“Today the US Strategy for Central Asia is defunct. It has to be thought through from the beginning and a new strategy has to be devised that more adequately embraces current realities” – states Dr. Frederick Starr, an American academic historian, expert on Central Asia, Russia and Eurasia, and chairman of the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, in an interview to CABAR.asia.
CABAR.asia: What aspects have the US traditionally emphasized in its cooperation with Central Asian countries? How is the Central Asian region conceptually understood?
The U.S. and I should add, European perception of Central Asia was created in the days after the collapse of the USSR. The question then was how can these new sovereignties emerge as modern viable states, economies, and societies. Those were the concerns that were translated right from the start into an effort to develop institutions that were more appropriate to modern life. That meant in many cases increasing the element of participation, and democratization. It also meant encouraging the right of citizens to organize themselves into voluntary associations, and NGOs, it also included various other rights and so forth. On the economic side, it included a transformation of the state-based economy into a pluralistic one that was based on private property and initiative.
These were the two main focuses after the collapse of the USSR. They were both defined in terms of transformation in the post-Soviet era. Now, the question immediately arises: what about security? The new states were all very fragile, lacking normal instruments for defending themselves. Both the United States and Europe recognized this but were at first rather passive in their approach. Full NATO membership was eventually extended to Central European states but no comparable initiative affected the Caucasus or Central Asia. For the new states themselves, which in most cases had never existed before within the same boundaries, the protection of their new sovereignties was objective number one. The need to maintain cordial relations with post-Soviet Russia meant that the new governments rarely enunciated this concern publicly. This left a tension between the security concerns of the new sovereignties on the one hand, and the West’s desire to create a post-Soviet orders that would easily mesh with the global economy.
This is not to say that the US and Europe ignored the new states’ concern over security. Let us note the activities of NATO in the 1990s and thereafter, especially the Partnership for Peace. This entity, which still exists today, fostered interoperability, training, and overall modernization across Central Asia and in the Caucasus. It even included an entity called “Centrazbat”, the Central Asia Battalion, which carried off a remarkable long-distance mobilization beginning in Louisiana and ending in Uzbekistan. The question we must ask is where is this thread today?
To summarize, I think there was greater stress on post-communist transformation – both in institutions and laws, constitutions, in the economy and social organization, than on security. While security and the protection of sovereignty were definitely in the picture, in optimistic Western minds these assumed a somewhat subordinate position.
How different is the current US Strategy for Central Asia 2020-2025 from previous ones? Does the Strategy and its approaches reflect the realities and needs of the region itself?
Well, had you asked this question before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I would’ve said it was a step forward. It wasn’t completely satisfactory and there are several corrections and changes that one might propose. But had you asked me this question before the invasion I would have said this is was a definite move in the right direction, even though further steps were needed. Due to Mr. Putin’s assault of Ukraine this strategy is now inadequate and defunct. It has to be rethought from the beginning and a new strategy has to be devised that more adequately addresses current realities.
What should be considered in the next US Strategy for Central Asia? Will the region also be tied to Afghanistan?
There was a tendency from 1992 on for the United States and Europe to reward countries where economic, legal, and constitutional reforms deemed to augur more open and participatory societies. The tendency to reward those countries meant withholding support from countries that didn’t evolve in this manner. For many decades Uzbekistan didn’t, for reasons that we all understand. The Uzbeks took a very cautious position and, as a result, the United States long held the country at arm’s length. Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, was seen for most of that period as moving in the right direction. For a while the United States was quite enthusiastic about what Mr. Akayev called the “Switzerland of Central Asia”. Turkmenistan absolutely baffled everyone as it tends to today.
Turning to the future, we must acknowledge that if countries are going to work together they must be aware of each other’s interests and concerns. If one side’s first and existential concern is to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, then the other side must be responsive to that if it wants to collaborate with it. The first change in American and European strategy today is to recognize that we cannot separate the overall relationship from the security of each country in the region. That’s number one. If we are unwilling to address that, neither the US nor Europeans can expect deep and productive collaboration.
