Central Asia is witnessing a rapid surge in digital authoritarianism. In this interview, we closely examine the dynamics between the state and citizens, explore the role of international actors, and evaluate the economic ramifications posed by the phenomenon. Together with expert Ildar Daminov from the Central European University, we navigate the intricate challenges surrounding the establishment of digital dictatorships in the region. We provide recommendations for civil society and the media. Additionally, we investigate the role of Meta and Google in safeguarding digital rights and freedoms, while addressing ways individuals can protect themselves amidst the escalating online authoritarianism.
Ildar Daminov, a doctoral candidate at the Central European University, Vienna, specializes in Comparative International Political Economy and Social Science Methodology. With master’s degrees from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the Central European University, he primarily investigates authoritarian regimes, digitalization impacts, governance issues, and conflict prevention. His geographical research emphasis encompasses Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and East Asia, particularly Korea. His professional tenure includes research service provision to significant international entities like the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
CABAR.asia: Central Asia has seen a noticeable rise in digital authoritarianism in recent years. What societal, political, and technological factors do you think have contributed to this trend, and how might these drivers differ from those influencing the global rise in digital authoritarianism?
My research reveals three key patterns shaping the development of digital authoritarianism in Central Asia.
Firstly, the region’s deep-rooted tradition of political suppression, stemming from the Soviet era, plays a pivotal role. The presence of punitive organs such as national security committees and domestic intelligence agencies, resembling the former State Security Committee (KGB), forms a crucial link. This tradition, influenced by the theory of “path dependence,” explains the region’s political systems’ behaviour. The more entrenched the history of repressions, surveillance, censorship, and disinformation, the easier it becomes to perpetuate these practices. While digitalization amplifies the scale of repression, its qualitative impact remains limited.
Second, Central Asia is characterized by autocratic regional integration and close links between ruling regimes. While maintaining trade and foreign policy relations within the region, their connections with China and Russia are particularly influential. These autocratic regimes actively borrow from one another, notably in areas such as legislation. Unlike neighbouring hybrid regimes like Moldova or Ukraine, which border democracies, Central Asia is surrounded by a consolidated bastion of autocracies. This regional context plays a significant role in facilitating the export of technology and the adoption of repressive legislative practices, shaping the region’s political landscape.
Third, Central Asia grapples with an oppressed business environment shaped by international technology giants like Meta (formerly Facebook) and Google dominating the provision of software and digital services. Meanwhile, Internet providers, technical support, and infrastructure face two scenarios. They can either be co-opted in “softer” regimes, such as Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, with mutually beneficial conditions between the state and business, or completely subordinated in regimes like Turkmenistan or Tajikistan, and formerly in Uzbekistan. These dynamics highlight the varying degrees of state control and consolidation within the region.
While Central Asian countries are not as extensively engulfed in digital authoritarianism as their counterparts like Russia and China, instances of limited repression exist. Kyrgyzstan serves as an example, where local internet shutdowns and basic disinformation tactics have been observed. Factcheck Kyrgyzstan conducted an investigation exposing the utilization of bot farms by local political parties to disseminate political disinformation during the 2020 elections. These incidents shed light on the evolving landscape of digital repression within the region.
CABAR.asia: With increasing state surveillance and censorship, how has the digital space changed for citizens in Central Asian countries? Can you share specific examples where digital authoritarianism has impacted ordinary citizens’ daily lives, and how have people adapted or resisted these changes?
Differentiating between Central Asian states is crucial when analyzing their digital landscapes. Since the early 2000s, significant changes have occurred, with some countries initially struggling to respond to the rise of online freedoms. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, for instance, implemented complete Internet shutdowns or access restrictions. In Turkmenistan, Internet access was a privilege until 2007. Conversely, authoritarian systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and partially Uzbekistan adopted a comparatively more “liberal” approach. These countries employ a mix of surveillance, partial censorship, and disinformation strategies to regulate the digital space.
Advancements in big data analytics have propelled the evolution of surveillance technologies in Central Asia. This development empowers states to gauge public sentiment on social networks. A prime example is the Tokayev regime in Kazakhstan since 2022. When social media outbursts, like the recent Ekibastuz accident, fuel social discontent, the Kazakh government swiftly responds to quell unrest.
At the same time, surveillance technology has witnessed significant progress in the global market, exemplified by the recent Pegasus spying scandal. This represents a new stage of surveillance, distinct from previous systems like SORM. Tracking phones has become more accessible, aided by technologies utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) that have permeated both the digital and offline realms. For instance, Kazakhstan has implemented widespread surveillance cameras known as “Sergek,” with over 13,000 cameras deployed nationwide capable of facial recognition. While the adoption of such technologies varies across Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have yet to embrace them, while Kyrgyzstan installed around 500 cameras in 2022. Although the numbers may be relatively low, the trend is obvious.
Generally, regimes in Central Asia still rely on rudimentary forms of repression, exemplified by Kazakhstan’s frequent use of complete Internet shutdowns. Even as the most economically developed country in the region, Kazakhstan resorts to these shutdowns, as observed during the events of January 2022. Such initiatives inflict significant economic damage on citizens, with estimates by Eurasianet indicating that a recent several-day internet outage cost the country $410 million. These shutdowns not only disrupt communication but also halt trade and online banking, resulting in substantial economic losses.
