“Green projects and environmental aspects of cooperation remain on the margins of the discourse about economic benefits for Kyrgyzstan and China,” political scientist Nargiza Muratalieva (Kyrgyzstan) notes in her article written specifically for the analytical portal CABAR.asia.
Global climate change has not spared Central Asia, where dry periods and even water conflicts are increasingly observed. In such conditions, attracting green investments is an opportunity to mitigate the growing environmental problems throughout the region. As the President of Kyrgyzstan noted during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, “Kyrgyzstan will try to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The Kyrgyz economy is gradually “greening”, more and more carbon-free energy sources will be put into operation, meaning, first of all, hydroelectric power plants.”
In addition to the EU, China in Central Asia has also announced greening its initiatives and green finance principles in recent years. Ahead of the 26th Climate Change Conference (COP) in Glasgow, China is likely to announce further steps on green projects that correlate with the Paris Agreement on climate change.
Neighboring countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are already actively building green cooperation with China, implementing projects in the field of renewable energy sources and green technologies. In this aspect, the question arises of what place does the green agenda occupy in relations between Kyrgyzstan and China? Is there a future for building green cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan?
The official greening discourses
As it is known, China stands out not only for its leading positions in the field of green energy, but also for its ambitious goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060. Beijing has previously given “green” promises: under the Paris Agreement – to control coal consumption, reduce industrial emissions and increase the production of renewable energy.[1] In addition, China is also actively using the Green Agenda in foreign policy: in 2017, Beijing issued a guide to promoting the Green Belt and Road, and a detailed plan of ecological cooperation under “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), which notes the goal of integrating the concept of ecological civilization and green development into the initiative by 2025 and creating a favorable model for sound cooperation in the field of environmental protection.
Green rhetoric was also present during the Belt and Road forums in 2017 and 2019, and in April 2019, the Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC) was created, which includes 120 organizations from 60 countries.
Greening BRI looks timely enough and is well perceived in Central Asia. This process may serve as Beijing’s response to the criticism it receives in recipient countries: frequent corruption scandals and accusations of using the “debt trap” diplomacy – all this more than once led people in some countries to anti-Chinese protests, including some cases in Kyrgyzstan. The official discourse in the implementation of certain projects in Kyrgyzstan with Chinese funds is accompanied by epithets about “win-win and mutually beneficial cooperation” on both sides. At the same time, if neighboring Nur-Sultan and Tashkent have already integrated into the possibilities of “green” financing of Beijing, it is rather difficult to find success stories in “green” projects with China in cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and China.
Hydropower and green energy
As it is known, investments from China still account for the bulk of the total volume of foreign direct investment in Kyrgyzstan. The main sectors that received Chinese FDI over the period from 2006 to 2017 are geological exploration, mining and the production of petroleum products.[2] The investment sectors of China in Kyrgyzstan have not changed in recent years: it is mainly the production of refined petroleum products, mining, and geological exploration.
Chinese FDI in Kyrgyzstan by industry
Based on the structure of Chinese investments in Kyrgyzstan, it is not yet possible to talk about “green” projects. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan had high hopes for China in terms of constructing a number of hydropower plants.
In particular, in 2010 there was information that Chinese scientific institutes based on the Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic financed the study of glaciers, water resources, including the transboundary Sary-Jaz and Ak-Sai rivers. In the discussion process of 2010, the director of the Institute of Water Problems and Hydropower of the National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic Dushen Mamatkanov noted that “Sary-Jazz, Uzengi-Kush, and Ak-Sai make up 75% of the water resources of western Xinjiang.” If in 2008 the implementation of this project was offered to the Russian side, then already in 2013 the ex-President of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Atambaev pinned his hopes that a memorandum on the construction of the Sary-Jaz cascade of hydroelectric power plants (three stations) of the Issyk-Kul region will be signed with the PRC. However, the matter did not progress beyond the declared intentions of the Kyrgyz authorities. According to various estimates, the implementation of this project would allow not only exporting electricity to Kazakhstan and China, starting mining of rare earth metals, developing tourism, but also influencing the management of the resources of an important transboundary river.
It is noteworthy that in China at the end of 2019, within the framework of a public-private partnership, an agreement was reached on attracting 1.26 billion USD for the construction of a dam on the Aksu River with a height of 247 meters. That is, China has begun construction of the world’s highest river dam in Xinjiang, which will allow not only to create a reservoir with a capacity of 1.1 billion cubic meters, but also to build hydraulic installations, the output of which will amount to 1.89 billion kWh annually. While Kyrgyzstan is unsuccessfully negotiating the construction of the Sary-Jaz (for about 15 years) and other hydroelectric power plants, China plans to complete the construction of the above-mentioned dam within 8 years, two of which have actually passed.
