There is no doubt that the current leader of Uzbekistan will unconditionally win his second presidential election. However, the main questions are different: in what direction he intends to lead his country further and which methods. Judging by the analysis of his activities in recent years, Mirziyoyev himself is in some uncertainty, hoping to combine processes that are still incompatible in political science.
Distinguishing between legal and political legitimacy
The next presidential elections in Uzbekistan, which will be held on October 24, 2021, are the sixth direct presidential elections in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and the second for Shavkat Mirziyoyev. He became president in 2016 – formally as a result of elections in December of the same year, but in fact immediately after the death of Islam Karimov at the end of August of the same year (according to the official version, on September 2). Then, in early September 2016, the role of the interim president of the country, according to the Constitution (Article 96), was to be assumed by the speaker of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis Nigmatilla Yuldashev. However, the latter, who was far from being a heavy hitter in the country’s ruling elite, predictably recused himself in favor of one of the more politically influential figures.[1] And there were three such influential figures at that time – Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov and Head of the National Security Service Rustam Inoyatov. It was in this triangle that the question of who would be the next president was decided. The back biting for the presidency was then won by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, supported by Rustam Inoyatov, behind whom was the most omnipotent structure of the country, de facto a state within a state. In addition, Mirziyoyev received the support of the khokims of the regions, among whom Mirziyoyev, himself a former regional khokim, enjoyed greater support and popularity than Azimov. Finally, the behind-the-scenes support of the Kremlin, which was against the candidacy of Azimov, who was considered a pro-Western figure there, played an important role in this issue.
As it usually happens in practice of changing authoritarian political regimes, the country’s new leader will soon deal with not only former rivals, but even with the people who brought him to power. First, in June 2017, the now former contender for the throne, Rustam Azimov, was removed from the post of deputy prime minister and from the government in general,[2] and at the beginning of 2018, Rustam Inoyatov, who was sent to resignation from the post of Chairman of the NSC,[3] giving as consolation the post of presidential adviser and a seat in the Senate.
Thus, from a legal point of view, the actual change of power in September 2016 was not entirely legitimate. The case was, however, amended and finalized in legal terms as a result of the presidential elections in December 2016, although the elections were by no means free, fair, and truly competitive. As in the past under Islam Karimov, as a nominal alternative candidate in the elections, then third-rate figures in the administrative hierarchy of Uzbekistan were “appointed”, who were completely controlled by the de facto ruler of the country and his entourage – they were the leaders of three “puppet” parties represented in parliament. Such “alternative” candidates, having played their fake role, then become the object of ridicule in society, especially on social networks. The current elections follow roughly the same scenario.
Although the election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as president in 2016 was not legitimate in terms of the legal norms of electoral democracy, he, however, began to quickly gain points in terms of political legitimacy, announcing and starting to implement a course in the direction of some, albeit limited, political and economic liberalization of life in the country, eventually earning the image of a reformer, and as such, unlike his predecessor, becoming a handshakeable in the ruling circles of the West.
How did this liberalization manifest itself?
In the economic sphere, a course was taken towards a transition to a real market mechanism. Earlier, this transition was hampered by Karimov, who adhered to the priority of strict centralization and direct administrative control over the economic processes in the country. Mirziyoyev, on the other hand, proclaimed and began a course to support private entrepreneurship. Perhaps the first and most significant practical step in this direction was the liberalization of foreign exchange policy and the corresponding abolition of the overvalued exchange rate of the Uzbek som. Under Karimov, this exchange rate was set from above, almost personally by the president himself.[4] As a result of the long-awaited reform, although there was a slight decrease in the exchange rate of the national currency, nevertheless, due to the disappearance of a complex of different exchange rates, including the official, shadow and stock rates, the role of the black market in currency exchange and, in general, in the economy has sharply decreased.
