Central Asia, a region at the crossroads of trade routes and geopolitical interests, is grappling with the pervasive menace of organized crime. From drug trafficking to corruption, criminal networks pose multifaceted challenges that demand immediate attention and strategic action. As governments in the region navigate the intricate dynamics of this underworld, they must draw lessons from global experiences, forge international collaborations, and implement comprehensive reforms. In this analysis, we delve into the intricate landscape of organized crime in Central Asia, exploring its transnational dimensions, regional responses, and the imperatives for transformative change.
Professor Kupatadze is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher at King’s College London’s Russia Institute. He previously taught at the School of International Relations, St Andrews University. He held postdoctoral positions at George Washington University (2010-11), Oxford University (2012-13) and Princeton University (2013-14). His research specialization is transnational crime, corruption, public sector reform, informal politics and crime-terror nexus. Alexander’s current research focuses, among other things, on non-conventional security threats (crime, corruption, violence, etc) in post-Soviet Eurasia (especially in Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine) and their study from a comparative perspective.
History of organised crime in Central Asia
CABAR.asia: With reference to the most recent Organised Crime Index in Central Asia (CA), how have various factors — including Russia’s heavy sanctions, the supply of sanctioned goods from Central Asia, parallel imports, illicit trade and smuggling surges, human and drug trafficking, and financial crimes — shaped contemporary trends and trajectories in the region? Please, also share some historical background of criminal actors’ evolution in Central Asia.
As a member of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime network, I contribute to indexing activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. While serving as a reviewer and regional expert, I provide insights for the Final Report. The scoring of each Central Asian state reveals varying levels of criminality, with Kazakhstan at 4.27 and Tajikistan at 5.62, resulting in a regional score of 4.52 below the global average of 4.88. State-embedded actors, including officials within law enforcement and judiciary, emerge as the prevailing criminal entities, deeply entrenched within the state structure. Understanding their impact is vital to address and combat transnational organized crime in the region.
Corruption has evolved into a facilitator of organized crime, a phenomenon that has persisted throughout history. However, in recent years, corruption has assumed a paramount role within organized crime networks, blurring the boundaries between the two. The rise of state-affiliated actors, commonly known as state-embedded actors, has further complicated this distinction. Their involvement in organized crime activities is so significant that discerning corruption from organized crime has become increasingly challenging. It is no longer solely a matter of providing protection to criminal groups in exchange for favours, fees, or services; it extends beyond that. These state-affiliated actors often directly orchestrate criminal operations themselves, further entangling the relationship between corruption and organized crime.
In general, in the post-Soviet part of the world, we have this problem of the blurred boundary between public and private, state and commercial, organised crime and the state. I would struggle to differentiate between a politician a businessman or a criminal in the early stage of statehood in Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan. It was very difficult to tell because some businessmen could be a part of the so-called ‘underworld’. It’s almost like an ideal case of collusion when corruption and organised crime are different terms just because of analytical value. However, empirically there is not much distinction between organised crime groups and state-embedded networks. So that is an important takeaway.
Across the post-Soviet region, a pervasive challenge persists in the indistinct demarcation between the realms of public and private and the convergence of state and commercial entities with organized crime. Distinguishing between politicians and businessmen, or identifying criminals in countries like Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, poses a formidable task due to the intricate web of connections. In these contexts, certain businessmen themselves can be intertwined with the so-called “underworld.” The situation exemplifies a scenario of collusion, wherein corruption and organized crime, despite being distinct terms analytically, exhibit limited empirical differentiation. The convergence of organized crime groups and state-embedded networks is evident, emphasizing a crucial observation.
Various entities exist within the landscape of criminal networks, including traditional organised crime groups and mafia-style structures commonly associated with “thieves-in-law” (vory-v-zakone). Originating in Soviet prisons, these traditional criminals can be likened to Sicilian mafia godfathers, yet their influence in Central Asia has remained relatively limited. While they have maintained a significant presence in the Caucasus, Russia, and Ukraine, their impact in Central Asia has been less pronounced. During the Soviet era, individuals from Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan populated the ranks of these traditional criminals or “vory.” Notable figures such as Kamchy Kolbayev hold substantial prominence within Central Asian organized crime, along with a select few others. Nevertheless, the prevailing perception is that state-embedded actors wield greater power and influence compared to traditional organized crime groups.
