“Establishing and strengthening cultural ties with ethnic Uzbeks abroad will allow to shape and coordinate the soft power of Uzbekistan abroad and in Central Asia,” Niginakhon Uralova notes in an article for CABAR.asia
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There are around seven million[1] ethnic Uzbeks living as a minority in five neighboring countries. Besides this status, they share some common grievances – lack of or poor access to education in Uzbek, low representation in government positions, obstacles to speaking their language freely, and of course a weak tie to their kin state – Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan has recently been trying to bring back top Uzbek talent from across the world who once left the country. To this end, the “Buyuk Kelajak” (Great Future) Expert Council was founded by Uzbek compatriots with the support of Uzbek authorities in 2018 to connect Uzbeks overseas into an advisory network of professionals that aims to facilitate the reforms in Uzbekistan. With over 200 compatriots from 30 countries on its board, the council was tasked to develop “Strategy 2035” – a development strategy for Uzbekistan, which was presented in 2019.[2] In addition, there is El-Yurt Umidi Foundation that, among others, works for “establishment of relations with compatriots…” Last year a database on Uzbek citizens who work abroad, Oltin Daftar (Golden Book) was created. So far, it registered around 500 successful Uzbek diaspora who might benefit the country with their investments in the future. To note, the book lists over 100 people in South Korea alone and their expected investment in the country is estimated at USD 14 million.[3]
The efforts, however, do not much include reaching out to ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries, whose calls for support from behind their borders are still left unanswered. For example, in 2017, the non-governmental literary fund of ethnic Uzbek youth in Kyrgyzstan “Begaiyim” sent an open letter to the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, asking him not to forget about ethnic Uzbeks abroad.[4] A year later, ethnic Uzbeks of Turkmenistan asked the same via Radio Ozodlik.[5] With the arrival of the new regime in 2016, many hoped for a change in Tashkent’s policy towards ethnic Uzbeks in neighboring countries, but noticeable support is yet to be seen.
Drawing borders…
Millions of ethnic Uzbeks live outside Uzbekistan in five neighboring countries. This did not happen due to natural or willful migration, but due to territorial boundaries drawn in the process of creation of the former Soviet Union and, in the case of Afghanistan, a much earlier determining of borders. Uzbekistan’s current territory, albeit with controversies and subsequent border disputes, was roughly formed in 1924 – 36 under the political and social re-organization of Soviet Central Asia – ‘national delimitation’ (natsional’noe razmezhevanie).[6] Before the delimitation, people of Central Asia were categorized into six nations by the Soviets – the Kazakhs, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tajiks, the Kyrgyz people, and Karakalpaks.[7] The territory where mostly Uzbeks lived would go to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Uzbek SSR), incorporating the Karakapakstan autonomous SSR in 1936. The border drawing process left millions of ethnic Uzbeks outside the borders of Uzbekistan, in four different, newly formed republics (although the Soviet rule never intended them to become independent states) and Afghanistan.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, millions of ethnic Uzbeks found themselves in new, independent states, divided by international borders, while becoming ethnic minority groups. By the early 1990s, there were around half a million ethnic Uzbeks in the territory of Kyrgyzstan, mostly close to the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border, making 13 percent of the total population.[8] In Tajikistan over a million[9] ethnic Uzbeks made up 23,5 percent[10] of the total population in 1989, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were home for over 300 thousand ethnic Uzbeks each.[11]
Uzbek minorities were almost completely cut off from their historic motherland due to Islam Karimov’s notion of O’zbekchilik (Uzbekness) that he tried to construct in order to unite the nation. This was part of his endless efforts to keep a peaceful bilateral relationship with neighboring states, and it carried a territorial element, embracing those born on the current territory of Uzbekistan.[12] The result was to unite the nation and promote national belonging within the borders of Uzbekistan, while leaving Uzbeks in other Central Asian countries without support or help from Uzbekistan.
