This article, written exclusively for CABAR.asia by Dr. Charles Sullivan, traces how three new Central Asian leaders differ in terms of their respective governing styles and how they seek to shape state-society relations.
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The newly independent countries of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan exhibit varying modes of authoritarian governance today. While Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have experienced maiden transitions at the highest levels and retained non-democratic systems, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are still contending with this issue. Differing degrees of coercion combined with the level of maneuverability of sitting presidents explain the political variation observed in Central Asia. However, a series of political, economic, and regional challenges in an era of intensified Great Power rivalry threaten the durability of the “Stans”.
Introduction
When it comes to Central Asia, the region’s autocrats are seemingly in a league of their own in terms of self-aggrandizement. The most famous person in Kazakhstan is Nursultan Nazarbayev, also known as Elbasy or the “Leader of the Nation” in Kazakh. His birthday (July 6th), which is also known as Capital Day, and the Day of the First President (December 1st) are official state holidays. Kazakhstan’s government even changed the name of the capital city from Astana to Nur-Sultan following Nazarbayev’s resignation from the presidency in 2019.[1] Nazarbayev has a bit of a sense of humor. In 2015, he jokingly apologized for winning reelection once again, this time supposedly with 97.7% percent of the popular vote.[2] But the elites in Kazakhstan are no longer laughing alongside Elbasy, in light of the mass protests which arose in response to the “stage-managed” June 2019 presidential election designed to anoint Nazarbayev’s chosen successor.[3] Protests in Kazakhstan have since waned, but not because the elites have initiated a change in course. On the contrary, the novel coronavirus pandemic has forced most people off of the streets. To even further complicate matters, in mid-June 2020 Nazarbayev himself tested positive for COVID-19.[4]
Turkmenistan’s political system is even more eccentric in nature. The stories about the late president Saparmurat Niyazov (who preferred to be called Turkmenbashi or the “Leader of the Turkmen”) are bizarre. Niyazov banned ballets, rewrote the calendar months and days of the week, penned his own opus (Ruhnama) and made it a required text, and built golden monuments in his own image.[5] He then suddenly died in late 2006. Thereafter, his successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, began crafting his own cult of personality. Berdymukhamedov likes to be called Arkadag (or “Protector” in Turkmen) and regularly shows off his military combat readiness, bowling skills, and off-road driving, all so as to apparently inform his citizens that he has no intentions of unexpectedly leaving power anytime soon.[6]Few in Tajikistan laugh at President Emomali Rahmon, in part because he essentially won the country’s five-year-long civil war in the mid-1990s (albeit with Russia and Uzbekistan’s much-needed assistance)[7] and has since assumed near-total control over the country, save for the most remote areas. But Rahmon also takes precautions to keep himself from serving as the butt of jokes. As a case in point, in 2013 the government temporarily banned YouTube access in the country after someone released a video showing the president singing and dancing at his son’s wedding.[8] Islam Karimov, the late ironfisted ruler of Uzbekistan, did not have any sense of humor. He silenced all dissent – most brazenly in May 2005 in the city of Andijan[9] – until his death in 2016. However, Karimov’s successor, Shavkhat Mirziyoyev, has given Uzbekistan’s citizens much to talk about by partially dismantling his predecessor’s dictatorship.
The variation in terms of the types of authoritarian governance practiced across Central Asia today is quite pronounced. In Ashgabat, dictatorship remains in vogue. In Tashkent, the government is gradually abandoning absolutism and rekindling ties with the West. In Nur-Sultan, a farcical election designed to legitimize Nazarbayev’s successor energized local civil society activists, forcing the government in turn to make use of repressive measures to suppress public discontent. In Dushanbe, the political climate is growing ominous with the government seemingly making preparations for a dynastic succession in the coming years.[10] Yet how can we account for such variation?