CABAR.asia: The interplay between digital authoritarianism and economic growth is complex. How do you see the growth of digital economies in Central Asia being impacted by these practices, and what might be the long-term implications for regional and global economic integration?
I would start by saying that the processes of “digital repression” in Central Asia have not gone unnoticed by civil society. Despite recent political changes, Kyrgyz civil society remains proactive in its investigations. Since the late 2010s, the automation of disinformation campaigns, particularly under the presidency of Zhaparov, has become evident. Factcheck Kyrgyzstan and Kaktus.Media have conducted insightful investigations, revealing how bot systems create an illusion of mass support for pro-presidential parties on social networks. This active engagement of civil society is an encouraging trend.
While digital authoritarianism negatively affects the digital economy, Central Asian regimes have yet to fully adopt automated models of repression and censorship seen in countries like China. Manual censorship remains prevalent, as highlighted by investigations from the Kazakhstan Bureau for Human Rights and the Digital Rights and Freedom Association. In the absence of sophisticated automated systems, regimes resort to general measures, such as widespread internet shutdowns. However, in the long term, advancements in digital repression technologies are anticipated, which may lead to more targeted interventions. As these technologies evolve, the potential damage to the digital economy can be mitigated through state interventions aimed at preserving infrastructure.
It is worth acknowledging that the Central Asian market remains largely influenced by European and American companies. Central Asian governments often refrain from ordering direct censorship measures on platforms like Google or Meta, as these platforms have become deeply ingrained in citizens’ daily lives (except in Turkmenistan, although blocking Google there would pose significant challenges). Consequently, despite repressive measures, the digital segment of the economy is poised to continue its growth trajectory in the region.
CABAR.asia: You have touched upon the role of Meta and Google in advancing the digital economies of CA states. In light of the increasing digital authoritarianism, can you describe the role of international tech companies in Central Asia? Do they serve as unwitting enablers, active resistors, or neutral actors? How can they contribute to the protection of digital rights in the region?
Realistically, major digital companies prioritize profits over human rights concerns. However, their activities can still have positive effects on human rights in Central Asia. Despite this, Central Asian governments often attempt to impose restrictive measures on these companies, aiming to undermine their presence in the already limited regional market. Notably, in Kazakhstan, the introduction of a security certificate in 2015-2019 sparked widespread resistance from Google, Mozilla, and local civil society. Beyond addressing human rights violations, the resistance aimed to prevent undemocratic governments from imposing technical restrictions without recourse to legal challenges. While Kazakhstan eventually abandoned the certificate idea, the government persists in seeking alternative means of imposing restrictions. The synergy between tech companies and civil society in safeguarding digital rights remains significant in this context.
What additional measures can digital giants undertake to safeguard the digital rights of citizens in the region? They must go beyond mere acknowledgement and take concrete steps. Opening local offices and actively engaging with local activists on privacy rights is crucial. Tech executives often lack awareness of ground-level realities, as demonstrated in Myanmar, where Facebook admitted its platform was used to incite genocide after 2016. This highlights the blindness of tech executives to the local agenda.
CABAR.asia: Digital authoritarianism often involves sophisticated data handling and analysis capabilities. Could you explain how Central Asian governments have developed these capabilities? What role have foreign technology and knowledge transfers played in this process?
It is essential to distinguish between individual states in Central Asia when examining the situation, such as in the case of biometric laws in Kazakhstan. Comparing these laws to similar ones in the European Union, this topic emerges as highly sensitive. While the use of biometric data facilitates convenient access to public services through platforms like Kazakhstan’s eGov system or Uzbekistan’s digital platform, caution is warranted. Recent crises, as the one witnessed in Russia with their electronic agendas through platforms like “Gosuslugi,” swiftly transforming the country into a digital surveillance state, serve as cautionary tales. While it may be unlikely to reach such extremes in Central Asia, the existence of risks necessitates learning from the mistakes of others.
Since the 1990s, Central Asian regimes have relied on the Russian SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities) system for wiretapping and tracking Internet communications, a practice adopted across the region. Basic analysis and tracking elements are thus present in all states. However, the emergence of big data analysis technologies is a notable development, primarily observed in electoral autocracies like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, a market of companies specializing in social network data analysis has emerged, including notable names like Alem Research, iMAS, and Media System, as highlighted by Vlast magazine in 2018.
As I mentioned before, the adoption of face recognition technology in Central Asia is a concerning trend, albeit in its early stages. The use of such technology has raised serious allegations, with the analyst blog Bitter Winter suggesting its deployment against participants of peaceful Kazakh rallies protesting anti-Muslim atrocities in China. Furthermore, notable incidents include participants actively destroying cameras of the “Sergek” system, suggesting a deliberate response to this technology. These developments highlight the importance of addressing the ethical and human rights implications of face recognition technology in the region.
CABAR.asia: How are Central Asian nations collaborating or competing in the digital space, particularly regarding authoritarian practices? Are there any regional patterns or alliances emerging that could shape the future geopolitical landscape of digital authoritarianism?