Changes in the socio-political sphere
In the political sphere, the nature of the ruling regime has changed little. Uzbekistan still remains an authoritarian state, where parliamentary and presidential elections are held as a matter of form, without real choice and genuine political competition. The real opposition in the country is still not allowed to register and start its activities, or to participate in elections. The leaders of existing opposition parties in exile were never allowed to return to their homeland and attempts to create and register a new party before the elections, Hakikat va Tarakkiyot (Justice and Development), were crossed by formal legal and illegal measures of a repressive nature.[5] In parliament, as it used to be under Karimov, only “puppet” parties, which were once created by the authorities themselves, remain admitted. Why to talk about parties, even if the restrictions on registration of non-political non-governmental non-profit organizations, introduced by Islam Karimov in 2004-2007, have not yet been canceled.
However, certain changes in the socio-political sphere did take place. First of all, censorship in the sphere of the media was weakened. The local press, grown bolder, began to publish materials that, under Karimov, would have been suppressed by political censorship. At the same time, although, in comparison with Karimov’s times, the media and the Internet have become freer, and citizens have become bolder in expressing criticism of the authorities on social networks, freedom of speech and the press in its full form did not come, and recently the cases of reprisals against some journalists and bloggers have even become more frequent.[6] In addition, in terms of Internet freedom, Uzbekistan remains in one of the last places in the post-Soviet space: according to the Freedom House report for 2021, the country remains among the countries in this indicator, gaining 28 points out of 100 possible.[7]
Another significant change in the socio-political sphere was the release from jails of prisoners of conscience and a number of religious citizens convicted under the regime of Islam Karimov on politically motivated, fabricated cases. However, political prisoners, as a rule, were released under an amnesty or after the expiration of their prison terms, and not as a result of full rehabilitation and, accordingly, without providing monetary compensation for the mental and physical suffering inflicted. In this sense, one cannot say that justice has completely triumphed in relation to former political prisoners. Moreover, more than two thousand religious citizens convicted on political charges are still languishing in dungeons.[8]
International observers welcomed Mirziyoyev’s decision from August 2, 2019, to close a maximum security colony in the village of Jaslyk in the Kungrad region of Karakalpakstan, notorious for the ill-treatment and torture of prisoners there, many of whom were convicted on political charges. However, as of April 2021, it has not yet been completely closed. It still contains persons sentenced to life imprisonment,[9] which suggests that positive decisions of the Uzbek authorities related to human rights are not always followed by their strict implementation.
Finally, a major achievement from a human rights perspective, there has been clear progress towards the elimination of forced labor in the cotton sector. Earlier, the Uzbek authorities publicly denied the existence of forced labor practices in the country. The ice has broken during the reign of Mirziyoyev. Speaking from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly in September 2017, he finally publicly acknowledged the problem and expressed his readiness to solve it soon.[10] Indeed, in the same year, the Uzbek authorities stopped sending schoolchildren on a massive scale to pick cotton in the fall season.[11] Somewhat later, they stopped sending college and university students, and then doctors and teachers.
In addition, to solve problems in the cotton sector, the government chose not the best measure: decisions from above began to create so-called cotton-textile clusters, one in each agricultural region. In these clusters, the key role was assigned to textile companies, which now have to conclude contracts with farmers for the supply of raw cotton. In the past, farmers entered into such agreements with state-owned raw cotton procurement points and ginneries. The problem with newly formed clusters, however, is that, firstly, they, like state-owned ginneries in the past, remain monopolists in each separate region and, thus, are able to dictate their terms to farmers, for example, low purchase prices. At the same time, such a newly minted monopolist acts in conjunction with local hokimiyats, who were never relieved by the government of their responsibilities to take care of the raw cotton harvesting. Secondly, a number of these clusters were created in offshore zones, and with an opaque ownership structure, which gave rise to a serious and reasonable suspicion that at least some of them were created by the officials themselves or persons close to the authorities.[13]
Changes in foreign policy
Certain positive changes have also taken place in foreign policy, especially with regard to the neighbors in the Central Asian region. If, under Karimov, Tashkent’s relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan turned out to be close to the state of the Cold War, then Mirziyoyev began to quickly build bridges with them, establish diplomatic ties, and strengthen economic cooperation. The problems accumulated over the past years in the border sphere, fraught with interstate conflicts, as, for example, recently took place on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, began to be resolved.[14] Largely thanks to the efforts of Uzbek diplomats and with the obvious support of Mirziyoyev, most of the Uzbek Kyrgyz[15] and Uzbek-Tajik borders were demarcated,[16] the problems of enclaves began to be resolved, the situation around which became a source of interstate tension.