Overall, this article posits that contemporary differences with respect to the coercive natures of these ruling regimes and the statuses of the so-called “founding fathers” can help us understand the contrasting political trajectories observed across the region. Accordingly, this article traces how three new Central Asian leaders (Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Kazakhstan, Shavkhat Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan, and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Turkmenistan) differ in terms of their respective governing styles and how they seek to shape state-society relations. The deaths of Niyazov in Turkmenistan and Karimov in Uzbekistan have permitted the new leaders of these systems to either largely govern in the same fashion as their predecessor and not implement any substantive reforms (i.e. Turkmenistan), or carry out reforms designed to disassemble certain aspects of their predecessor’s system (i.e. Uzbekistan). In contrast, Nazarbayev’s resignation from the presidency but continued involvement in Kazakhstan’s politics (albeit seemingly from afar) arguably hinders his successor’s ability to carry out any significant reforms.
Kazakhstan periodically introduces cosmetic modifications but these so-called reforms do not reshape the manner in which power is exercised within the system. Even if Tokayev aspires to undertake transformative measures, Nazarbayev’s sustained presence serves to obfuscate any such efforts, at least for the time being. As such, this article argues that authoritarian leaders who succeed a late president can seize or pass upon the opportunity to undertake a reformist agenda, whereas other leaders who must still work with their living predecessor seemingly remain enfeebled. In addition, this article provides an overview of the political situation in Tajikistan and discusses how the impending transition from Rahmon to his (as of now) unnamed successor may transpire in the future.
Generally speaking, reforms in Central Asia carry little meaning. Elites champion grandiose plans to convince the masses that progress is being realized and that ordinary citizens should be grateful. In some countries (i.e. Uzbekistan) this strategy appears to be working, while in others (i.e. Kazakhstan) it is faltering. After all, had it not been for the onset of the novel coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the ensuing two-month lockdown, the mass protests across Kazakhstan likely would not have ceased. So, why have Central Asia’s leaders thus far refrained from governing according to democratic principles?
In truth, the elites have demonstrated over the past generation that they do not wish to disperse power by institutionalizing it. Bearing this in mind, the seeming absence of any international pressure on these governments to carry out liberalizing measures permits Central Asia’s autocrats to keep ruling as they wish. Consequently, if they continue to oppose reforms designed to liberalize and diversify their systems, then the fissure between elites and the masses will only further widen. Granted, the expansion of this sociopolitical cleavage will likely not bring about the downfall of these regimes in the immediate future, but it will certainly complicate state-society relations as the four Central Asian republics discussed here to enter into a new decade of heightened geopolitical uncertainty.
Despotic Diversity
Not all Central Asian autocracies are equally authoritarian in nature. Kyrgyzstan constitutes an (unstable) outlier in comparison to its neighbors. While it is unwise to label the Kyrgyz Republic as a liberal democracy,[11] the government in Bishkek has experienced several political transitions already since independence. In addition, Kyrgyzstan differs from its neighbors in that several of the country’s presidents have been overthrown.
