With the strengthening of the positions of the new government in Kyrgyzstan, more and more questions are raised about the rapprochement of Kyrgyzstan with Turkey. If these arguments are valid, what triggered these changes? How did official Bishkek begin to view relations with Turkey? Why Ankara is ready to restore the Batken region and how it is connected with geopolitics, this and other issues are discussed in the article, written by Adinay Kurmanbekova, a participant of the CABAR.asia School of Analytics
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The recent visit of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sadyr Japarov to Turkey, mutual visits of the foreign ministers of the two countries and statements of support demonstrate both the renewed interest of Turkey in Kyrgyzstan and the rethinking of the importance of Turkey for the official Bishkek. After the October events, over the course of several months, the authorities of the two countries held meetings at different levels.
President Sadyr Japarov expressed a focus on increasing turnover of commodities between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Turkey to 1 billion USD per year,[1] and official Ankara, in turn, expressed its readiness to assist in the restoration of houses in the border areas affected by the armed conflict in the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. To top it all off, in an interview with Turkish TV channel, Sadyr Japarov shared his intention to resume relations between the two countries and pointed out the mistakes of the previous government.[2] These events contrast with the previously politically “cold” period, when the rather harsh statements of the Turkish authorities, and no less harsh statements of the former President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev in 2015 about the downed Russian plane, and then about the educational network “Sebat” (now “Sapat”) had temporarily spoiled the relationship between the two states.[3]
There were also conflicts between the diplomats of the two countries,[4] and ultimatums of the Turkish authorities about “choosing a side”. During the leadership of Sooronbay Jeenbekov, although political relations did not intensify, they did not deteriorate, and the FETO factor remained a stumbling block. As one can see, the current government has decided to go the other way. It is symbolic that this restructuring of relations is taking place on the threshold of the anniversary – 30 years of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, which became the first state to recognize the sovereignty of the Kyrgyz Republic. The intertwining of history, the similarity of culture and language have always worked to bring the two countries closer together, and long-term cooperation only strengthened the influence of official Ankara not only in the vastness of Kyrgyzstan, but throughout Central Asia.
Economic component
Turkey is among the 5 main export and import destinations of Kyrgyzstan. If in 2019 the inflow of foreign direct investment from Turkey amounted to 94,565.5 thousand US dollars,[5] in 2020 this amount decreased to 22,827 thousand US dollars. The external debt of Kyrgyzstan to the government of the Republic of Turkey as of March 2020 was 93.27 million US dollars[6] (bilateral concessional loans), which is more than 2% of the total external debt of the country. The share of Turkish enterprises in Kyrgyzstan – with full participation of foreign capital – from 2014 to 2019 ranks around 300 enterprises, along with China, Russia, and Kazakhstan.[7] And in 2020, turnover of commodities with Turkey decreased by 13.9%.[8]
As one can see, in recent years, the economic relations between the countries have noticeably decreased, which was obviously influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and, as a result, closed borders. Consequently, attempts to regulate economic indicators from the Kyrgyz side are not surprising: it was proposed to create a Kyrgyz-Turkish investment fund,[9] and in July 2021, it is planned to hold a Kyrgyz-Turkish business forum with the participation of Turkish businessmen.[10]
As for Turkey, it has an economic interest in the Central Asian space, including Kyrgyzstan, which has human capital, growing opportunities for the supply of Turkish goods, as well as opportunities for the “Middle Corridor”. During the working visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic to Turkey, the ministers of the two countries also “agreed to take concrete steps for cooperation within the framework of the initiative of the Trans-Caspian Middle East-West Corridor.”[11]
In turn, this initiative will effectively link Turkey to China through Central Asia and allow Turkey to receive economic benefits from Europe’s investment and trade with Beijing. In addition, the Turkish side announced the need to sign a free trade protocol with Kyrgyzstan, which will make it much easier to export goods from Turkey to Kyrgyzstan but can also negatively affect the development of the national economy of the Kyrgyz Republic, in which imports significantly exceed the country’s exports.