At the same time, in comparison with the Karimov regime, Uzbekistan under the leadership of Mirziyoyev began to show greater weakness in relation to the neo-imperial claims of Moscow, giving up its positions or being on the verge of surrendering in terms of its state sovereignty. These weaknesses manifested themselves in at least three issues:
- the conclusion of an unprofitable and environmentally risky agreement for Uzbekistan with Rosatom on the construction of a nuclear power plant in the Jizzakh region,[17] a decision on which was clearly pushed by the Kremlin and was not an initiative of Tashkent itself.
- hesitation of Tashkent on the issue of joining the Eurasian Economic Union, which serves for Moscow not only for economic cooperation with partners in the region, but also to advance its far-reaching political goals.
- the handover of key assets, including those in the oil and gas industry, under control of Russian business structures and persons associated with them, and under dubious opaque schemes bordering on a conflict of interest.[18]
Things have reached amusing incidents. During the visit of the speaker of the Russian Senate Valentina Matvienko, after her one-on-one conversation with Mirziyoyev, she suddenly announced during a subsequent meeting with the speaker of the Uzbek Senate about an alleged agreement with the president that Uzbekistan would soon join the EAEU.[19] The very fact that this decision was announced not by the Uzbek side, but by the Russian side, and there was no comment from the presidential office, raised bewilderment as well as doubts as to whether Tashkent would surrender its sovereignty to Moscow. Moreover, only at the very last moment, when at the beginning of 2019 the EAEU was already preparing to accept Uzbekistan as its members, Tashkent backed up,[20] and a little later applied for observer status with this organization.[21] Nevertheless, after all that happened, there was a feeling that Tashkent was still teetering on the brink of losing its sovereignty.
New risks in this regard have increased in connection with the events in Afghanistan, where the Taliban in August 2021, sooner than expected earlier, removed the government of Ashraf Ghani from power and took this power into their own hands.[22] In connection with these events and the increased uncertainty in all of Central Asia regarding its security in the face of new threats from the south, Tashkent began to experience pressure, including within the country,[23] in favor of joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). So far, Tashkent has resisted these temptations, declaring in the person of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Uzbekistan has no intentions to join any military-political blocs.[24] Tashkent managed to take this position largely due to a very pragmatic approach towards the Taliban regime, which made it possible to reduce the risks of a conflict with its southern neighbor.
Choosing between legitimacy and authoritarian control of power
“It is difficult to call the internal political course of Mirziyoyev reformist in the full sense of the word”
It should be noted that to a large extent the existing weaknesses in the foreign policy of the Mirziyoyev regime reflect its weaknesses in the domestic policy. After all, a strong and confident foreign policy can afford to be pursued by a state with a solid political and economic foundation within the country. In this regard, the Mirziyoyev regime is left with many problems associated with the still backward way of conducting state affairs. Despite certain positive changes, which were mentioned above, it is difficult to call Mirziyoyev’s internal political course reformatory in the full sense of the word. This course can rather be qualified as under-reform, that is, as steps towards reforms that have not yet achieved a fundamental transformation, without which it is impossible to achieve the country’s dynamic development. What prevents the political leadership from more fully and consistently implementing the course of reforms? I would name two such fundamental factors.