In contrast, in Turkmenistan, the government heavily restricts the activities of all local civil society groups while espousing a neutral foreign policy.[12] Turkmenbashi regularly “shuffled the deck” of elites to keep competitors off-balance.[13] Since assuming power, Berdymukhamedov has largely adhered to his predecessor’s domestic and foreign policies, while implementing a handful of cosmetic political reforms. As such, the dictatorship in Ashgabat looks to be stable. Uzbekistan is not nearly as repressive as its neighbor, yet this was not always the case. Under Karimov’s rule, some sources estimate that the government held as many as 10,000 to 12,000 political prisoners in detention.[14] Karimov’s tenure was marred by allegations of systemic torture and the institution of a forced labor system.[15] The former president also ordered the construction of an infamous prison (Jaslyk) – located in the far western desert region of the country – to hold terrorists and anyone who seemingly posed a challenge to his rule.[16] Throughout his reign, the State Security Service terrorized the local citizenry. But things have noticeably changed since Karimov’s death. Mirziyoyev has since stripped the SNB of some of its powers, shuttered Jaslyk, eased censorship, released some political prisoners, and initiated a series of economic reforms that have thrust Uzbekistan into the spotlight.[17] Recently, Mirziyoyev signed a decree to abolish the country’s quota system for cotton production in furtherance of ending forced labor.[18]
Tajikistan, on the other hand, appears to be traversing in the opposite direction. By selectively targeting elites he formerly welcomed into the government, Rahmon has cemented his hold on power.[19] That said, his writ is tenuous in the east and Rahmon’s soldiers have occasionally retreated after battling against rival militias.[20] Rahmon aspires to wield power like Berdymukhamedov but lacks the capacity to cow everyone into submission. Kazakhstan, on the contrary, embodies a “velvet fist” autocracy.[21] The government makes use of targeted coercion – such as in 2019 with the holding of a snap election won by then-interim president Tokayev[22] – but prefers to practice a type of “authoritarian persuasion”.[23] The elites and the government herald Nazarbayev’s “100 Concrete Steps” modernization plan and “multivector” foreign policy.[24] The regime’s “talk”[25] though has opened up a Pandora’s Box. Today, many citizens seek actual change while the elites retain control.[26]But why are the Central Asian republics so different in terms of authoritarian governance? Overall, the political preferences and maneuverability of the region’s leaders seem to offer a rather convincing explanation. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand out since both Berdymukhamedov and Mirziyoyev have seized upon a historic opportunity. With their old bosses no longer alive, they have a lot of political latitudes to govern as they please. In other words, they have effectively maneuvered to assert control in the wake of their predecessors’ deaths. The key difference between them is that Berdymukhamedov has chosen to keep the Turkmenbashi dictatorship largely intact, whereas Mirziyoyev is revising aspects of the old Karimov absolutist system. Neither seeks to establish a liberal democracy. However, they harbor different interests on the world stage. In the future, it is expected that Ashgabat will maintain its neutrality while Tashkent tries to woo the West. By staying isolated and neutral, Turkmenistan shows little interest in diversifying or playing the Great Powers off of one another. Uzbekistan, however, seeks to capitalize on its geostrategic location, realize its full economic potential, and reconnect with the West.[27]
By dying, Niyazov and Karimov have bequeathed their successors the chance to go their own ways. In Kazakhstan, however, Tokayev does not have the same luxury because his old boss is still alive.[28]
Kazakhstan’s actual maiden political transition has yet to take place. Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter Dariga – who served as Speaker of the Senate for less than one year (and according to the constitution was next-in-line to the presidency) until Tokayev unexpectedly dismissed her from office in May 2020[30] – is likely no longer a potential successor. It is difficult to understand the reasons behind Dariga’s political downfall. That said, it is also premature to assume that Tokayev has consolidated power. Perhaps Kazakhstan’s new leader is just starting to solidify his position, but it appears that his maneuverability is still bounded. Most likely, influential actors obtained Nazarbayev’s blessing to authorize Tokayev to remove Dariga. Nazarbayeva’s ouster may help to stem the government’s legitimacy crisis in the long run, but in the short term, Tokayev and the elites also need to navigate the country through a health crisis and an economic downturn brought on by a global pandemic.
Kazakhstan also differs from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the sense that Nur-Sultan’s autonomy on the world stage is much more restricted. Kazakhstan champions its “multivector” foreign policy, but the hard truth is that the government has become less “proactive” and more “reactive” over time as Russia has assumed an aggressive foreign policy.[31] Assuredly, Moscow would not let the political situation in Nur-Sultan spiral out of control, for Kazakhstan stands as one of Russia’s most reliable and impressionable allies. But Kazakhstan’s proximity to Russia also comes with a price. As a case in point, Tokayev’s recent statements about how Kazakhstan perceives Russia’s actions in Crimea highlight the extent of Moscow’s influence.[32] In the coming years, Kazakhstan will thus predictably drift further into Russia’s geopolitical orbit, particularly if relations between Russia and the West remain highly contentious.