The leadership did not try to establish tight contacts with co-ethnics beyond Uzbekistan’s borders, nor did it ever try to facilitate the return of ethnic Uzbeks to the country, unlike its neighbors. Nur-Sultan (then Astana), for example, introduced the Oralman program, in which over a million ethnic Kazakhs have moved to Kazakhstan since the early 1990’s – mostly from China and Uzbekistan.[13] Kyrgyzstan also welcomed around 50,000 ethnic Kyrgyz people through its Kayrylman program within ten years after its establishment in 2006.[14]
There are a few reasons for that. When Uzbekistan gained its independence, Uzbeks made up the main component of the population and Tashkent probably saw no need for more ethnic Uzbeks. Kazakhstan, for example, needed more ethnic Kazakhs as they comprised less than 40 percent of the population.[15] In Uzbekistan there was not any fear that ethnic Russians or Tajiks, or any other groups would undermine the unity of the nation since 72,8 % of the total population were of Uzbek ethnicity in 1991 (currently it is around 80%).[16]
Life behind borders
Ethnic Uzbeks have been facing a number of difficulties due to their minority status. For example, Uzbeks were targeted during an inter-ethnic conflict in southern part of Kyrgyzstan in 2010 when over 400 people died, while around 2000 homes were destroyed. A decade later, the Kyrgyz government still has not provided accountability for most of the crimes committed during the conflict.[17]
Number of Uzbek Minorities in Central Asia*
*As per Vielmini, F. 03.02.2021, “Uzbek Communities in Central Asia as Human Connectivity Factor: Elements for a Kin-State Policy”, Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/uzbek-communities-central-asia-human-connectivity-factor-elements-kin-state-policy-29131?fbclid=IwAR03GsgVYUXaqmS0cSpnWK12IRu4IIecpIaPCE6POhvpWzoEWGPjl8529Rk
While ethnic Uzbeks make almost 15 percent of the population and are the biggest minority group in Kyrgyzstan, according to HRW, they are disparaged in society and underrepresented in government bodies and law enforcement. For example, on January 5, 2016, residents (mostly ethnic Uzbeks) of Arslonbob village in Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan held a protest of around 300 people against police raids into their homes, accusing the police of nationalism.[18] It is also hard for them to study in Uzbek as Uzbek language schools had been declining in number, school textbooks are difficult to obtain, and since 2014, entrance exams in universities are held in Kyrgyz or Russian.[19]
The number of ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan has gradually been shrinking. While current official data is unavailable, the census of 2010 shows that Uzbeks make up 14% of Tajikistan’s population. It is a significant decrease from 23,5 percent in 1989.[20] At the same time, education in the Uzbek language is becoming less and less possible due to a lack of textbooks and educators. More parents are sending their children to Tajik-language schools to advance their job opportunities in the future. To note, only 7.6% of civil service positions were held by ethnic Uzbeks in 2014. Some Uzbeks are changing the nationality of their newborn children to Tajik in their birth certificates so they would have better opportunities in the future.[21]
The latest available data from Turkmenistan shows that there are less than 300,000 ethnic Uzbeks in the country, making up less than 6% of the population. Following the 2002 attempted assassination on Turkmenistan’s then president Saparmurat Niazov, ethnic Uzbeks were removed from high-ranking government positions, while all Uzbek-language schools were closed.[22] Later, in 2004, it was reported that Uzbek imam-hatybs (mosque leaders) were replaced with Turkmen ones in the Dashoguz region, where mostly Uzbeks live.[23] Uzbeks also face obstacles to leaving[24] the country to work, which is increasing dissatisfaction among them.[25]
Kazakhstan is home for over half a million ethnic Uzbeks, who not only were born there, but also have migrated since 1990s due to economic reasons.[26]
“In Shymkent, as I observe, most of them [ethnic Uzbeks] are not rich,” says Batyr, whose mother is an ethnic Uzbek, and whose father is Kazakh. “They have to earn money at an early age to help their family. It is difficult for them to pass the exam [admission exam to universities]. Because they did not graduate universities or colleges, they work in building [constructions], in the streets sweeping, selling [things] in bazars, [but] not in government organizations.”