First, the Mirziyoyev regime, like any authoritarian regime, has to balance on the account and interaction of two often conflicting demands. On the one hand, like any regime of government, Mirziyoyev’s strives to achieve its legitimacy, if not from a legal, but at least from a political point of view. This refers to the achievement of public trust and genuine consent of the majority of the country’s population with its rule, which is difficult to achieve otherwise than by pursuing a successful policy of economic growth and ensuring social well-being in the country. In short, effective, and just government makes it politically legitimate.
At the same time, an authoritarian ruler must solve another problem, namely, to keep power in his hands and keep society in subjection. And the authoritarian ruler achieves this, as a rule, by means of control over the repressive apparatus, restriction of civil liberties, as well as by brainwashing the population by means of propaganda.
A certain pattern can be traced here: the more legitimate a regime is, the less it can afford to rely on repressive and propagandistic methods of keeping society in subjection and obedience. And vice versa, the less legitimate this regime, and this happens if the country’s economy is in a deplorable state, the arbitrariness of the authorities and corruption prevail, the more it is forced to rely on repressive measures and propaganda. The relationship between these two aspects of the functioning of authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, the desire for their legitimacy, and on the other hand, the need to ensure the subordination of subjects, both ordinary citizens and elite circles, is always dynamic and changeable.
It would seem that if the leader of a country achieves his political legitimacy, then why should he be afraid to go to open and truly competitive elections in order to be elected on the wave of popular confidence according to all the rules of electoral democracy? As a rule, the very fact that an authoritarian ruler, as happened with Mirziyoyev, initially comes to power in a legally illegitimate way, by seizing control over the law enforcement agencies, relying on them and on the support of influential clans, as well as external forces (in our case – Moscow), then it is extremely difficult for him to retreat from this path in the future. It is difficult psychologically, and the influential forces that supported him in their time will do everything to prevent the democratization of the country’s political system. In the event of a fall in his legitimacy, such an authoritarian ruler is even more doomed to rely on the repressive apparatus (controlled by the police, the national security service, the prosecutor’s office, the judicial system), as well as on the support of influential persons and groups in the country, those who have real power, money, and have a wide clientele network behind the back. However, in order to take advantage of these factors of retaining personal power, an authoritarian ruler must, firstly, completely eliminate any possibility of the emergence of political competitors, and also in exchange for support from the repressive and bureaucratic apparatus, as well as from his own patronage network, satisfy their expectations. And these expectations simply boil down to guarantees of a monopoly on power in certain sectors of the state hierarchy and the ability to convert this power into a financial equivalent and control over assets. It is this state of affairs that creates the basis for the preservation of corruption of the state apparatus at all levels of the political hierarchy, and that is why the possibilities of an authoritarian ruler to carry out full-fledged reforms, especially in the political and legal sphere, are by definition limited.
Rising corruption in the country
The Mirziyoyev regime was no exception to the above method of achieving and retaining power. That is why the corruption processes in the country, as a whole, not only did not decline, but in certain areas of the state and economic life of the country only intensified. In some areas, the ground for corruption has diminished, for example, as noted above, in the areas of currency exchange and related foreign trade transactions. But in others, such as civil engineering and the management of the country’s most important assets, corruption has increased.
In matters of corruption, Uzbekistan, like the aforementioned post-Soviet countries, is playing a double game. On the one hand, under pressure from Western international institutions, the government began to take legislative measures to curb corruption. Thus, a law on public procurement was adopted,[25] the Anti-Corruption Agency was created,[26] and from January 1, 2021, it was promised to introduce a mandatory annual declaration by state officials of their income and property.[27] However, new legal norms and procedures designed to curb corruption often work selectively in Uzbekistan, ignoring cases of abuse of power by influential persons, especially if they are in the close circle of the president, without attention and adequate action. The created anti-corruption agency is still acting timidly, and even then, mainly in relation to state structures of the middle and lower levels, not daring to affect the interests of those close to the president. And the adoption of a number of other necessary laws are still being postponed or remain promises.