The “Gülenist” Factor in Kyrgyzstan
Since 2016, Kyrgyzstan has been the target of pressure from Turkey over the educational institutions of the former Sebat. The attempt, according to the Turkish leadership, of a military coup in Turkey was reflected in Kyrgyzstan as well. The Turkish authorities blamed their former ally, religious preacher Fethullah Gülen, for these events, whose name is associated with educational institutions “Sebat” in Kyrgyzstan and beyond. Ankara demanded that immediate action be taken: to close the institutions and expel Gulen’s supporters. Thus, educational cooperation between countries very quickly turned into issues of political significance. Turkey tirelessly reminded of the possible threat of FETO to the stability of Kyrgyzstan, and sometimes did not neglect both ultimatums and blackmail. As a reaction to the current situation, a memorandum was signed between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the state educational foundation Türkiye Maarif Vakfı (“Maarif”), and the network of “Sebat” lyceums continued its work by renaming the international educational institution (IEI) “Sapat”, which also included the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic.
In November 2020, Agreements were signed between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Turkish Maarif Foundation on the opening and operation of private educational organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic,[12] which is the reaction of the Turkish authorities to the refusal of the Kyrgyz side to close the educational institutions of Sapat. It is worth noting that opponents of the Turkish authorities criticize Maarif, being concerned that it is associated with the ideology of political Islam and represents Erdogan’s Trojan horse.[13] Education has long been considered one of the effective instruments of “soft power”, due to which certain states delicately convey their norms and values. In the new 2021 academic year in Bishkek, it is already planned to open the first secondary school of the Maarif Foundation, which positions its mission in “the implementation of comprehensive educational activities around the world, based on the common values of humanity and the wise traditions of Anatolia ”.[14] At the same time, the foundation can manage not only general education schools, but also kindergartens and universities.
A joint statement by the Kyrgyz foreign ministers and Turkey in November 2020 reported that the parties agreed “to combat all forms of terrorism and extremism”: “Taking into account the detailed information and specific examples provided by the Turkish side of the terrorist organization FETO, they agreed to work close cooperation between the two countries in the fight against all types of terrorist activities … “.[15] Although the Kyrgyz leadership has not yet officially announced its position on this issue, on June 9, after negotiations with Sadyr Japarov, the Turkish President said: “We are in solidarity with my dear brother that FETO poses a threat to the national security of both countries. Recent political issues have exposed the dark, bloody and unpleasant face of FETO. God willing, we will overcome this together, by supporting each other … ”.[16]
With the disappearance of the president of the Sapat school network, Orhan Inandi, in May 2021, the delicate issue with FETO has regained its relevance. This caused a violent reaction from the public and was the reason for rallies demanding to find Mr. Inandi. Orhan Inandi’s wife stated that he was being held at the Turkish embassy in Kyrgyzstan.[17] In turn, the publication “Sabakh” announces the arrest of Inandi by the State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan.The Turkish diplomatic mission does not comment on these accusations in any way, and President Erdogan replies that “he does not know him and does not want to hear anything about FETO supporters”.[18]
Geopolitics or just “new vector” rhetoric?
The new government of Kyrgyzstan has faced with a number of problems, including a pandemic, economic hardship and, in addition, a bloody conflict on the border with Tajikistan in April 2021. Turkey was one of the first countries to declare its readiness to assist in the restoration of infrastructure in the Batken region, and the Public Union of the Turkic people of Kyrgyzstan provided humanitarian assistance to the affected region. It is possible to single out a geopolitical subtext in this, since the events that took place forced both parties to the conflict to seek support in the international arena. Some experts saw in these events Russia’s loyalty to Tajikistan and a noticeable revival of relations between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. Some parallels can be traced to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh – Russia and Turkey supported two different sides. However, officially, Russia remains neutral on this issue. There are also forecasts that Turkish President Erdogan is trying to consolidate his leadership in the Islamic world, and Central Asia (including Kyrgyzstan) is the best mix of predominantly Turkic-speaking countries with dominant Islamic religious practices. Turkey’s open support has stimulated pro-Turkish sentiment in Kyrgyzstan and a rethinking of kinship Turkic ties. Besides the point, at this time, Tajikistan is improving relations with Iran.