In light of the sheer coercive capabilities of the state coupled with Turkmenistan’s isolationism, the elites in Ashgabat can rest somewhat easy, so long as they find a way to address mounting economic concerns.[33] In Tashkent, however, there is much work to be done since “reform” has become the new buzzword and Mirziyoyev’s reputation is now intertwined with him chipping away at the old Karimov dictatorship. Assuming this trend continues, we should expect for Uzbekistan’s civil society to grow over time. Eventually though, Mirziyoyev will have to contend with such liberal-oriented groups if/when his government shirks on instituting meaningful reforms. As for Tajikistan, no one knows how Rahmon will manage his departure from politics. If history offers any clues, Rahmon may stay in power until he dies (like Karimov). Or he may step into another role (like Nazarbayev) and instruct his eldest son[34] – who currently serves as the mayor of Dushanbe and Chairman of the Majlisi Milli or “upper chamber” of Tajikistan’s parliament[35] – to undertake a gradual liberalization campaign (in a similar fashion to Mirziyoyev) or keep turning inward (like Berdymukhamedov). Rahmon has the luxury to choose from among all these options, namely because the international community pays him little attention. His heir apparent, however, is only in his early 30s. Hence, the longer Rahmon lives, the better the chances are that Tajikistan will undergo a smooth high-level political transition. In any event, Rahmon will likely remain a political fixture in the region for years. In October 2020, he was re-elected to the presidency for another seven-year term, supposedly with ninety percent of all votes cast.[36]
Considerable variation exists among the Central Asian republics in terms of how the new and old leaders of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan govern.
Tunnel Vision
The atmosphere in Kazakhstan is somewhat tense. According to the International Monetary Fund, “gross domestic product fell from about $240 billion in 2013 to $170.5 billion in 2018”.[37] The country’s banking sector is also very “sick”, owing to corrupt lending practices, state bailouts, and criminal investigations.[38] Corruption in the banking system is so pervasive that construction for the hyped project to build a light railway transit system in Nur-Sultan with Chinese assistance has totally ceased.[39] In addition, the National Bank of Kazakhstan’s “foreign reserves fell from $18.05 billion in July 2018 to $11.13 billion in June 2019”.[40] And all of this happened prior to the onset of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
The main problem facing Kazakhstan, however, is political in nature. Even if Tokayev wishes to institute wide-ranging reforms to combat corrupt banking practices, curtail moral hazard, and entice foreign companies to invest, he is not very powerful. In fact, the elites likely prefer for Tokayev to remain weak, since reforming the system would pose a threat to the wealth which they have acquired. In brief, thirty years of Nazarbayev’s rule coupled with a decline in global oil prices has ushered Kazakhstan into its current dilemma. Austerity measures combined with gradual political liberalization appears to be the only viable solution to addressing this unfortunate state of affairs, but no one in Nur-Sultan is courageous enough to state aloud that the way to resolve the current impasse entails dismantling the system that Nazarbayev built.The political situation in 2019 grew very uneasy with special police units detaining peaceful protesters in cities across the country. The mysterious death of civil society activist Dulat Aghadil – who allegedly died of natural causes while being held in detention – sparked a round of mass protests.[41] But the regime manages to remain in control, perhaps in part to the onset of the pandemic which mandated social distancing to contain the spread of the virus. Still, it is difficult to predict whether the system could absorb a major shock (be it in the form of another major currency devaluation, a second coronavirus outbreak, the death of Nazarbayev, or all of the above) at this juncture. In March 2020, Kazakhstan reported its initial positive cases of the novel coronavirus. After initially quarantining Nur-Sultan and Almaty, the government locked down other major cities and regions. Kazakhstan began reopening its economy in May. By late June, however, the number of COVID-19 cases had sharply risen. To combat the virus the government has periodically reinstated some lockdown measures,[42] but overall Kazakhstan has fared rather well thus far in navigating between encouraging citizens to help contain the spread of the virus and keeping segments of the economy open.