As a result, already under Mirziyoyev’s rule, one corruption scandal after another began to arise. Since the beginning of 2017 alone, a number of journalistic investigations have been carried out and published, revealing corruption, conflicts of interest and behind-the-scenes deals at the highest level of the state hierarchy of Uzbekistan. Here are just a few of them:
- Discovery by activists and journalists of the construction of a secret resort residence of the president in the Akhangaran mountains worth about one billion dollars, information about the allocation of which is not available in any publicly available source, not in the press, or in the legal database.[28]
- Diversion from legal responsibility of government officials close to the president who allowed a conflict of interest and improper control during the construction of the Sardobin reservoir, which is why a dam burst on it in May 2020, which led to the flooding of thousands of square kilometers in the Syrdarya region and in neighboring Kazakhstan, and as a result, to huge economic damage. It turned out that the construction itself was carried out by “semi-dark” methods, with hiding from the public information about the relevant decisions of the government and the allocated budget for this construction.[29]
- Construction in the capital of the Tashkent-City business complex, which involved offshore companies with an opaque ownership structure and without any significant authorized capital and credit and professional history.[30] Moreover, these companies were provided by the government with a number of tax and customs benefits, as well as bank loans, which gave rise to serious suspicions of money laundering.
- Allocation of the company of the mayor of Tashkent, who is close to the president, of a large 555 million (in dollar equivalent) contract for the production and installation of smart gas meters in households, in violation of the procedures and rules of an open tender.[31]
- Identification of conflicts of interest in the presidential family itself and its kindred environment. It turned out that the company of the brother of president’s son-in-law turned out to be the beneficiary of the sums under the project, financed from public funds.[32] However, it appears that no conflict of interest has been officially declared. And the very legal regulation of the conflict of interests in Uzbekistan has not yet been adopted.
Political culture and style of government inherited from the predecessor
Another fundamental factor that does not give Mirziyoyev sufficient political will to follow the path of political reform is the political culture in which he emerged as a state person, as well as the corresponding autocratic style of government. One of the characteristic features of this political culture and this style of government is voluntarism, a tendency towards micro-management in the absence of sufficient attention to strategic issues, inability to distribute roles in the country’s leadership, create a system of checks and balances in decision-making and control over their implementation, share spheres of political and strategic leadership and civil service. Like Karimov, Mirziyoyev is inclined to constantly show initiative in matters of a private and local nature, to give spontaneous and ill-conceived instructions for the execution of middle and lower-level officials on some objects of local importance, all sorts of populist promises and statements, clearly designed for outreach goals. At the same time, in his public speeches, as a rule, there is no strategic analysis that would allow identifying the main problems and challenges of the country’s development, ways of solving them, formulating long-term goals, phasing in their achievement, defining priorities, and assessing achievements at each stage, considering and would harmonize the interests of different stakeholders. The word “development” is rarely found in his lexicon.
In his speeches and numerous voyages throughout the country, one can see his sincere desire and feverish efforts to change the economy for the better, to give impetus to the processes that will lead to the country’s prosperity. However, he apparently has little idea of how to achieve this. That is why window dressing has become an integral part of his public appearance. The lower rank officials, apparently sensing his desire to demonstrate success or that things are going as good as possible and began to arrange Potemkin villages (window dressing) along his route, for example, to hastily erect greenhouses according to his impulsive instructions, which then quickly fall into desolation.[33] Or, out of servility, they urgently plant fir tree seedlings along the route of his travel, and at the end of his visit, immediately remove them, apparently for other similar theatrical purposes.[34] It is hard to imagine that he did not know about this, because people from his administration are usually sent to the places of his planned visits in advance to supervise and prepare for the meeting.
Fixation on propaganda and state ideology
This combination of grandiose plans, populist measures, promises and ostentation has been especially evident shortly before the presidential elections. Apparently, someone from the entourage suggested to the president that in order to build up his political heft, he needs some kind of state ideology that would indicate a certain grand idea, as well as the high goals and vectors of the country’s development arising from it. For example, something like the Karimov’s ideology of Mustakillik (state independence, translated from Uzbek) or a slogan about the great future of the country.