However, even if some changes in the foreign policy vector of Kyrgyzstan take place, one should not forget about the geographic remoteness of Turkey from Central Asia – which undoubtedly makes one skeptical about the possibility of Turkey’s significant influence in the region. Although it is worth noting that economic ties are strengthening: starting from June 2021, regular flights to Turkey with Turkish Airlines and Turkish Cargo are increasing, Kyrgyzstan also agreed to open a new regular flight on the Istanbul-Bishkek-Osh-Istanbul route.[19] Thus, work is underway to simplify the travel of citizens from the southern regions to Turkey and to reduce territorial alienation between the “fraternal nations”. However, it is also important that the level of trust between the countries has been largely violated – another hindering factor, along with the absence of large Turkish financial and economic projects in Kyrgyzstan. Another question is how Russia, which is rightfully considered one of the main players in the post-Soviet space, can react to this intensification of relations. As practice shows, conflicts are effectively resolved when there are no large external players (let alone confrontational on some issues). Therefore, the conflict on the border with Tajikistan demonstrates the need to strengthen intraregional dialogue without the intervention of other external forces.
Many experts regarded the June visit of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sadyr Japarov to Ankara as a “harbinger of a new milestone” in relation to the two countries. The parties discussed cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and Turkey, took part in a business forum, Mr. Japarov met with migrants and signed agreements on cooperation in the fields of culture, education, agriculture, etc. However, neither analysts nor political scientists have ever seen an agreement on economic aid or investment.[20] It was only stated that the Turkish side expressed a desire to provide military-technical assistance to the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan on a grant basis. As a result, this visit was rather nominal and did not demonstrate significant shifts in cooperation between the countries.
Are there any prospects for relations between the countries?
Speaking about the prospects for relations, one must also consider the possible risks associated with changes in the foreign policy vector. In this case, the question arises whether there is a fear of the possible emergence of neo-Ottomanism in Kyrgyzstan? Comparing Turkey’s positions with other major players in the region, one can see that they are still significantly weak. Kyrgyzstan still maintains strong ties with Russia and Beijing’s positions are gradually increasing. The Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS), created on the initiative of Ankara, is still only a dialogue platform, and Sapat, which has been operating in the Kyrgyz Republic for more than 20 years, is already “out of favor” by the official leadership of Turkey. Consequently, it is too early to talk about the possibility of changing the country’s ideology in favor of neo-Ottomanism.
There remain potential areas that need to be significantly improved:
– the development of trade and economic relations and the development of cooperation in business.
– construction of hydroelectric power plants. Kyrgyzstan’s electricity infrastructure is not new, and there have been recent concerns about the potential of this sector. Moreover, the Turkish side recently expressed its readiness to further cooperate in the construction of a hydroelectric power station in Kyrgyzstan;[21]
-opening of new transport routes.
– investing in other sectors of the economy.
Conclusion
The recent years of cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey have shown a cooling due to political points of “non-contact”. However, with the arrival of the new leadership of the country and the events that took place, there were some signs of increased cooperation between the official Bishkek and Ankara. The economic situation in Kyrgyzstan forces us to actively seek partners, therefore the country shows openness in attracting Turkish investors. But when attracting investments, the country should not forget about the possible risks and prevention of the influence of the interests of other countries. Turkey continues to actively invest in the educational sphere of Kyrgyzstan, thereby reinforcing its “soft power” in the region. The Gulenist factor is still a sensitive issue in Kyrgyz-Turkish relations, but due to the creation of new educational institutions and foundations, cooperation between countries is developing with renewed vigor. The new leadership of Kyrgyzstan encourages the intensification of all possible assistance to Turkey in various areas of the state. Ethnocultural closeness with Kyrgyzstan has always provided a unique chance for Turkey to build and strengthen its zone of influence. In this vein, the border conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Ankara is able to gradually strengthen its geopolitical interests. But, due to the location and the presence of other geopolitical players, it is still too early to talk about a change in the foreign policy vector of Bishkek with respect to Ankara. Rather, it can be characterized as an attempt to normalize previously stagnant relations and build cooperation with non-regional players.
