“The unwillingness or inability of modern Russia to maintain historically established relations with the Pamir peoples leads to a rethinking of the role of Russia on a regional scale” – about the weakening role of Russia in the Pamirs in an article, specifically for CABAR.asia.
The Tajik government has launched yet another military operation in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), also known as the Pamirs or Roof of the World. This remote mountainous region makes up almost half of the country’s territory and is home to about 3% of Tajikistan’s population. According to the Tajik authorities , the operation is being carried out against organized criminal groups backed by international terrorist organizations and aims to ensure “the security of citizens, public order and the restoration of unhindered movement of vehicles along the Dushanbe-Kulma international highway.”
A section of the highway was blocked by residents of the Rushan district in order to prevent the advance of military forces into the city of Khorog, where tensions have not abated since November 2021 after the killing of a local resident allegedly by security forces and the dispersal of peaceful protests. During the protests, residents of GBAO expressed dissatisfaction with the inaction of the authorities in investigating the circumstances of the death of people, the increased military presence, the information isolation of the region, as well as the persecution of the Pamiris.
The anti-terrorist operation is carried out harshly, uncompromisingly and is accompanied by numerous victims and arrests. This is of serious concern to the world community, including the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, the European Union , Switzerland , the UN Secretary General, the UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Human Rights Watch and a number of other international non-governmental organizations who have issued statements urging the government of Tajikistan to refrain from excessive use of force, to prevent casualties among the civilian population and to enter into a constructive dialogue with the Pamiri minority.
One of the players that has great influence on the Tajik authorities, and thus is able to contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict, is Russia, on whose support the Pamiris counted very much due to their special historical ties. However, in its briefing on the events in GBAO, the Russian Foreign Ministry only expressed concern about the safety of Russian citizens, casualties among law enforcement officers, and referring to the Tajik authorities, called the escalation of tension provoked by criminal elements and accomplices of extremism who joined them.
Russia has long been considered the protector of the small ethnic groups of the Pamirs, who differ from the rest of the population of Tajikistan in language (the Pamir languages belong to the Eastern Iranian languages, while the state Tajik language belongs to the Western Iranian languages) and religion (unlike Sunni Tajiks, the majority people of the Pamirs are Shiites, Nizaris). A special relationship between the Russians and the Pamiris developed back in the 19th century, when the Russian Empire literally protected the Pamiris from the genocide of the Afghan khans and the oppression of the Bukhara emirs, who considered the Pamiris to be infidels due to their belonging to the Shia, or rather the Ismaili movement in Islam. In those days, the Russian military of the Pamir detachment, “protecting the southern borders from external enemies, they began to protect local residents from internal enemies, bandits, officials, thereby replacing non-existent local authorities.”
During the Soviet era and until the withdrawal of troops from GBAO in 2004, three Russian border detachments were based in the Pamirs (Khorog, Ishkashim and Murgab), supplying the inhabitants of this remote mountainous region with food and jobs. Even during the years of the civil war of 1992-1997, when the Pamiris were on the side of the opposition, the Russian military became “the only significant economic agent, security guarantor and socialization institution that prevented the development of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast along the path beaten by Afghanistan.”
The politics of the current Russian authorities in relation to the Pamiris is more distant and is fundamentally different from Imperial Russia and even the Soviet government, which, despite colonial ambitions, was still more productive and humanitarian in nature.
Having a separate culture and way of life, the inhabitants of the highlands of the Pamirs have always been distinguished by hospitability, peace-loving and free-thinking. An important role in this is also played by the high level of education of the population and adherence to Ismailism, which is considered a fairly democratic movement in Islam. Fundamentally, these characteristics helped the Pamiris at necessary time achieve the protection of Russia, which is thousands of kilometers away, and to a certain extent explain the increased likelihood of protest moods. However, as practice shows, violent methods of suppressing popular discontent only exacerbate the existing contradictions.
Therefore, the only effective method of resolving conflict situations between the center and GBAO is a dialogue involving influential mediators. Russia could act as such a mediator. However, given the current situation in the world, there are several factors that explain the impossibility or rather unwillingness of Russia to intervene in this conflict.
Ukrainian factor
Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine and increasing political and economic isolation, it is important for Russia to maintain good and trusting relations with the current leadership of Tajikistan, which, as shown by the recent visit of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon to Moscow in the framework of meetings of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), remains a friendly country. This is also evidenced by the neutral or rather silent position of the official authorities of Tajikistan during the adoption of two resolutions of the UN General Assembly regarding the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the humanitarian consequences of this aggression in March of this year and the refusal of Tajikistan to support the exclusion of Russia from membership in the UN Human Rights Council in April. Thus, taking the side of the Pamiri minority means turning the current political regime against itself and, accordingly, spoiling relations with an ally, which Russia cannot afford.
