Director of the Uzbek Center for Research Initiatives “Ma’no” Bakhtiyor Ergashev, in an interview for CABAR.asia, spoke about the specifics of the public administration system in Uzbekistan, in particular about the administrative reform and why the principle of appointing khokims is preserved.
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In 2016, Uzbekistan entered a new stage of its development. The republic’s leadership strives to ensure the country’s economic growth, increase its investment attractiveness and competitiveness in world markets. Significant changes are also taking place in the social sphere. The “nisi of politics” of Uzbekistan is also changing.
However, the administrative reform, which began several years ago, practically did not affect the local government system. In particular, the principle of appointing khokims by the president is still preserved. What is the reason for this practice and why is President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is in no hurry to introduce a mechanism for electing heads of local authorities? We talked with the well-known political scientist of the country, director of the Center for Research Initiatives “Ma’no” Bakhtiyor Ergashev on this matter.
CABAR.asia: why over the past 30 years of independence the system of state power on the ground in Uzbekistan has practically not changed?
Well, let us start with the fact that Uzbekistan was originally and remains a unitary state. We have a presidential republic. Some people call the Uzbek model of power super-presidential. This means that the head of state coordinates the activities of all branches of government in the country. One of the powers of the president within the framework of this model is the appointment of khokims of the regions and the city of Tashkent, as well as their dismissal.
The current system of public administration took shape in the first half of the 1990s, and then it was a vital necessity. Since, after gaining independence, the leadership of the young, sovereign Uzbekistan was faced with the task of forming statehood and preserving political, social, economic stability in the country. The most important feature of the state as a political institution is the speed of passage of management signals – from top to bottom. The faster this process proceeds, the more stable the structure of the state is. That is why a centralized government was created in Uzbekistan. Without this, it would have been impossible to form the foundations of the new state.
I hardly imagine that we would have applied the system of electing khokims in the 1990s. The country would simply drown in endless elections, useless squabbles between the center and the regions.
There is one more important point, which is, for some reason, little talked about now. Decentralization processes have always existed in Uzbekistan in the form of family-clan and compatriot ties that have been rooted for centuries. The construction of a new sovereign state required overcoming this tradition of clannishness through the appointment of khokims who would be directly subordinate to the president and would not be dependent on local, regional elites.
We must not forget about the external factor. In the absence of a rigid centralized system of government, it is extremely difficult to resist negative external influences. Take a look at neighboring Afghanistan. The example of this country clearly shows what the imbalance in relations between the center and the regions can lead to.
Nevertheless, everything around is changing. Today we live in a completely different country than 30 years ago. Society’s demands for democracy have grown, but the model of government remains unchanged. There is a feeling that things should not continue in this way.
You are absolutely right; the state administration system must be gradually changed. However, the main question is the dynamics, the pace of such changes. Of course, any sane citizen would like the country to have more democracy, to apply the mechanism of accountability of local authorities to the population, so that people can control the activities of officials, influence their decisions, etc. One of the most effective tools of public control is the electoral system of khokims. Although, in the current conditions of the development of society, it is too risky to introduce this practice in Uzbekistan. Personally, I am against such drastic decisions. Let me explain why.
Let us ask ourselves a question: what result will we get by applying the mechanism of khokim election now? To carry out reform for the sake of reform in order to resemble any countries that for some reason consider themselves the standard of democracy? Although, it is silly to think that everything that works for them will immediately work for us. It will not happen. Since each country is a set of unique characteristics from geography to history, culture, and mentality. There is no single model of democracy applicable to all.
Moreover, present-day Uzbekistan is at the stage of deep, comprehensive reforms affecting all spheres of the country’s social, political, and economic life. If we start electing khokims now, we will get discord in society. This will lead to a sharp decrease in the rate of passage of management signals from top to bottom. Even with a centralized vertical of power, we are all witnessing how difficult it is to carry out reforms. The introduction of the mechanism for electing khokims will further aggravate the situation. A fierce struggle for power of local elites and clans will begin, bickering among candidates for the positions of khokims, with all the ensuing consequences.