Traditional organized crime in the post-Soviet region primarily thrives within prison environments, where it originated and maintains its stronghold. However, an interesting transformation is occurring. In the 1990s, these traditional criminals extended their influence beyond prisons, assuming significant roles in the economic and political realms. Nevertheless, as the 2000s approached, their power began to wane, although they still retained some influence within prisons in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Nonetheless, this influence is diminishing, particularly in Tajikistan, where radical extremists are taking over. Notably, two major riots in the past five years were orchestrated by individuals affiliated with radical extremism. This development is significant as it not only suggests the replacement of the criminal hierarchy with extremist elements but also highlights the emergence of prisons as a source of financing for terrorism, using the criminal cashdesk known as “obshack” for radical extremists rather than purely criminal purposes. Unfortunately, there appears to be a lack of discussion surrounding this phenomenon.
CABAR.asia: How have the intersections between governments, businesses, and crime syndicates in Central Asian states evolved over time?
In Kazakhstan, the occurrence of such intersections between organized crime and other sectors is relatively minimal compared to its Central Asian counterparts. The country demonstrates commendable progress in controlling organized crime, similar to Georgia. Nonetheless, interactions and intersections between these entities do exist, taking various forms. One manifestation involves businesses making payments as protection fees to organized crime groups. However, such instances are less prevalent in Kazakhstan, as they typically arise in contexts where the state’s authority is feeble. This phenomenon was more pronounced in the 1990s. Kyrgyzstan, particularly in regions like Chuy, where notable criminal bosses originate, may still witness this relationship dynamic, where businesses make protection payments.
An additional type of intersection occurs when the origin of capital or the business itself is intertwined with organized crime. During the 1990s, many individuals from the criminal underworld sought to legitimize their activities by transitioning into the realm of legal entrepreneurship. Consequently, regional bazaars and long-established businesses, particularly those dating back to the 1990s, are most susceptible to this form of intersection. Such cases represent another significant dimension where organized crime intersects with legitimate economic endeavours.
Moreover, there exists a significant number of businesses teetering on the edge of legality and illegality. Although Kazakhstan fares better in comparison to Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan in this regard, many private companies resort to criminal methods. Predatory practices and illicit takeovers of enterprises, commonly observed in Russia and Ukraine, are also prevalent in Central Asia to some extent. Private companies engaged in illegal and illicit activities orchestrate various types of crimes, ranging from the seizure of enterprises to smuggling diverse categories of consumer goods and counterfeit products. The nature of these illicit activities can take multiple forms, illustrating the diverse range of items being smuggled. Consequently, it is essential to distinguish and analyze the interconnections among these three distinct forms of criminal activities.
Political dimension
CABAR.asia: What are the most popular schemes of financing organised crime, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities within Central Asia? How have regional governments endeavoured to regulate or combat these activities, and what multilateral mechanisms currently exist to address these issues?
Organized crime is an unequivocally transnational phenomenon, particularly evident in activities such as smuggling and drug trafficking. The comprehensive breakdown provided by the Organised Crime Index proves instrumental in understanding these activities. Notably, the trafficking of heroin and synthetic drugs has experienced substantial growth, necessitating heightened attention. Additionally, wildlife crime assumes growing significance, primarily due to its connections with China. The intricate interplay of these criminal activities across borders underscores the global nature of organized crime and the need for concerted efforts in combating it.