Furthermore, in this issue, about ideology, there has recently been a certain confusion, a hasty change of milestones. This was especially reflected in the way the project of the Institute of Islamic Civilization was seen and implemented. Most likely, initially Mirziyoyev and his entourage saw the prospect of careful reintegration of the country into the Islamic world and following the model embodied by the Emirates. A drift in this direction would correspond to the growth of Islamic and social-conservative sentiments in society, while at the same time justifying the renunciation of the standards of liberal democracy. However, perhaps frightened by the events in Afghanistan, Mirziyoyev was forced to adjust plans for this institute, renaming it by his resolution into the Scientific and Educational Center, which promotes the idea of ”Third Renaissance – New Uzbekistan”.[35]
Mirziyoyev spoke about the Third Renaissance for a reason (authors’ note – by the previous ones, he meant the enlightenment Muslim renaissance of the 9th-12th centuries and the period of the 9th-12th centuries of Timurid rule (14th-15th centuries)). This idea is akin to Karimov’s Uzbekistan as a country with a great future and a great past. A combination of the concepts of the Renaissance and the “new” Uzbekistan gives this idea a similarity. In such an ideologeme, one can even see something similar to the structural composition of the idea of communism, which sought to build the Soviet Union, but in the end never did. However, there is also a significant difference from the communist ideology, and it lies in the fact that if in the Soviet ideologeme the pre-socialist past was most likely the embodiment of something negative, then Karimov-Mirziyoyev’s future grows out of the legacy of the glorious and great past. This can be seen in the example of the newly erected Monument of Independence near Tashkent, the foundation of which is replete with images of the heroes of this glorious past.
Signs of crisis in Mirziyoyev’s rule
I think that attempts to create this kind of state ideology can be viewed as a fig leaf covering the absence of a professionally developed and effective strategy for the country’s economic, social, and political development through its transformation. Instead of developing such a strategy, we see a return to some of the old state-building practices that were established under his predecessor.
In addition to attempts of creating a state ideology, there is a return, although not yet fully, to the practice of repressions against opponents and critics of the regime. This indirectly testifies to the growing crisis of the Mirziyoyev regime. This crisis is caused by the loss of some of the political legitimacy that he acquired in the first three or four years of his presidency, when he actually took some steps to open the floodgates of the market economy and support entrepreneurship.
However, despite some improvement in the investment climate and the conditions for doing business in the country, on the whole, the results of the efforts of the new president in the first five years of his rule can be called rather modest. At least, there has been no breakthrough in the economic sphere yet. For example, GDP per capita even decreased in comparison with 2016 year – from 2568 USD to 1686 USD in 2020.[36] Foreign direct investment increased, but not significantly, from 1,663 USD in 2016 to 1726 USD in 2020.[37]
The difficulties of the last one and a half years, of course, can be attributed to the pandemic, from which many countries of the world have suffered economically. The situation could, however, be saved, but it is not saved by the country’s rather large gold and foreign exchange reserves, formed largely due to the fact that the country produces up to 100 tons of gold per year.[38] As of June 1 of this year, these reserves amounted to 35.52 billion USD.[39] Unfortunately, this potential is eroded by huge and rapidly growing external debt, which today is equal in size to the available foreign exchange reserves. In this vein, as of July 1, 2021, the total external debt of Uzbekistan reached 35.9 billion USD, having increased by 6% in the last six months alone.[40] At the same time, the government did not report to the public on what this debt was spent on, what the gold and foreign exchange reserves are spent on. The problem here is not only and not so much in the amount of debt, but in the lack of transparency in government spending, in the fact that funds are often spent thoughtlessly and wastefully, without proper economic calculations, and, apparently, as a result of behind-the-scenes lobbying by various influential interest groups. According to available information, gold and foreign exchange reserves are spent on not the most important purposes – for example, on construction work in a residential and office complex, on various pompous objects (for example, on the construction of facilities of the Institute of Islamic Civilizations, the construction of the Independence Monument, the development of a huge park “New Uzbekistan »), to create an ultra-expensive resort residence of the president, or to produce gas meters in households, etc.
