it’s a really important time for the region right now, states Dr. Murtazashvili. “We’re seeing really creative foreign policy ideas emerge from the region. We’re looking at Central Asian states increasingly look south towards South Asia, for example, looking for new trade routes. We’re looking at India to some extent, but we’re looking at Iran and Turkey having renewed relations with Central Asia and really trying to push.”