The second change regards Afghanistan. Central Asia’s main geopolitical challenge is to reopen a window for trade with South and Southeast Asia. This is the key not only to its economic progress but to the sovereignty of its states. This is essential as the sole means of overcoming the ancient isolation of Central Asia arising from its double landlocked status. This cannot be done without Afghanistan’s cooperation, period.
Therefore, the further development of the countries of Central Asia as sovereign states and as viable economies is heavily dependent on having transport windows open in every direction. Thanks to Soviet rule these are already open to the north. China, the European Union, And Turkey have opened corridors to the east and west. But the crucial southern window remains tightly closed.
However, if you look over the last 3000 years, it is not the routes to China the West, or North that dominated in Central Asia. It was the route to India, the Great India Road, as the late Uzbek-Georgian archeologist Edvard Rtveladze called it. That was the main transport, trade, and cultural corridor for all of Central Asia for thousands of years. Reopening that route today is an essential goal.
Now, what are we going to do about that? Many prudent observers say that progress will be stalled until the new Taliban government in Kabul achieves recognition abroad. This is reasonable but insufficient. For it seems to me that its willingness and ability to open transport routes across its territory can be approached as a kind of test of the new Taliban government in Afghanistan. I am not suggesting that neighboring states and investors recognize the Taliban tomorrow, but why not engage with them in a discussion on opening the transport corridors. If they are responsive, and if they can provide security, then the participating countries from Central Asia and their Western partners can then talk about further involvement and eventually recognition. In other words, the transport issue provides a convenient index of Taliban intentions.
It seems to me that path for such an approach is open. The Taliban had always been open to the transport corridors. Indeed, they even supported the TAPI pipeline 20-30 years ago. At the same time, new or revived forms of Islamism seem to be spreading in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The Taliban seems unable to prevent this, even within its own ranks. That is not good news. But if the neighboring states and major powers indicated their readiness to advance on transport if the most radical forms of Islamism can be contained could help move the process forward and provide a test for future relations.
Why is economic cooperation between the US and Central Asia weak and how can it be strengthened?
Economic cooperation is strong and growing rapidly, especially with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, I have to note, also, that it’s also growing with Kyrgyzstan. American and European investors have been a major presence in the economies of the entire region.
That said, a formidable impediment to further growth is that –in a legal and business sense– there IS no Central Asia for the Western businessmen. There are instead five countries (or six or eight countries if you add the Caucasus, and it is necessary to deal with each one quite separately. This means that one has to get visas to go from one to the other. Transporting goods even from one to the other is a mess. Every impediment that sovereignty can create is present among the Central Asian states. For the foreign investor this is like driving your car with the break on – you can’t do it. The single biggest goal for Central Asian states and their foreign trading partners is to develop more coordinated institutions in the areas of trade, transport, and investments. This does not require a Central Asian union or a single economic zone. I am talking simply about reducing the barriers that now exist.
Which Central Asian country is the most important player for Washington and why?
That’s a very interesting question, due to the many and fundamental shifts taking place within the region. However, a clear bifurcation has developed. On the one side you have the rapidly developing economies – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. On the other side are those that are not developing so rapidly, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Now, what is the relationship between the two of these? The fact is that if the economies of the region were to link arms, coordinate, and cooperate, then the distinction between the leaders and the rest would be diminished. In spite of much talk, this process has barely begun.
Let me stress that coordination and cooperation does not require integration in the sense of pooling sovereignty. The region lived under an integrated Soviet system for most of the 20th century and does not wish to reconstitute it, or anything like it. However, in terms of region-wide coordination and cooperation, Central Asia is the most backward region in today’s world. If normal coordination existed among the region’s countries the distinction between fast and slow developers would be reduced, everyone would move forward, and without disadvantaging anyone.
How will Russia’s war in Ukraine affect the US in Central Asia? Will the US try to increase its cooperation with Central Asia, or vice versa, will the region probably also be under Western sanctions?
If I may rephrase your question in broader terms, no one knows how this is going to end. As if you take your role seriously as an analyst, you have to consider all possibilities, even what may seem the most unlikely ones. My problem with the analyses of events in Ukraine is that the range of outcomes that are being discussed in the world press and among governments is too narrow. Thus, I think we have to consider a complete crushing of Ukraine by Russia. This would leave Russia itself in economic tatters, utterly isolate, and unable to hold the territory it has gained. It is unlikely Mr. Putin would survive such a disastrous “victory.” It is likely to look elsewhere, to softer targets for expansion, including Central Asia.