At the same time, it is not yet clear that the government has taken sufficient measures to radically improve the investment climate in the country, for which it would be necessary, first of all, to establish open and transparent rules of the game and guarantees to protect investments and property rights of investors from the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy. This, in turn, depends on progress in establishing the rule of law and implementing administrative reform. Unfortunately, neither the one nor the other has yet been observed. Large businesses and deals in Uzbekistan continue to take place behind closed doors, often with kickbacks and transactions through offshore zones. And the courts still make decisions following the so-called telephone law.
Feeling that it is not possible to strengthen its legitimacy, first of all, in view of the very corruption processes and the practice of nepotism, which were mentioned above, the Mirziyoyev regime increasingly began to resort to the old Karimov methods of ensuring the loyalty of the population and employees of the state apparatus – methods of propaganda, coercion and tightening the nuts. It is characteristic that in the pre-election speeches of Mirziyoyev, no plans for further structural reforms were outlined. Instead, we heard promises of some rosy results from his reign that will be achieved in the distant future.
It is still difficult to predict which path the Mirziyoyev regime will take further, whether the rollback from the course of reforms will continue to intensify, or whether these reforms will be continued, albeit in a curtailed form. The most probable, in my opinion, is the last option – limited reforms that have little effect on the foundations of the system and style of government. If this is so, then the situation in the country can again be qualified as under-reforms, or reforms in some areas and stagnation or even a rollback in others. And that would be far from the worst scenario. The third would be the worst – a complete return to a model similar to Karimov’s.
Some international observers still hope that at least by the end of the second presidential term, Mirziyoyev will not run for a third term, adjusting the country’s legislation for this, as Karimov has repeatedly done earlier.[42] I consider these hopes in vain, unjustified illusions. It is highly likely that he will follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, as well as the authoritarian leaders of Russia and Kazakhstan, whose model of oligarchic capitalism Mirziyoyev has already adopted. It is from this perspective that both the civil society of Uzbekistan and international stakeholders should proceed, setting themselves up for a long period of putting pressure on the regime from inside and outside, in order to truly transform the country.
The opinions expressed in the article belong solely to the author and do not reflect the position of the editorial staff of the analytical platform CABAR.asia or the IWPR Central Asia media organization.
[1] Gazeta.uz, 8 September 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/09/08/five-years/?fbclid=IwAR0cH23WjgsDskUSzsxjnIPmeof5XSd3f8u5TZ0bQM1QwIq4AaCwbwEdvx4
[2] Uznews.uz, 6 June 2017, https://uznews.uz/ru/article/5318/
[3] Radio Liberty, 31 January 2018, https://www.svoboda.org/a/29009216.html
[4] Fergananews, 05/29/2014, https://www.fergananews.com/articles/8156
[5] Radio Ozodlik, October 13, 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31506385.html
[6] See: Radio Ozodlik, October 04, 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31491263.html
[7] FREEDOM ON THE NET 2021, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/FOTN_2021_Complete_Booklet_09162021_FINAL_UPDATED.pdf
[8] Radio Ozodlik, 13 October 2021, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/aqsh-o-zbekiston-diniy-mahkumlar-/31506794.html
[9] Radio Ozodlik, April 7, 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31190603.html
[10] Radio Ozodlik, 21 September 2017, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/28748174.html
[11] Gazeta.uz, December 3, 2017, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/12/13/cotton/
[12] Central Asia Labor Rights Monitoring Mission, https://labourcentralasia.org/ru/news/doklad-ugf-prinuditelnyy-trud-pri-sbore-khlopka-v-uzbekistane-v-2018-godu/?f =sANwmylp
[13] The Diplomat, uly 14, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/kristian-lasslett-on-uzbekistans-cotton-clusters-conundrum/
[14] Eurasianet, Apr 29, 2021, https://eurasianet.org/tempers-flaring-as-kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-come-to-deadly-blows
[15] Present, 6 March 2021, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-border/31171146.html
[16] EurAsia Daily, 28 September 2021, https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/09/28/dushanbe-i-tashkent-do-konca-goda-provedut-demarkaciyu-na-granice-dvuh-gosudarstv
[17] Fergananews, 12/29/2017, https://www.fergananews.com/news/27740
[18] See: Radio Ozodlik, December 4, 2017, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/28894432.html; October 14, 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31221084.html; April 20, 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31209109.html – the key person in the operations described in these stories was Bakhtiyor Fazylov, closely associated with the Russian Gazprombank and at the same time close to Shavkat Mirziyoyev.