In addition to the aforementioned aspects, several other noteworthy factors come into play. For instance, underground tunnels situated along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border bear resemblance to those found on the US-Mexico border, often employed for migrant trafficking. Similarly, tunnels observed on the Israel-Egypt border primarily serve as conduits for fighters seeking to infiltrate enemy territories. However, in the context of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, these underground passageways predominantly facilitate the smuggling of consumer goods. Notably, there is a bustling trade in Chinese commodities flowing into Central Asia, subsequently destined for Russia. Recently, attention has been drawn to a scandal involving the Abdukadyr family, of Chinese Uyghur descent, who were connected to the chief of Kyrgyz customs. This family orchestrated illicit operations, smuggling commodities from China to Kyrgyzstan, and reaping substantial profits from these activities. The prevalence of such incidents underscores the dynamic nature of smuggling networks and the complex challenges faced in tackling them.
Trade-based money laundering represents another often-overlooked area of research, warranting closer examination. The extensive trade activities between China and Central Asia reveal significant disparities between reported customs figures from both sides. This discrepancy can be attributed to various factors including smuggling, customs error, merchanting trade as well as trade misinvoicing, a technique employed in money laundering. Under-invoicing involves deliberately undervaluing goods to make higher payments, thereby illegally transferring funds abroad. Conversely, over-invoicing entails receiving excessive payments, enabling the illicit inflow of funds from abroad. Various techniques are employed in trade-based money laundering, making detection a challenging task. Given the substantial trade inconsistencies observed among Central Asian states, China, and even India, there exists a compelling need to unveil the underlying dynamics in this domain.
CABAR.asia: How has the Taliban’s resurgence (a terrorist organization banned in Central Asian countries – ed.) influenced the perpetuation of criminal activities, criminal organizations, and drug trafficking networks in neighbouring countries? In what ways have Central Asian regimes addressed these challenges?
Assessing whether criminal activity has increased or decreased following the Taliban’s rise to power is a challenging task due to the lack of comprehensive data for making accurate comparisons. Current evaluations often rely on seizures and interdictions, which provide only a partial glimpse into the overall picture of criminal activities. The apprehensions and confiscations represent merely the visible portion of a much larger and elusive problem. While it is possible that more seizures are occurring, it does not necessarily indicate a surge in drug trafficking or improved law enforcement efforts. The increased seizure rate may reflect other factors, such as changes in enforcement strategies or variations in corruption levels, rather than an absolute reduction in criminal activity. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of the situation demands more robust and nuanced data, which currently remains elusive.
The issue of drug trafficking is further complicated by pressures from the international community to enhance interception efforts. An intriguing debate transpired between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which I personally witnessed during a United Nations meeting. Afghanistan claimed that approximately 20% of Afghan heroin traversed the Northern route, encompassing Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In response, Tajikistan contested the figure, asserting that it was closer to 10%. The dispute over the percentage carried substantial implications: if Tajikistan acknowledged the higher figure, it would imply a failure to effectively curb drug trafficking within its borders. Consequently, political dynamics significantly influence this discourse, adding an additional layer of complexity to the matter.
So, the extent to which drug trafficking from Afghanistan has changed remains uncertain. However, reports suggest that the Taliban has purportedly intensified efforts to suppress heroin production in provinces controlled by their rivals. Paradoxically, despite public declarations of a ban on heroin production, the prohibition is not uniformly enforced. Instead, enforcement appears to be selective, targeting specific regions and networks that oppose the Taliban’s authority. This fragmented approach raises questions about the Taliban’s genuine commitment to eradicating drug production and suggests a strategic utilization of drug policies to consolidate power and undermine rival factions. The complex dynamics surrounding drug trafficking and enforcement in Afghanistan necessitate a nuanced examination to better understand the evolving landscape.
Despite the complexities surrounding drug trafficking, there are indications of progress in Afghanistan’s governance and anti-corruption efforts. The government’s commitment to improvement is evident, as they express a willingness to legalize certain trade flows that were previously associated with smuggling. While these trade flows encompass commodities beyond drugs, the move towards formalization is driven by the Taliban’s willingness to be transformed into a recognized state. With the loss of crucial international aid, the Taliban recognizes the necessity of legitimizing trade to sustain their bureaucratic apparatus. Consequently, the situation in Afghanistan appears to be relatively less dire. However, it is important to note that these developments do not significantly impact the heroin trafficking routes through Central Asia. As such, it remains uncertain whether drug trafficking has diminished or increased in the region. The intricacies of the situation call for a comprehensive assessment to accurately gauge the evolving dynamics.