Turkmenistan has a strong penchant for isolationism. For months, Ashgabat obfuscated a World Health Organization visit to the country to analyze the spread of COVID-19 and the government maintains that it has no recorded cases of the virus.[43] The reasoning behind this is straightforward: any public admission that the government has failed to protect its citizens from COVID-19 threatens to undermine Berdymukhamedov’s Arkadag personality cult.[44] That said, the country’s seclusion has inadvertently fostered a heavy economic dependency on China, and the government’s recent decision to suspend the convertibility of the manat and restructure the social security system has weakened its legitimacy.[45] To further complicate matters, China’s slowdown will place Turkmenistan in even more of a bind. As of March 2020, Beijing canceled gas deliveries with a host of nations, citing force majeure due to the coronavirus outbreak.[46] As a consequence of economic mismanagement, Ashgabat in 2019 was also designated by ECA International as the most expensive city in the world for ex-pats.[47]
In Uzbekistan, Mirziyoyev’s reformist measures have been well-received to date. But the reforms could slow to a trickle in the coming years. Predictably, the government will likely continue touting the importance of reforms but focus on only making cosmetic changes. This game of reforms will work as long as the Karimov dictatorship casts a long shadow. Over time, however, citizens will begin voicing concerns about elite foot-dragging. In Kazakhstan, citizens came to understand the game of reforms once they realized that the economy (which has been struggling ever since 2014) is nowhere near on the cusp of rebounding and the political system will not undergo any substantive changes. Tokayev has recently created a “Supreme Council” to supposedly tackle the country’s social, economic, and political challenges, but no one should expect this entity to enact meaningful reforms.[48] Bearing this in mind, if Mirziyoyev seeks to emulate Nazarbayev’s ruling style then he should take note that ordinary citizens eventually grow tired of their government’s empty promises with the passage of time.So, why should Western nations care about political happenings in a remote region of the world like Central Asia? For one thing, it is important to note one of the reasons why nondemocratic leaders like Nazarbayev, Karimov, Niyazov, Berdymukhamedov, and Rahmon have managed to stay in power for so long is because the West is not really interested in them. The West’s sparse ties to the “Stans” arguably hinder democratization and good governance prospects across the wider region.[49] But the Central Asian republics are also concerned about how neighboring Great Powers might respond should local reformist initiatives spiral out of control. In this sense, the continuation of the nondemocratic rule should not come as a surprise, for neither Russia nor China wishes to see democracy bloom in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan. This supplementary point is significant, for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any of the Central Asian republics could come under attack if new forms of governance start springing up.[50] Volatility within the international system combined with widening fissures between elites and masses will thus stretch the “Stans” thin in the years ahead. As such, it seems as if the greatest challenges facing Central Asia are just becoming visible at the dawn of a new decade of heightened (geo) political uncertainties.
In theory, political stability should prevail within the “Stans” (at least in the short term), provided that the ruling regimes in Nur-Sultan, Tashkent, Ashgabat, and Dushanbe effectively manage all future electoral contests, periodically introduce cosmetic reforms to demonstrate progress and utilize coercion in a selective manner to quell public dissent and block opposition groups from arising. But reality dictates that this non-democratic model of the sustained rule does not hold out much promise in terms of ensuring long term political stability.
In fact, Kyrgyzstan’s 2020 mass protests and coup d’état (which resulted in President Sooronbai Jeenbekov’s resignation) serve as a telling sign as to what could transpire in any of the other Central Asian republics should the elites keep refraining from dispersing and institutionalizing power, mishandle a future election, and fail to effectively halt a mass uprising. In closing, things could fall apart quickly anywhere in Central Asia in the future, especially if the elites remain tone-deaf to the genuine concerns of the masses.