Let us imagine that the elections took place and the khokim was elected. And what if he turns out to be incompetent, gets bogged down in corruption, etc.? It will be necessary to re-elect the hokim, and this is a long, worrying process. This kind of re-election will take a lot of time and resources. Meanwhile, the work will not continue. Thus, we will definitely not get any progress.
You would ask, are the current heads of local authorities all true angels / (clean and fluffy)? Of course not! Many ineffective khokims have to be removed from their posts. But in this case, the process of appointing a new candidate takes much less time. The most important point is that the state has leverage and control over the situation.
Who will now benefit from the immediate implementation of the khokim appointment system? Society? No. Because at the moment it does not have mechanisms and institutions to effectively control the activities of the khokim with their enormous legislative powers.
The economy will not get better either. Indeed, in conditions of weakness of regional budgets, local leaders are not able to independently create an environment for regional development. The need for centralized investment will remain in any case.
And who will win? Only a narrow layer of political scientists, political strategists, experts in the field of electoral technologies, sociologists, journalists, and bloggers will win. They will master the electoral budgets of candidates, providing appropriate services and publishing ordered materials. Here they will be satisfied. And everyone else will lose.
But then again, what about the president’s promises? Indeed, even in his election campaign, Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated that the khokims would be elected by the people. But at a recent meeting in the city of Nurafshan, the president said that the society was not ready for the elections of khokims. This change of position has agitated the active part of the country’s population and there are dissatisfied.
In 2016, when the transit of power in Uzbekistan was taking place, Shavkat Mirziyoyev intended to gradually introduce a mechanism for electing the heads of local authorities. This was one of the directions of his election program.
However, time has made its own adjustments to the president’s plans. I think that during the four years of his rule, the head of state realized that without the creation of an effective mechanism of checks and balances on the ground, now, in the midst of the reforms being carried out, to the practice of electing khokims is fraught with the stability of the entire political system of the country.
Understand that serious, systemic reforms cannot be carried out just for the sake of gaining additional points in international ratings or loudly announce the flourishing of democracy in the country.
Haste in this matter will not lead to anything good. It is necessary to proceed from a real assessment of the current situation. And the realities are such that our society is not yet ready to consciously elect khokims and bear full responsibility for their choice. The President understands this very well. In the end, we are not talking about canceling the decision. Sooner or later, the institution of local government elections will appear in Uzbekistan. But this should happen after the country has implemented the bulk of the planned political, economic, and social reforms.
According to the indicators of last year, 11 out of 14 administrative units in Uzbekistan are subsidized and only three regions are self-sufficient from an economic point of view. How will the elected khokims work in such conditions? Will they be able to make a difference? Hardly without financial resources from the center. They, as now, will have to ask the center for money for the development of the region.
I often discuss with people who say that the introduction of a system for electing khokims will make society more democratic. As an expert who has been dealing with issues of public administration for many years, I can firmly state that this will not happen until institutional conditions are created on the ground and a balance of political forces in the regions is achieved.
What do you mean?
The fact is that now khokims of all levels are endowed with superpowers. According to the current legislation, they are simultaneously head of the executive and representative bodies of power. I am surprised that the powers of the chairman of regional, district, city councils of people’s deputies have not yet been removed from the khokims. It turns out that every year the head of the local authority is the khokim, he gives an account to himself and approves it himself. And only the central government in Tashkent can control their activities. If we introduce a mechanism for electing khokims in such conditions, then in fact we will get local khans endowed with enormous powers, and clan traditions will immediately resume. The center will no longer have leverage over the situation; it will drown in various agreements and compromises. And the mechanism of control from below (by public organizations, civic activists, self-government bodies) has not yet been formed. This situation will certainly lead to serious failures in the system of executive power.
When the environment will be mature enough, where we can talk about the readiness of the Uzbek society for the election of khokims? Are there clear signs of this maturity? What efforts should the state and society itself make for this?
As always, everything depends on the economy. According to my calculations, the system of election of khokims should be switched over in 15 years. Our center conducted an independent analysis. According to it, if Uzbekistan reaches an annual GDP growth rate of at least 6-6.2% from 2023, then within a maximum of eight years the country’s gross domestic product will double. And this is an average of 3.5 thousand USD per capita. At the same rate, by 2035, it is possible to achieve a new doubling of GDP, which will amount to at least 7-7.5 thousand USD per person. And then we will live in another country, with a much more developed economy and society as a whole.