CABAR.asia: How would you assess the “New Kazakhstan” initiative’s approach to repatriating funds and combating corruption in the context of social justice and transparency? How do other Central Asian states compare in their efforts to address corruption?
Determining the authenticity of the repatriation initiative is a challenging task. While there are indications of a genuine effort to recover stolen funds linked to the Nazarbayev family, the success and selectivity of this endeavour remain uncertain. Repatriating assets is a complex and arduous process, contingent on cooperation from overseas territories. In the United Kingdom, recent legislation in the form of the economic crime bill imposes stricter regulations on facilitators, including banks and lawyers, to hinder the money laundering activities of corrupt individuals. This development highlights the ongoing battle against illicit financial practices and signifies a potentially positive impact on repatriation efforts—however, the efficacy and broader implications of the initiative warrant further examination.
In contrast, there have been instances where the National Crime Agency (NCA) pursued illicit funds originating from Kazakhstan. However, these efforts encountered setbacks as the court ruled in favour of Nazarbayev’s daughter, citing insufficient evidence to substantiate the claim of illegitimate income. The reliance on evidence from Kazakhstan further complicated the matter, highlighting the challenges in establishing the stolen nature of assets. The process of proving the illicit acquisition and subsequently repatriating the funds is a challenging task, fraught with complexities. Nevertheless, it is evident that President Tokayev and his administration demonstrate a genuine willingness and commitment to address this issue. The obstacles encountered underscore the intricate nature of asset recovery and underscore the need for comprehensive strategies to combat illicit financial flows.
When assessing the situation in Kyrgyzstan, it is disheartening to observe a lack of progress in the country’s efforts to combat corruption. In fact, one could argue that the situation has deteriorated further over time. While it may be challenging to establish concrete evidence to substantiate this claim in a methodologically rigorous manner, anecdotal reports paint a bleak picture. Regrettably, there are no encouraging signs of improvement in Kyrgyzstan, and the persistent challenges associated with corruption remain a cause for concern.
When analyzing the situation in Tajikistan, it becomes apparent that little has changed, and it is unrealistic to anticipate any significant improvements. The country remains entrenched in rampant corruption, which seems to permeate its political and societal fabric. Given this deeply ingrained issue, the prospects for meaningful reform in the near future appear bleak as well. The prevailing state of hopelessness and the absence of substantial change indicate the formidable challenges that Tajikistan faces in addressing its corruption woes.
While there have been some cautiously optimistic developments in Uzbekistan, I remain sceptical of the extent of actual change. Despite the introduction of numerous policies, regulations, and discussions, the tangible impact on the ground is yet to be convincingly demonstrated. Corruption continues to persist, revealing a state of what can be described as a “corruption equilibrium.” Escaping this entrenched cycle is notoriously challenging, as only a few countries have managed to achieve significant success in this regard. Georgia and Estonia serve as notable examples of countries that have made substantial progress, while Armenia is still in the process of navigating this path.
Ways out
CABAR.asia: As organized crime remains a pervasive global issue, which countries’ or regions’ strategies could serve as instructive models for Central Asian leaders to emulate and collaborate with?
There is no one-size-fits-all solution that can be readily applied to Central Asia, as the region’s unique circumstances defy easy extrapolation from other countries or regions. Unfortunately, it often requires seismic events to initiate substantial changes on the ground. A prime example is Ukraine, where a full-fledged war played a pivotal role in driving improvements. Encouragingly, progress is being made in Ukraine, particularly through reconstruction efforts and increased pressure for transparent practices. In Georgia and Armenia, significant transformations were catalyzed by revolutions. These instances highlight the necessity of major upheavals, akin to a “Big Bang” in political economy parlance, to instigate substantive shifts. While such transformative events may not materialize, it is worth noting that certain micro-processes can still exert a meaningful impact. Recognizing the nuanced dynamics at play, a comprehensive approach is essential to address corruption and drive positive change in Central Asia.