In the context of authoritarian international organizations like the SCO and the CIS, often referred to as the “club of elderly autocrats,” there is an exchange of data and practices. While this exchange may lack institutionalization, the SCO actively promotes the concept of a “sovereign Internet” and maintains cybersecurity working groups. By invoking existing “international norms,” the SCO assists Central Asian regimes in legitimizing their restrictive measures. As a counterargument to the EU’s norms, the SCO presents an alternative approach, providing a platform for shaping cybersecurity policies within the region.
CABAR.asia: What is the role of Russia and China in authoritarian learning when it comes to the digital domain?
When discussing the platforms of authoritarian regimes, it is crucial to differentiate between their domestic influence and their presence in Central Asia. Platforms like Russia’s Yandex and China’s Baidu primarily cater to their respective domestic audiences. In Central Asia, however, they face competition from European and American counterparts that still maintain a presence. China’s effective digital ecosystem developed through the ban on Western companies, stimulating the growth of local technologies and infrastructure. However, it remains doubtful whether they could have survived open competition against giants like Google in the 2000s.
Yandex, having established its presence early, competes well within the digital ecosystem of Central Asian countries. It even acquired Uber in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, edging it out of the market. However, it is improbable for Yandex to monopolize the entire Central Asian market. Even if it did, it would remain an external actor, subject to co-option or negotiation for political purposes. The Russian leadership has the advantage in this regard as Yandex is a Russian company. With limited local platforms in the region, Central Asia must contend with major players from America, Europe, and Russia. While the likelihood of Central Asia succumbing to Russia’s digital authoritarian influence is low, particularly after 2022, it does not guarantee easy exploitation of Yandex by Central Asian dictatorships for political gains.
In the vanguard of adopting stringent digital regulations, Russia implemented a law in the early 2000s, significantly preceding the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Yet, it would be a miscalculation to overstate the viability of mimicking Russian or Chinese models of digitalised repression in other autocracies. Given their resource-heavy nature and complex nuances, replicating these models within Central Asia’s contours is an ambitious task. Displacing tech titans like Meta and Google from the market, in favour of a homegrown online infrastructure, remains a challenging endeavour.
Despite Russia and China being significant purveyors of technology to Central Asia, they are not exclusive in this enterprise. Alarmingly, firms from democracies also partake actively in these distributions. For instance, the notorious Pegasus is a product of an Israeli company, while certain data analysis methodologies are supplied by Italian firms. Regrettably, legal mechanisms to control the trade in such dual-use technologies or the export of services remain absent. Thus, while Russia and China’s roles are considerable, it is lamentable that developed democracies also contribute to the surge of digital authoritarianism in Central Asia.
To conclude, Central Asia’s circumspect attitude towards China is echoed in its technology acquisitions. While Smart City technologies have proved instrumental in reducing crime and accident rates in urban areas, there is a flip side to this coin. The spectre of both the Central Asian governments and China potentially accessing the amassed data poses a considerable risk. Given the politically charged situation surrounding China’s ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz, the question of what China could potentially do with the acquired data is a pertinent concern and one that remains unanswered. Consequently, there is a pervasive apprehension within Central Asian societies and administrations about the dangers of relying overly on China for technology exports.
CABAR.asia: Considering the trend towards digital authoritarianism in Central Asia, what are some potential counter-strategies that local civil society, the international community, and digital rights organizations can employ? How can they effectively promote digital freedom and privacy in an environment of increasing state control?
Even as autocracies in Central Asia strengthen their hold, they remain fundamentally electoral, with each election becoming a rigorous stress test for the regime. Concurrently, civil societies in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are burgeoning. From a practical standpoint, the priority lies in engaging with the populace via at least two approaches:
- Public engagement and education should be given prime focus. Basic rules of ‘information hygiene’ and critical analysis of incoming information need to be clarified: the types of sources, their varying reliability, whom to trust and whom to question, how to triangulate sources for comparison, and deduce basic conclusions about the trustworthiness of the source, among others.
- We need to underscore the significance of privacy in public education. It’s critical to debunk the Soviet-era hangover of dismissive attitudes towards surveillance, encapsulated in the sentiment, “Why should I worry if I have nothing illegal to say?” Digital surveillance, after all, can bleed into the physical realm. The Rumba vacuum cleaner scandal in the United States serves as a cautionary tale, where devices were found to be recording users and transmitting data from inside homes. In one unnerving data leak, a customer discovered his private photo circulating on social media. While this incident is relatively harmless, it underscores the risk of more compromising materials falling into the hands of authoritarian regimes.
These essential steps will bolster civic pressure on ruling regimes. They could potentially promote the creation or enhancement of personal data protection frameworks, a practice not yet widely embraced across Central Asia.
Furthermore, it’s essential to ally with local divisions of global digital tech juggernauts in a unified front to thwart the draconian plans of regional governments. A case in point is Kazakhstan’s cyberbullying law, ostensibly a guise for censorship, thwarted by the combined might of civil society and major tech firms. This instance radiates a hopeful signal, indicating that the march towards digitised repression is not an immutable trajectory, even within authoritarian regimes.