On the other hand, we have to consider also the full collapse of Russia. Mr. Putin is a very fragile leader at this point. If he falls from power or is removed from power his successors may at first try to pursue his war against Ukraine. But Russia’s economy has taken such a terrible hit as a result of its war, that Moscow’s position in the world will fundamentally change. One must even consider the possibility of a complete change of government there and the partial or complete breakdown of the fragile and hyper-centralized state ruled from Moscow. The result could be, as Putin himself expressed it, a state reduced to the size of Muscovy and several new entities on its borders. My point is this in analyzing developments in Russia, we have to consider dramatic discontinuous changes as well as evolutionary ones. And until we’ve done that, neither you Central Asians nor we in the West and in the United States will be in a position to develop a serious strategy.
So, what I’m saying is we have to consider everything from the most extreme positions on both sides as we go forward. Now, what does that mean? It seems to me in our discussion with Central Asian countries, the United States should include these big questions on the agenda. We should launch a process by which we are considering all possibilities and framing strategic responses that are useful both to Central Asian countries and to the United States, and which address actual realities, wherever they fall on that broad spectrum of possibilities.
What is the future of US-China tensions and how will they affect Central Asia?
You cannot base your strategies for the future on a single assumption of the direction of change. There is reason to consider both: one has to consider that China somehow manages to overcome various challenges – domestic and foreign– and achieves its goal of becoming the preponderant global power. However, one has also to consider the impact of this fundamental demographic shift in the country, as well as the impact of current policies which retard the economy by constraining capital, entrepreneurship, and by strengthening governmental controls., is not good for the economy. One has also to include the impact of public attitudes on these controls and on the government’s COVID policies, which have been extremely strict and have not been welcomed everywhere.
In other words, as with Russia, with China, one must consider a wider range of future possibilities. Now, it seems to me that the potential for a good relationship between China and the United States exists, but it will depend above all on China. Don’t forget the United States and especially voluntary private groups in the United States, founded many of the most important hospitals and educational institutions in China today. This was done a century ago, but it left a residue of many Chinese and Americans who consider that a productive and positive relationship to be desirable and possible. If a moderating wave passes through Beijing and the Chinese government, I can imagine very productive relationships in many areas. If it does not, I could imagine a very serious situation of frontal conflict. Since we can’t know the future, we have to devise a path – a strategy and tactics – that can be quickly adjusted if developments go take a sharp turn in either direction.
Will a basic cooperation agreement be signed with Kyrgyzstan?
Kyrgyzstan has passed through a very difficult period. When and how to date its origin is a subject for historians to consider. After a very cordial, initial period, the relationship soured. This was due to developments both in Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent in the United States. Let me remind you that when after the collapse of the USSR president Clinton had the idea of basing the US – Central Asian policy on Kyrgyzstan, which he viewed as the regional centerpiece – the “Switzerland of Central Asia” Then it soured under several contentious rulers in Bishkek and under pressure from Moscow over NATO’s use of the air base in Bishkek, Today’s new government in Kyrgyzstan seems to me to hold much promise. It includes some very competent men and women and does not include most of the people who have caused so much difficulty for the last almost decade. With regard to the United States, it has taken a very constructive position, which has been much appreciated here in the USA.
I think all sorts of things that weren’t possible even two or three years ago are now becoming possible. I met just the other day with 16 rectors of Kyrgyz universities. What an impressive group they are! It seems to me that we should not be thinking just about government to government relations: about formal agreements, treaties, and the like. Let the diplomats do that. Let them focus on security, too, which US-Kyrgyz relations have neglected for a decade. At the same time, we should be talking about human contact in business, education, science, sports, and the arts. The Kyrgyz Republic has a competent and active embassy in Washington, which is much welcomed. As contacts are renewed, both sides will see possibilities in the future relationship that are not visible to us today. So, I’m very optimistic about this. I am confident that Kyrgyzstan is no longer going to be at the back of the Central Asian train.