Kazakhstan presents an interesting case wherein the government’s inclination to bolster its international reputation and attract investments has spurred some developments. Over time, countries in the region aspire to emulate the success and image of countries like Russia, despite the latter’s history of pervasive corruption, which contributed to its imminent defeat in the war. This unwillingness to emulate Russia can serve as a potent catalyst for change, particularly in nations such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where Russia is held up as a role model. Consequently, potential changes in the prevailing environment can incentivize elites to strive for improvement, with corruption playing a central role in this context. A significant reduction in corruption can lead to a corresponding decline in organized crime. Similarly, the removal of drug trafficking from Afghanistan has the potential to effect positive changes. However, it remains uncertain whether any substantial developments will materialize in the foreseeable future.
Geopolitically, Central Asia’s location presents certain challenges when compared to regions such as Ukraine or the Caucasus. However, it is important to acknowledge the transformative influence of the European Union (EU) in this context. The EU has demonstrated its capacity to bring about positive changes in Central and Eastern Europe, albeit with some variations in outcomes. While countries like Romania and Bulgaria continue to grapple with issues of organized crime and corruption, they have shown notable progress over time. This underscores the potential impact of the EU and its close proximity in driving reforms.
Speaking of Ukraine, a complex set of signals is emerging, reflecting a mixed landscape of progress and challenges. Notably, President Zelensky enjoys remarkable popularity with a public trust level surpassing 75 per cent, a significant increase from the pre-war period. This popular support can serve as a catalyst for combating corruption and various forms of criminality. The government has demonstrated a genuine interest in addressing organized crime, particularly within the military sector, and has achieved some noteworthy successes in this regard. However, it is unfortunate that corruption and crime had to be politicized and securitized, necessitating the experience of a full-fledged war before significant improvements could be witnessed.
Looking ahead, there is a substantial discourse on reconstruction efforts and the responsible allocation of funds. Ukraine faces immense pressure to ensure transparent utilization of these resources, particularly as a substantial portion is expected to originate from Western countries, the European Union and the United States. While it is important to acknowledge that all stakeholders involved possess their own corruption challenges, there exists a vested interest among these actors in supporting less corrupt practices and fostering transparency. Moreover, demands for transparency are also emanating from grassroots levels. It is through this collaborative synergy that tangible progress is anticipated, albeit with ongoing vigilance.
CABAR.asia: Based on the analysis presented, what key recommendations might you suggest for Central Asian regimes to implement in both the short and medium term in order to combat organised crime and its associated challenges effectively?
Overcoming the challenges posed by organized crime is an arduous undertaking, as evidenced by the words of Leoluca Orlando, the mayor of Palermo. Orlando famously equated the fight against the mafia to a Sicilian cart, emphasizing the need for two essential components: robust law enforcement and widespread civic education. This dual-pronged strategy entails equipping law enforcement agencies with the necessary legal framework and resources while simultaneously educating the public about the detrimental impact of organized crime. Crucially, the cultivation of awareness and resistance to criminal networks must commence at the foundational level of education within schools. These two fundamental approaches offer valuable lessons for Central Asia as it grapples with its own challenges in combating organized crime.
Regrettably, bolstering the capabilities of law enforcement agencies can inadvertently invite abuse, as previously highlighted — the issue of state-embedded actors looms large. Simply augmenting police capacities does not guarantee their deployment against organized crime; instead, it could potentially serve to facilitate illicit activities. However, the effectiveness of these wheels — the components of law enforcement and civic education — hinges upon the critical prerequisites of transparency and accountability. By ensuring that law enforcement and the judiciary operate in a transparent manner and are subject to robust civic oversight, the wheels can function as intended. Implementing this framework, while acknowledging the unique circumstances of each country, undoubtedly poses significant challenges. Nonetheless, adherence to such principles lays the foundation for progress.