In addition, Kyrgyzstan has unsuccessfully tried to attract Chinese investments in the construction project of the Upper Naryn cascade of hydroelectric power plants. As one can see, the long-term plans of the Kyrgyz authorities to receive Chinese investments for the construction of hydropower plants have not yet been realized, although Beijing is actively declaring its readiness for green projects.
However, as a rule, China seeks to build “green” projects with countries of a different category – with higher incomes. According to the American Enterprise Institute China Global Investment Tracker (AEI 2019), from 2014 to 2019, Chinese enterprises invested only 2.3 billion USD in alternative energy sources in eight (8) low and lower middle-income countries, while over the same period Chinese firms have invested 20.9 billion USD in alternative energy sources in high and upper middle-income countries.[3]
The overall trend towards green financing in China has intensified in 2020, according to the International Institute for Green Finance (IIGF), the share of energy investments in solar, wind and hydropower was 57% (about 11 billion USD), compared with 38% in 2019 year. Speaking of Central Asia, in neighboring Kazakhstan, with the help of a Chinese corporation, the Moinak hydroelectric power station was built, and work is underway on the construction of small hydroelectric power plants and wind farms . Over the past four years of the new 1,500-megawatt renewable energy capacities in Kazakhstan, two-thirds were built jointly with Chinese partners. In Uzbekistan, in 2019, a Chinese company completed the construction of a new hydroelectric power station at the Tuyabugiz reservoir.
The above-mentioned cases and statistics show that so far China’s green cooperation is aimed primarily at more developed countries, and in Central Asia at more stable ones – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, if projects for the construction of large hydropower plants in the region carry geopolitical risks, then the construction of small hydropower plants could fill the gaps in green cooperation between Bishkek and Beijing. Today, speaking of “green” projects in the interaction of Kyrgyzstan with China, the parties are more likely to be exposed to “greenwashing”[4] – green PR, which has nothing to do with real actions to reduce the negative impact on the environment.
“Brown trace” of Chinese projects
In the history of bilateral relations between China and Kyrgyzstan, there are already a number of examples when non-compliance or underestimation of environmental standards and norms led to environmental degradation, leading to a deterioration in the image of Chinese projects.
One of the resonant examples is the modernization of the Combined heat and power (CHP), which was completed in 2017 with a Chinese loan of 386 million USD. A year after the modernization, not only an accident occurred, as a result of which the capital was left without heat in the January frosts, but also corruption exposures and lawsuits followed with the participation of high-ranking officials. At the same time, the public never saw the document on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of modernization of the CHP.
Such a project can hardly be called “modernization”, given that part of the CHP is still operating on old equipment, and the use of coal cannot be called a modern measure to reduce air emissions. As Professor Farkhod Aminjonov rightly notes, “attempts to ensure domestic energy consumption by increasing the use of coal in almost all Central Asian countries have led to an exacerbation of the environmental situation”.[5]
For several years in a row, Bishkek has been covered with strong smog during the heating season, and according to the AirVisual website, the capital of Kyrgyzstan topped the list of the dirtiest cities in the world. According to the estimates of the State Environmental Protection Agency, in Kyrgyzstan, about 14% of emissions into the atmosphere of harmful substances come from the CHP, which annually burns about 1 million tons of coal – the “dirtiest” type of fuel. According to the report “Smog in Bishkek: Myths and Reality,” coal emissions have increased by 22% over the past 6 years. In addition, the authors of the report, based on an approximate quantitative assessment of the main sources of PM 2.5 in Bishkek, came to the assumption that CHP is the second most important source (after “households and other buildings not connected to CHP), contributing the most to anthropogenic 2.5 PM pollution.[6]
The ecological footprint with a Chinese context is present not only in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, but also in other regions of the country. Seven villages in the Uzgen district of the Osh region at the beginning of 2019 were left without water due to the fault of the Chinese coal mining company Jin Long LLC, as well as Erkebek. As it turned out , coal dumps were piled in the bed of the spring, and after a while the water broke through these dumps and the mud got into the Zerger River. In 2018, there was information that the Chinese oil refinery in Kara-Balta “Zhunda” exceeds the permissible standards for the pollution of urban wastewater, since the water used in oil refining is discharged into the city sewer. Kara-Balta residents have repeatedly complained on the chemical smell that often appears in their bathrooms. According to eco-activist Bermet Borubaeva, “local residents of Kara-Balta have noticed that cases of stillborn children have become more frequent. Probably no one has conducted a study on the impact of cancer in the local population, but the influence is clearly present. It turns out that it is not profitable for the enterprise, and the state bodies will not even initiate such large-scale resource-intensive research”.