This material has been prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial board or donor.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent those of Nazarbayev University.
[1] RFE/RL Kazakh Service, “It’s Official: Kazakh Capital Now Called Nur-Sultan”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 23, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/it-s-official-kazakh-capital-now-called-nur-sultan/29837884.html (accessed 22 July 2020).
[2] Andrew Roth, “Kazakhstan’s President is Re-Elected by Almost Every Voter”. The New York Times, April 27, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/world/asia/nursultan-a-nazarbayev-kazakhstan-re-elected.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[3] Reid Standish, “Kazakhstan’s Fake Vote Might Wake Up Civil Society”. Foreign Policy, June 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/08/kazakhstans-fake-vote-might-help-bring-real-democracy/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[4] “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev Diagnosed with Coronavirus”. Eurasianet, June 18, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-diagnosed-with-coronavirus (accessed 21 July 2020). Nazarbayev has since recovered.
[5] Paul Theroux, “The Golden Man – Saparmurat Niyazov’s Reign of Insanity”. The New Yorker, May 21, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/05/28/the-golden-man (accessed 21 July 2020).
[6] “Turkmenistan: Berdymukhamedov’s Super-Fun Summer Holiday”. Eurasianet, August 5, 2019, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-berdymukhamedovs-super-fun-summer-holiday (accessed 21 July 2020).
[7] Charles J. Sullivan, “Embattled Authoritarians: Continuity and Collapse in Central and Southwest Asia”. Asian Security 16.3 (2020): 363-378.
[8] Steve Robson, “Tajikistan Bans YouTube after Embarrassing Video Posted of President Dancing and Singing Out-of-Tune at His Son’s Wedding”. Daily Mail, June 6, 2013, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2336788/Tajikistan-bans-YouTube-embarrassing-video-posted-President-dancing-singing-tune-sons-wedding.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[9] Anna Neistat, “The Andijan Massacre Remembered”. Amnesty International, July 2, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/the-andijan-massacre-remembered/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[10] Reid Standish, “How Tajikistan’s President Extended His Term – For Life”. Foreign Policy, May 25, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/25/how-tajikistans-president-extended-his-term-for-life-rahmon-isis-migrant-imf/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[11] Freedom House lists Kyrgyzstan as “partly free”. See “Freedom in the World 2020: Kyrgyzstan,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan/freedom-world/2020 (accessed 21 July 2020).
[12] Charles J. Sullivan, “Civil Society in Chains: The Dynamics of Sociopolitical Relations in Turkmenistan,” in Charles E. Ziegler (Ed.), Civil Society and Politics in Central Asia (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), pp. 249-275.
[13] Charles J. Sullivan, “Halk, Watan, Berdymukhamedov! Political Transition and Regime Continuity in Turkmenistan”. Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia 5.1 (2016): 42-43.
[14] “‘Until the Very End’: Politically Motivated Imprisonment in Uzbekistan”. Human Rights Watch, September 25, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/25/until-very-end/politically-motivated-imprisonment-uzbekistan (accessed 21 July 2020).
[15] Neil MacFarquhar, “Islam Karimov Dies at 78, Ending a Long, Ruthless Rule of Uzbekistan”. The New York Times, September 2, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/world/asia/uzbekistan-islam-karimov-obituary.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[16] Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Terror at Jaslyk”. The Nation, April 13, 2004, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/terror-jaslyk/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[17] “Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan”. Human Rights Watch, October 7, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan (accessed 21 July 2020); Steve Swerdlow, “Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan”. The Diplomat, September 1, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/charting-progress-in-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan/ (accessed 22 July 2020); “A Year of Economic Reforms with President Mirziyoyev”. Voices of Central Asia, December 28, 2017, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/a-year-of-economic-reforms-with-president-mirziyoyev/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[18] “Uzbek President Orders Abolition of State Cotton Quotas”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 7, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-president-orders-abolition-of-state-cotton-quotas/30475066.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[19] Sullivan, “Embattled Authoritarians: Continuity and Collapse in Central and Southwest Asia.” See also Jesse Driscoll, “Hobbesian Neopatrimonialism,” in Marlene Laruelle (Ed.), Tajikistan on the Move: Statebuilding and Societal Transformations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018); Jesse Driscoll, “Consolidating a Weak State after Civil War: A Tajik Fable,” in John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz (Eds.), Paradox of Power: The Logics of State Weakness in Eurasia (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018).