[19] Gazeta.uz, October 2, 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/10/02/eeu/
[20] Fergananews, 20 January 2020, https://fergana.media/news/114339/
[21] Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 9, 2020, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30477498.html
[22] DW, 17 August 2021, https://www.dw.com/ru/taliby-zahvatili-afganistan-kto-upravljaet-gruppirovkoj-chego-ot-nih-zhdat/a-58889413
[23] For example, here is an article by a local pro-Russian expert, actually calling for joining the CSTO: Eurasia Expert, October 14, 2021, https://eurasia.expert/v-uzbekistane-obsuzhdaetsya-vozvrashchenie-v-odkb/?fbclid=IwAR2TK8zMAZ6QyzL_Ppjl1uXg35L3umsgM7UEn7-3cCCuzfZ52curA_P4Yh8
[24] Uzdaily, 08 October 2021, https://uzdaily.uz/ru/post/64251
[25] Norma.uz, 23 April 2021, https://www.norma.uz/novoe_v_zakonodatelstve/zakon_o_gosudarstvennyh_zakupkah_prinyat_v_novoy_redakcii
[26] Gazeta.uz, June 29, 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/06/29/anticorruption/
[27] Gazeta.uz, July 7, 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/07/07/declaration/
[28] Radio Ozodlik, 23 February 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/tainaia-rezidentsiia-dlia-prezidenta-uzbekistana/31117724.html
[29] See on this topic: Gazeta.uz, May 10, 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/05/10/sardoba/ ; Present time, May 4, 2020, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/raspilili-dambu-v-uzbekistane/30591699.html ; Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, 25 June, 2021, https://www.uzbekforum.org/video-sardoba-a-year-after-the-tragedy-more-questions-than-answers/
[30] See: CentralAsia.Media, 17 September 2018, https://centralasia.media/news:1469998 ; CentralAsia.Media, 24 September 2018, https://centralasia.media/news:1471404
[31] Radio Ozodlik, 25 May 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30620760.html
[32] Radio Ozodlik, 15 September 2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31459992.html
[33] Podrobno.uz, 10 June 2021, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/nelzya-rasprostranyat-natyanutuyu-za-ushi-situatsiyu-na-vsyu-stranu-ekspert-o-zabroshennykh-i-povrezh/
[34] Gazeta.uz, June 20, 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/06/20/andijan/
[35] Gazeta.uz, 17 July 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/07/17/centre/
[36] Macrotrends, 2021, https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/UZB/uzbekistan/gdp-per-capita
[37] World Investment Report 2021, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2021_en.pdf
[38] Gazeta.uz, June 24, 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/06/24/gold/
[39] Review.uz, 8 June 2021, https://review.uz/post/zolotovalyutne-rezerv-uzbekistana-vrosli-na-13-mlrd
[40] Gazeta.uz, 23 September 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/09/23/external-debt/
[41] Gazeta.uz, September 26, 2021, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/09/26/shavkat-mirziyoyev/
[42] Voice of America, October 14, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/uzbek-election-eyed-as-indicator-of-nation-s-future-/6271139.html?fbclid=IwAR3-2dySmQu_Fliptk9qeYKjNASCh5EeI5VABfpV9PUQ7a6rCfBVzgDhxu8