The latest available data shows that there are 58 Uzbek language and 84 mixed language (Kazakh-Uzbek, Russian-Uzbek, etc.) schools in Kazakhstan.[27] Studying in Uzbek has its disadvantages, however. Graduates of Uzbek-medium schools have to take examinations for university entrance either in Kazakh, Russian or English.[28] Due to this reason and the low quality of education, parents send their children to either Kazakh or Russian schools.[29]
Hope for Change
The Karimov administration never tried to facilitate the return of ethnic Uzbeks to the country, nor did it ever try to support them elsewhere. Its stand was that the Uzbek government is supposed to protect its citizens, not all Uzbeks across the world – ethnic Uzbeks are citizens of other countries and should be treated as such.[30] Non-interference in the Osh conflict of 2010 is an example. Karimov was also dismissive towards labor migrants who chose to earn outside Uzbekistan, labeling them as “lazy” people. For a ruler who was concerned much with nation-branding, it was “disgusting” that Uzbeks leave the territory of Uzbekistan and “sweep streets” in Moscow “embarrassing us all [the nation].”[31]
With President Mirziyoyev’s arrival, things seem to take a little different shift. There have been some steps taken to establish a friendlier relationship with ethnic Uzbeks abroad as he tries to create a different, more open image for Uzbekistan.
In 2017, for example, the Education Center for Afghan Citizens was established in Termez, Uzbekistan. There are 18 undergraduate and 19 secondary (vocational) programs provided for youth from Afghanistan, most of whom are ethnic Uzbeks. Almost a hundred students received their degrees in Uzbek Language and Literature.[32] But it does not mean the center was founded only for ethnic Uzbeks, but rather to further the bilateral relations with Afghanistan.
“The first year most students who went to Termez were ethnic Uzbeks,” says Nematullah Noori, an Uzbek from Afghanistan. “But in the following circles most students were Pashtuns. That is why the government of Uzbekistan should make knowing the Uzbek language a condition for the selection.”
To note, there are around 2.5-3.5 million ethnic Uzbeks living in Afghanistan (although the exact number is disputed). For the majority of them, studying in Uzbek schools is not an option. There is a scarcity of textbooks available in Uzbek as well as of educators who could teach in Uzbek. “I never had a chance to be educated in my own language,” says Nazeela, recalling her childhood in Afghanistan. “I used to have friends who were Uzbek but would not identify as Uzbeks because they were scared. I will share a personal anecdote. In high school, I was talking with a friend in Uzbek when the teacher said ‘no Uzbek’, and that is the part when you feel discriminated against. It is also seen how, for example, the role of Uzbek historic figures is not mentioned as part of Afghanistan’s history in the textbooks.”
Last year, the charity campaign “For Peace” was launched in Uzbekistan to draw public attention to the predicament of ethnic Uzbek youth living in difficult conditions without parental care in Afghanistan and to provide some support. Within the campaign, textbooks and fiction books in Uzbek, and some stationeries were collected to send to them.[33]
Conclusion
While it is good to see changes in support of bright, promising youth of Uzbekistan abroad, it is also worth not cutting ties with co-ethnics who were born outside Uzbekistan’s territory. The solution does not have to be physically bringing them to and welcoming them in Uzbekistan (there is still a question if they even wish to come here). But establishing and strengthening cultural ties with them will allow to shape and coordinate Uzbekistan’s soft power abroad and in Central Asia.
For example, provision of more textbooks is the minimum that can be done by Tashkent to employ its soft power in neighboring countries. The situation is especially dire in Afghanistan, where most available books in Uzbek are in Arabic script instead of Latin one (which Uzbekistan officially adapted in 1993). Also, establishing student exchange programs would facilitate not only more learning opportunities for the youth, it would also give them cultural experience – to see and learn about their so called ‘kin-country,’ its culture, values, and feel connected with it.
Similarly, special quotas can be introduced for ethnic Uzbeks from abroad to study at public higher educational institutions in Uzbekistan, particularly in subject fields such as the Uzbek Language and Literature, History of Uzbekistan, pre-school and primary education and the like.