Afghan factor
Despite the sovereignty of Tajikistan, the Tajik Afghan border is still considered a strategic frontier for protecting Russian interests. The current rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the resulting potential increase in arms and drug smuggling and the infiltration of members of radical groups such as ISIS into Central Asia, and beyond it into Russia, is a major concern for Moscow. However, as noted above, Russia is now in no position to fight on several fronts.
The largest 201st military base of the Central Military District of the Russian Armed Forces is stationed in Tajikistan, and according to some reports, Russia is forced to transfer part of the contingent to Ukraine, thus exposing the southern flank of Russia. The president of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon is the only and toughest critic of the Taliban among Central Asian leaders. Despite this, Russia positively assesses the dynamics of the Taliban rule and even takes steps to establish diplomatic relations with them. However, Moscow has no illusions about the reliability of the Taliban regime and is in no hurry to exclude them from the list of terrorist organizations banned in Russia. Thus, on the one hand, Russia uses soft rhetoric against the Taliban, holding back the possible advance of radical groups deep into Central Asia, and on the other hand, given, for example, the recent transfer of a large number of armed Taliban supporters to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, holds a hand on pulse, paying maximum attention to strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, supporting the current leadership of Tajikistan in every possible way.
Chinese factor
The expansion of China in the Pamirs is happening rapidly and on a large scale. Starting from the construction of roads to the alienation of part of the territory of the Murghab region of GBAO to China in 2011, the transfer of silver deposits for temporary use as an investment attraction and the construction of unofficial military facilities in the region, China is increasing its military and economic presence in the region, creating favorable conditions not for Pamiris, but for the ruling regime in Tajikistan. Unlike Russia, for the Celestial Empire, Tajikistan as a whole (and the Pamirs in particular) is a relatively easy source of resources, as evidenced by the indicators of foreign direct investment. So, for example, if in 2010 the amount of foreign direct investment income from Russia and China to Tajikistan was almost equal; in 2020, Chinese investments were 10 times higher than Russian ones. However, just like for Russia, the Pamirs is a buffer zone for protecting China’s interests from the introduction of radical Islamist groups. Thus, since the security interests of China and Russia in Central Asia coincide, given the rapprochement between Russia and China against the backdrop of confrontation with the West, and also considering that Moscow’s priorities are currently centered in Ukraine, Russia is tolerant of allowing the Tajik authorities Chinese expansion.
Conclusion
The colonial takeover of Central Asia in the 19th century was accompanied by violence from Russia and fierce resistance from the local population. However, according to some scientists, unlike other regions of Central Asia, the Russian Empire developed and liberated the Pamir rich in minerals and precious stones, not because of economic interests, since the development of industry was very difficult due to the natural features of the harsh region. Even the strategic geographical importance of the Pamirs in the Great Game between Russia and Britain faded into the background.
Rather, Russia’s interest in the Pamirs was explained by the unique features of the highlanders (including their religion, language, and external differences), whose culture and way of life had to be preserved from complete destruction. For the Russians, the Pamiris were “the last of the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, who were pushed back into the mountains by successive waves of Turkic migration, but who at the same time retained a racial and linguistic identity”. Moreover, the extremely deplorable and vulnerable existence of the Pamiris under the yoke of the Afghan khans and the Bukhara emirs aroused great sympathy and compassion for the Russian officers who responded to the highlanders’ calls for protection. However, as events show, this special connection between Russia and the Pamirs cannot be counted on in the 21st century.
Without the mediation of an influential intermediary, the confrontation between the central government in Dushanbe and the inhabitants of the Pamirs will continue to escalate. Considering the experience of the civil war of the 1990s in Tajikistan and the proximity to troubled Afghanistan, this will inevitably affect the stability of the entire Central Asian region. Thus, just as the events in Ukraine force the world community to rethink Russia’s role as an aggressor on a global scale, Moscow’s unwillingness, or inability to maintain historical relations with the Pamir peoples may lead to a rethinking of Russia’s role on a regional scale. In other words, Russia’s defection in the Pamirs not only speaks to its waning economic and military influence in the region but may also lead to a decrease in trust in Russia as a reliable ally.