This article was prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project implemented with the financial support of the Foreign Ministry of Norway. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial or donor.
[1] Official site of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic. See http://president.kg/ru/sobytiya/19433_prezident_sadir_ghaparov_prinyal_prezidenta_soyuza_palat_itovarnih_birgh_turcii_mustafu_rifata_hisardghiklioglu__
[2] President Sadyr Japarov intends to improve relations with Turkey. 24.kg. See https://24.kg/vlast/193325_prezident_sadyir_japarov_nameren_uluchshit_otnosheniya_sturtsiey/
[3] Begalieva, H. Atambayev to the Minister of Turkey: If you are so smart, why did you oversleep the coup? Website of the newspaper “Vecherniy Bishkek”. 2016. See https://www.vb.kg/doc/344342_atambaev_ministry_tyrcii:_esli_vy_takie_ymnye_pochemy_prospali_perevorot.html//
[4] Kyrgyzstan-Turkey. What will the dispute between the two diplomats lead to? Radio Azattyk. 2019. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-turkey-ambassador-fyrat-aitmatov/30016346.html
[5] Official site of the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. See http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/3683/
[6] Official site of the Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic. See http://www.minfin.kg/ru/novosti/mamlekettik-karyz/tyshky-karyz/struktura-gosudarstvennogo-vneshnego-dolga-kr-po-s6672
[7] Official site of the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. See http://www.stat.kg/ru/statistics/maloe-i-srednee-predprinimatelstvo/
[8] Official site of the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. See http://www.stat.kg/ru/statistics/vneshneekonomicheskaya-deyatelnost/
[9] Turkey is ready to cooperate with Kyrgyzstan in the construction of hydroelectric power plants. Azattyk. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31257688.html
[10] Turkish businessmen will come to Issyk-Kul in the summer. Satellite. See https://ru.sputnik.kg/society/20210504/1052385488/kyrgyzstan-turciya-biznes-forum.html
[11] Official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic. See https://mfa.gov.kg/ru/osnovnoe-menyu/press-sluzhba/novosti/sostoyalas-vstrecha-ministrov-inostrannyh-del-kr-i-turcii
[12] Official site of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic. See https://edu.gov.kg/ru/news/pervuyu-shkolu-v-kyrgyzstane-tureckij-fond-maarif-otkroet-v-bishkeke/
[13] Ulan Alymkul uulu Eshmatov. What is it and what are the goals pursued by the “Maarif” Foundation? Azattyk. 2018. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-maarif-turkey/29476939.htmlv
[14] Official site of the Maarif Foundation. See https://turkiyemaarif.org/page/524-Turkish-Maarif-Foundation-12
[15] Official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic. See https://mfa.gov.kg/uploads/content/9346/2f46ae07-383e-3baf-959a-7627d149e58a.pdf
[16] The Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Turkey discussed the fight against the FETO movement. Azattyk. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/prezidenty-kyrgyzstana-i-turtsii-obsudili-borbu-s-dvizheniem-feto/31299269.html
[17] Disappearance of Inandi: a week without news. Azattyk. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31293825.html
[18] Japarov asked Erdogan about Inandi’s disappearance. Radio Azattyk. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31300132.html
[19] Economist.kg. See. https://m.facebook.com/economist.kg/photos/a.178075696130235/794935297777602/?type=3
[20] Japarov’s visit to Turkey: invited investors, met with migrants. Radio Azattyk. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31301975.html
[21] Turkey is ready to cooperate with Kyrgyzstan in the construction of hydroelectric power plants. Azattyk. See https://rus.azattyk.org/a/31257688.html