Uzbek language schools and/or cultural centers can be founded in respective countries. In Kazakhstan, for example, there is already an Uzbek ethno-cultural center established by ethnic Uzbeks. Back in 2015, the center started Ziyo Sunday school where they teach the Uzbek language, history, and culture.[34]
Improving bilateral relations with neighboring countries, which Mirziyoyev seems committed to, could be a way to improve the image of the minority Uzbeks in neighboring countries. “At a policy level, building better relations would help as these things are always reflected at the societal level,” says Rohila, an ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan, expressing her hope for a better future.
This article was prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project implemented with the financial support of the Foreign Ministry of Norway. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial or donor.
[1] Vielmini, F. 03.02.2021, “Uzbek Communities in Central Asia as Human Connectivity Factor: Elements for a Kin-State Policy”, Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/uzbek-communities-central-asia-human-connectivity-factor-elements-kin-state-policy-29131?fbclid=IwAR03GsgVYUXaqmS0cSpnWK12IRu4IIecpIaPCE6POhvpWzoEWGPjl8529Rk
[2]Kun.uz, 24.12.2019. “Four members of Buyuk Kelajak Coordination Council resign from the organization”, https://kun.uz/en/news/2019/12/24/four-members-of-buyuk-kelajak-coordination-council-resign-from-the-organization
[3] Kun.uz, 15.01.21, “«Oltin daftar»ga kirgan vatandoshlar». Tashqi ishlar vazirligi yangi siyosatni tushuntirdi”, https://kun.uz/uz/news/2021/01/15/oltin-daftarga-kirgan-vatandoshlar-tashqi-ishlar-vazirligi-yangi-siyosatni-tushuntirdi
[4] Ozodlik, 21.07.2021, «Этнические узбеки Кыргызстана просят поддержки у Шавката Мирзияева», https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/28629273.html
[5] Voice of America, 30.07.2018, “Turkmanistonda etnik o’zbeklarning noroziligi kuchaymoqda”, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/29316832.htmll
[6] Fumagalli, M., 2007, Ethnicity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks abroad’, Central Asian Survey, 26 (1), 105-122. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634930701423525?journalCode=ccas20
[7] Ibid.
[8] Rezvani, B., 2013, Understanding and Explaining the Kyrgyz-Uzbek Interethnic Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan, Anthropology of the Middle East, 8 (2), https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/ame/8/2/ame080205.xml
[9] Демоскоп Weekly, 19.04.2021, Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=12
[10] IWPR, 28.07.2014, “Uzbeks Face Obstacles in Increasingly Tajik State”, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbeks-face-obstacles-increasingly-tajik-state
[11] Vielmini, F. 03.02.2021, “Uzbek Communities in Central Asia as Human Connectivity Factor: Elements for a Kin-State Policy”, Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/uzbek-communities-central-asia-human-connectivity-factor-elements-kin-state-policy-29131?fbclid=IwAR03GsgVYUXaqmS0cSpnWK12IRu4IIecpIaPCE6POhvpWzoEWGPjl8529Rk
[12] Fumagalli, M., 2007, Ethnicity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks abroad’, Central Asian Survey, 26 (1), 105-122, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634930701423525?journalCode=ccas20
[13] Eurasianet, 01.06.2018, “Kazakhstan’s returnees frustrated by cold shoulders”, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-returnees-frustrated-by-cold-shoulders
[14] The Diplomat, 14.07.2018, “Back to Wakhan: Kyrgyz Returnees Head Back to Afghanistan”, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/back-to-wakhan-kyrgyz-returnees-head-back-to-afghanistan/
[15] Eurasianet, 01.06.2018, “Kazakhstan’s returnees frustrated by cold shoulders”, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-returnees-frustrated-by-cold-shoulders
[16] O’zbekiston Respublikasi Davlat Statistika Qo’mitasi Rasmiy Sayti (O’zSAT). 2018. “O’zbekiston Respublikasing Demografik Holati [Demographics of Republic of Uzbekistan].” Accessed June 30, 2018. https://stat.uz/uz/432-analiticheskie-materialy-uz/2033-o-zbekiston-respublikasining-demografik-holati.
[17] HRW, 09.06.2020, Kyrgyzstan: Justice Elusive 10 Years On, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/09/kyrgyzstan-justice-elusive-10-years
[18] Озодлик, 06.01.2016, Арслонбобда уйлар тинтув қилинишига қарши митинг ўтказилди https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27470231.html
[19] Ibid.