Environmental issues are becoming a fairly strong mobilizing factor in the Kyrgyz Republic and may cause an even more active growth of anti-Chinese sentiments. In 2019, about 500 people in the Naryn region demanded to stop the work of the Chinese enterprise Zhong Ji Mining at the Solton-Sary deposit. Local residents complained that their livestock were dying due to blasting operations in the mountains and dirty drinking water. Already in the next 2020, due to mass protests, the project for the construction of an industrial trade and logistics center in At-Bashi was canceled with the attraction of 280 million USD from Chinese partners.
Ecological “faults” are already running through the issues of water and air pollution, disturbance of ecosystems for livestock farming.
To make matters worse, government measures to resolve and regulate the environmental agenda are still catching-up, that is, until the situation escalates to the limit, both sides – the contractor’s company management and local residents – are left on their own.
As the practice of implementing projects by China within the BRI and at the bilateral level shows, Chinese companies may not attach due importance to environmental standards in Central Asia. In addition, the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, with a weak regulatory framework and political instability, are unable to cope with the regulation of the environmental component of bilateral projects.
The cumulative effect on both sides contributes to the worsening of the situation in this area:
- the Chinese side refuses to involve non-governmental and public organizations in the process of assessing and monitoring environmental standards.
- seeking to attract a foreign investor, the host country is subject to deliberate lowering of environmental standards. Moreover, environmental regulations can be adjusted for a specific project.
Conclusion
Green projects and environmental aspects of cooperation remain on the margins of the discourse on economic benefits for Kyrgyzstan and China. In pursuit of investments, the Kyrgyz authorities turn a blind eye to the environmental situation, remembering it only during election campaigns in order to win the electorate. Lacking a solid legal basis for resolving these issues, state institutions do not coordinate their position on environmental issues, and corruption and short-sightedness, coupled with Kyrgyzstan’s focus on “brown” projects, only makes things worse. This background leads to negative environmental consequences and even to the disruption of planned bilateral projects. If the “green” projects are being ignored, which, while remaining on paper, serve only as a declarative narrative for both sides, even China’s investment in soft power will not correct the situation.
It seems that neither China nor Kyrgyzstan can already afford to ignore “green” investments and environmental issues, taking into account their interconnection not only with the economy, politics and social movements, but also with geopolitics, when the issue of climate change can already be attributed to security issues and the world powers are considering introducing duties for emissions.
To harmonize cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and China, it is important for the parties to pay special attention to the establishment of contractual and institutional mechanisms in the field of environmental protection, modern environmental standards, and requirements. In this regard, the experience of the EU countries and the USA can serve as a showcase for the promotion of green and environmentally friendly solutions. It is obvious that the PRC will try to adhere to green decisions in cooperation with countries with a high level of economic development, but there is still a huge vacuum in this regard in relations with Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has not yet developed its own agenda in the field of green projects, which, nevertheless, can and should be promoted both at the bilateral and at the regional level with China. One of the options for improving these issues could be the development of regional green mechanisms and projects, for example, at the level of the launched Chinese C5 + 1 format, or the SCO green program.
If China is interested in improving the image of BRI, reducing, and preventing anti-Chinese sentiment, fighting criticism that it is exporting its polluting model to other countries, then green solutions should move from official narratives to real projects not only in developed, but in small neighboring countries as well.
[1] People’s Republic of China (PRC). (2015). China’s intended nationally determined contribution: Enhanced actions on climate change. Bonn, Germany: Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
[2] Roman Mogilevsky, Kyrgyzstan and the Belt and Road Initiative // https://www.ucentralasia.org/Content/Downloads/UCA-IPPA-WP50_Kyrgyzstan%20and%20Belt%20Road%20Initiative_RUS.pdf
[3] AEI. 2019. “China Global Investment Data Tracker.” American Enterprise Institute (AEI). http:// www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker
[4] Tyler Harlan (2020): Green development or greenwashing? A political ecology perspective on China’s green belt and road, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2020.1795700
[5] Dr. Aminjonov F., 2020, Renewable energy sources in Central Asia: what should be on the agenda today ?, CABAR.asia, https://doi.org/10.46950/202002
[6] Smog in Bishkek: Myths and Reality. Research by Kanat Sultanaliev, Rahat Sabyrbekov, Zheenbek Kulenbekov, August 2021. American University of Central Asia – P.34.