A well-known statesman and politician, one of the founders of the Singaporean “economic miracle” Lee Kuan Yew once said: “Before embarking on democratic reforms, it is necessary to ensure that the country’s GDP per capita reaches 14 thousand USD. After that, the society will be ready to live and work in a democracy”. And he knew what he was talking about. Lee Kuan Yew made his way with Singapore from a third world country to a club of highly developed states. At the same time, they always liked to accuse him of authoritarianism.
Moreover, in Uzbekistan, the first step is to raise the economy, to give the opportunity and incentives to citizens to form sustainable sources of income.
Now the overwhelming majority of the country’s population is not really up to democracy, not up to participation in political and electoral processes. They are more concerned with how to feed their families and other domestic issues than with those who will rule the country, region, or district.
Poor people are not interested in social issues. In the conditions of Uzbekistan, this is mainly the lot of either pensioners who have enough free time, or young unemployed people who use social networks. And who, by the way, are very easy to bribe, seduce with various gifts and create shock troops from them to disturb public peace.
I am deeply convinced that only the success of economic reforms, a gradual increase in the number of people with sustainable sources of income in society will create a demand for democracy. Without the presence of a middle class capable of firmly defending its rights and interests, the introduction of a system of electing khokims in Uzbekistan will be a step not towards democracy, but towards ochlocracy, not towards the power of the people, but towards the power of the crowd. That is all!
How will the configuration of state power change when khokims are elected? And will this be considered as a real progress for Uzbekistan?
For Uzbekistan, this will be a real revolution in the field of public administration. The mechanism for electing khokims will lead to a radical change in the country’s political system. The mechanism of interaction between the center and the regions will change significantly. Local leaders will no longer report directly to the center. The system of strategic planning will also change, the regions themselves will determine the priorities of regional development, determine which spheres, industries and production need to be developed, what and how to support. However, all this is going to take place in the future. In order to reach such a future, it is necessary to carry out a serious administrative reform.
Such an attempt was made in 2018, right?
What has been done in the past few years can hardly be called an administrative reform. It is impossible to achieve the desired result by changing only the name of several ministries, creating a couple of new ones, reducing the number of civil servants, increasing their salaries, etc.
Reforming the public administration system should begin with a full functional analysis of all public authorities and administration. To understand what they really should be doing and what they are doing now, to reveal the correlation of these processes. And then to determine the regulations of each state body and, on its basis, to develop the official regulations of civil servants. However, this is a long, expensive, and difficult path, so no one wants to deal with it closely. Furthermore, for some reason everyone decided that the administrative reform in Uzbekistan was completed. Generally speaking, they did not take it seriously.
The public administration system needs to be changed evolutionarily. Unfortunately, in some issues we are very far behind. For example, I do not understand why the local government in Uzbekistan is still not divided. Although this should have been done back in 2004, when a bicameral parliament was created. Now all local power is concentrated in the hands of khokims. Regional, district, city councils of people’s deputies should not depend on local government bodies – neither financially, nor organizationally, nor personnel. Only in this case kengash will be able to gradually learn how to control the activities of khokims and at the local level we will get a second center of power.
Are the deputies themselves ready for this?
I agree that not all people’s representatives have sufficient experience, desire, and competence for the successful implementation of their mission. However, strong deputies need to be nurtured. They cannot appear out of thin air. It is necessary to work on this systematically, giving the deputies more powers and training them.
In turn, the state is taking significant measures to improve the efficiency of local managers. We recently adopted a law on civil service, and we are gradually starting to introduce a KPI mechanism for civil servants, as well as a system for declaring property, income, and expenses of officials. And this is only a part of the planned reforms.
It must be admitted that practically nothing has been done in this direction over the past twenty years. And the current changes will not yield quick results. It remains to be seen what will come of it.
This article was prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project implemented with the financial support of the Foreign Ministry of Norway. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial or donor.