[20] Eric McGlinchey, “Eurasia 2014: Into Thin Air”. Central Asia Program, Central Asia Policy Brief No. 10, June 2013, https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/7510 (accessed 21 July 2020).
[21] Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, “The New Dictators Rule by Velvet Fist”. The New York Times, May 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/25/opinion/the-new-dictators-rule-by-velvet-fist.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[22] “Hundreds Detained in Kazakhstan as Nazarbayev’s Chosen Presidential Successor Leads Exit Poll”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 9, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-presidential-election-nazarbaev-Tokayev/29988590.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[23] Edward Schatz and Elena Maltseva, “Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian ‘Persuasion’”. Post-Soviet Affairs 28.1 (2012): 45-65.
[24] Charles J. Sullivan, “State-Building in the Steppe: Challenges to Kazakhstan’s Modernization Aspirations”. Strategic Analysis 41.3 (2017): 273-284.
[25] Charles J. Sullivan, “Kazakhstan at a Crossroads”. Asia Policy 13.2 (2018): 121-136.
[26] Erica Marat, “Kazakhstan’s Police are Cracking Down on Protesters – As Political Activism Keeps Rising”. Washington Post, June 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/20/kazakhstans-police-are-cracking-down-protesters-political-activism-keeps-rising/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[27] Charles J. Sullivan, “Uzbekistan and the United States: Interests and Avenues for Cooperation”. Asian Affairs 50.1 (2019): 102-111.
[28] Charles J. Sullivan, “Transitions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Implications for the West”. Italian Institute for International Political Studies, October 1, 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/transitions-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan-implications-west-24064 (accessed 21 July 2020).
[29] Peter Leonard, “Kazakhstan’s Leader Resigns after Almost 30 Years in Power”. Eurasianet, March 19, 2019, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstans-leader-resigns-after-almost-30-years-in-power (accessed 21 July 2020).
[30] “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayeva, Often Eyed as Successor, Removed as Senate Speaker”. Eurasianet, May 2, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-nazarbayeva-often-eyed-as-successor-removed-as-senate-speaker (accessed 21 July 2020).
[31] Charles J. Sullivan, “End of an Era: Kazakhstan and the Fate of Multivectorism,” in Jean-Francois Caron (Ed.), Kazakhstan and the Soviet Legacy: Between Continuity and Rupture (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 31-50.
[32] “Ukraine to Issue Diplomatic Response over Kazakh President’s Denial of Crimea’s Annexation”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 5, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-diplomatic-response-over-kazakh-president-denial-of-crimea-annexation/30308855.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[33] Sam Bhutia, “Turkmenistan is Suffering an Economic Crisis of Its Own Making”. Eurasianet, September 6, 2019, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-is-suffering-an-economic-crisis-of-its-own-making (accessed 21 July 2020).
[34] “Will Rustam Emomali Become the Next President of Tajikistan?” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 8, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/will-rustam-emomali-become-the-next-president-of-tajikistan-/29810996.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[35] RFE/RL Tajik Service, “Tajik President’s Son Becomes Chairman of Parliament’s Upper Chamber.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, April 17, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-president-s-son-becomes-chairman-of-parliament-s-upper-chamber/30561480.html (accessed 22 July 2020).