[20] IWRP, 28.07.2013, “Uzbeks Face Obstacles in Increasingly Tajik State”, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbeks-face-obstacles-increasingly-tajik-state
[21] Ibid.
[22] IWPR, 11.01.2011, “Uzbek-Turkmen Talks Disappoint Both Ethnic Minorities” https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbek-turkmen-talks-disappoint-both-ethnic-minorities
[23] Radio Free Europe, 10.03.2004, “Turkmenistan: State Interfering In Religious Life Of Ethnic Uzbeks”, https://www.rferl.org/a/1051839.html
[24] Sof.Uz, 02.07.2018, “Turkmanistonlik o‘zbeklar tazyiq va ayirmachilik holatlari kuchayayotgani haqida shikoyat qilmoqda”, https://sof.uz/uz/post/turkmanistonlik-o-zbeklar-tazyiq-va-ayirmachilik-holatlari-kuchayayotgani-haqida-shikoyat-qilmoqda
[25] America Ovozi, 30.06.2018, “Turkmanistonda etnik o’zbeklarning noroziligi kuchaymoqda” https://www.amerikaovozi.com/a/4460623.html
[26] The Astana Times, 25.10.2019, “Nur-Sultan’s Uzbek ethno-cultural centre is growing rapidly”, https://astanatimes.com/2019/10/nur-sultans-uzbek-ethno-cultural-centre-is-growing-rapidly/#:~:text=At%20the%20beginning%20of%202019,representatives%20of%20the%20ethnic%20group.
[27] Қазақстан халқы Ассамблеясы, 06.08.2018, Сарты, узбеки и единый народ Казахстана https://assembly.kz/analitika/sarty-uzbeki-i-edinyy-narod-kazakhstana/
[28] Oka, N., 2009. “Ethnicity and Elections under Authoritarianism: The Case of Kazakhstan,” IDE Discussion Papers 194, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO). https://ideas.repec.org/p/jet/dpaper/dpaper286.html
[29] Демоскоп Weekly, 23.02.2015, “Сами себе хозяева. Как живется узбекам в Казахстане?”, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2015/0631/gazeta019.php
[30] Dadabaev, T., 2019, Uzbekistan as Central Asian game changer? Uzbekistan’s foreign policy construction in the post-Karimov era, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 4 (2), 162-175, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2057891118775289
[31] Radio Free Europe, 26.06.2013, “Karimov: Uzbek Migrants Are ‘Lazy,’ Beggars Don’t Exist”, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-karimov-beggars-migrants-remittances/25028531.html
[32] Kun.uz, 24.05.2020, Afg‘oniston qahramoni, etnik o‘zbeklar yetakchisi va endilikda marshal. Abdulrashid Do‘stum kim? https://kun.uz/uz/news/2020/05/24/afgoniston-qahramoni-etnik-ozbeklar-yetakchisi-va-endilikda-marshal-general-dostum-kim
[33]Daryo.uz, 22.09.2019, Navoiyda Afg‘onistonda yashayotgan etnik o‘zbeklar uchun kitob yig‘ildi, https://daryo.uz/2019/09/22/navoiyda-afgonistonda-yashayotgan-etnik-ozbeklar-uchun-kitob-yigildi
[34] The Astana Times, 25.10.2019, “Nur-Sultan’s Uzbek ethno-cultural centre is growing rapidly”, https://astanatimes.com/2019/10/nur-sultans-uzbek-ethno-cultural-centre-is-growing-rapidly/#:~:text=At%20the%20beginning%20of%202019,representatives%20of%20the%20ethnic%20group.
[35] As per Vielmini, F. 03.02.2021, “Uzbek Communities in Central Asia as Human Connectivity Factor: Elements for a Kin-State Policy”, Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/uzbek-communities-central-asia-human-connectivity-factor-elements-kin-state-policy-29131?fbclid=IwAR03GsgVYUXaqmS0cSpnWK12IRu4IIecpIaPCE6POhvpWzoEWGPjl8529Rk