[36] “Tajikistan Re-Elects Leader Rahmon with Overwhelming Majority.” Al Jazeera, October 12, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/12/tajikistan-leader-rakhmon-wins-election-with-over-90-percent (accessed 13 October 2020).
[37] Naubet Bisenov, “Kazakhstan’s Political Uncertainty Weighs on Its Currency”. Nikkei Asian Review, July 29, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Kazakhstan-s-political-uncertainty-weighs-on-its-currency (accessed 21 July 2020).
[38] Nariman Gizitdinov and Maria Kolesnikova, “Billions in Bailouts Still Can’t Heal Kazakhstan’s “Sick” Banks”. Bloomberg, February 17, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-17/billions-in-bailouts-still-can-t-heal-kazakhstan-s-sick-banks (accessed 21 July 2020).
[39] Darkhan Umirbekov, “Kazakhstan: Anti-Graft Agents Spring into Action over LRT Scandal”. Eurasianet, October 11, 2019, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-anti-graft-agents-spring-into-action-over-lrt-scandal (accessed 21 July 2020).
[40] Bisenov, “Kazakhstan’s Political Uncertainty Weighs on Its Currency”.
[41] “Kazakh Activists Demand Answers after Video Purportedly Shows Injuries to Aghadil’s Body”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, February 28, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-activists-demand-answers-after-video-shows-injuries-to-aghadil-s-body/30459744.html (accessed 21 July 2020); “Kazakh Interior Minister Says Some 80 People Detained During March 1 Rallies”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 2, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-interior-minister-says-some-80-people-detained-during-march-1-rallies/30463998.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[42] Assel Satubaldina, “Kazakhstan to Reintroduce Two Week Lockdown to Deal with COVID-19 Spike”. The Astana Times, July 3, 2020, https://astanatimes.com/2020/07/kazakhstan-to-reintroduce-two-week-lockdown-to-deal-with-covid-19-spike/ (accessed 21 July 2020).
[43] Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan Says It’s Coronavirus Free, But Doesn’t Want WHO to Check”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 8, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/analysis-turkmenistan-says-it-s-coronavirus-free-but-doesn-t-want-who-to-check/30600762.html (accessed 21 July 2020).
[44] Charles J. Sullivan, “Neutrality in Perpetuity: Foreign Policy Continuity in Turkmenistan”. Asian Affairs 51.4 (2020).
[45] Jakub Jakóbowski and Mariusz Marszewski, “Crisis in Turkmenistan. A Test for China’s Policy in the Region”. Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, August 31, 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-08-31/crisis-turkmenistan-a-test-chinas-policy-region-0 (accessed 21 July 2020).
[46] Stephen Stapczynski and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “China’s Top Natural Gas Buyer Cancels Imports after Epidemic Hurts Demand”. Bloomberg, March 5, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-05/china-s-cnpc-issues-lng-force-majeure-amid-virus-slowdown (accessed 21 July 2020).
[47] Wilson Chapman, “Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, is the World’s Most Expensive City for Expats”. U.S. News, June 18, 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-06-18/ashgabat-turkmenistan-is-the-worlds-most-expensive-city-for-expats (accessed 13 November 2020).
[48] Assel Satubaldina, “President Tokayev Creates Supreme Council Dedicated to Reforming Kazakhstan”. The Astana Times, September 15, 2020, https://astanatimes.com/2020/09/president-tokayev-creates-supreme-council-dedicated-to-reforming-kazakhstan/ (accessed 13 November 2020).
[49] On this line of reasoning, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Linkage Versus Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change”. Comparative Politics 38.4 (July 2006): 379, 383.
[50] Charles J. Sullivan, “The Superpower and the “Stans”: Why Central Asia is Not “Central” to the United States”. SAIS Review of International Affairs, March 27, 2019, https://www.saisreview.org/2019/03/27/the-superpower-and-the-stans-why-central-asia-is-not-central-to-the-united-states/ (accessed 21 July 2020).