The article attempts to analyze some of the important social changes that have occurred in Kyrgyzstan over the years of sovereignty. How has our society changed? How have we ourselves changed? Who are we? What have we become? – these and other questions have been discussed by Samar Syrgabaev, a social science researcher, PhD in Sociological Sciences, in an article written specifically for the analytical platform CABAR.asia.
This year, the Kyrgyz Republic, among many post-Soviet countries, solemnly celebrated the 30th anniversary of its state independence, which was accompanied by a number of review and analytical publications with an emphasis on the achievements and failures of the young republic during the period of sovereign development. In particular, the experts considered the spheres of domestic and international politics, and mainly economic processes. At the same time, in my opinion, little attention was paid to those social changes that have taken place in the depths of the Kyrgyzstani society. At first glance, they have a not so obvious character and were due to both internal and external prerequisites. Nevertheless, these profound social changes have an impact on the present and, to a certain extent, predetermine the future of the country.
How has our society changed? How have we ourselves changed? Who are we? What have we become? What do we expect from the future? These questions still remain without a satisfactory answer. They require further scientific reflection, serious analysis and evaluation, as well as summing up certain results.
Demographic prerequisites
The socio-political processes that took place over the thirty-year period of Kyrgyzstan’s independence were largely due to changes in the demographic structure of the population. Therefore, it is advisable to pay attention to some demographic trends. In this vein, since the last population census (1989), when our country was still a part of the USSR, there have been significant changes in the demographic composition of Kyrgyzstanis. According to the National Statistical Committee, the number of Kyrgyz increased from 52.4% in 1989 to 73.8% in 2020. The share of Uzbeks, Dungans and Tajiks also increased. On the contrary, the number of Russians (from 21.5% to 5.2%) and other ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Germans, etc.) has significantly decreased.[1]
At the same time, despite the high level of emigration of representatives of ethnic minorities, which peaked in the early 1990s and 2000s, the republic retained its multinational composition. Today, the ethnic structure of the country is represented by more than a hundred nationalities that have historically lived here for many decades. The dominant demographic position of the Kyrgyz to a certain extent contributed to the articulation and consolidation of such a concept as “titular nation” in political discourse, media space and public consciousness. This formed the historical conditions for the growth of post-Soviet national self-awareness and the search for the identity of the Kyrgyz, predetermined the nature of nation-building as a whole, based on the concept of “titular nation”. At the same time, issues of ethnic politics, harmonization of relations between ethnic groups for a long time was allowed to run its course. Only twenty years after gaining sovereignty, unfortunately after the tragic events of 2010 that led to bloody interethnic clashes in the country, the first steps were taken at the state level towards the formation of an inclusive civil (political) nation and common civic identity. After a protracted process of discussion in 2020, the concept for the development of civic identity “Kyrgyz Zharany” for 2021-2026 was adopted. the first steps were taken at the state level towards the formation of an inclusive civil (political) nation and common civic identity. After a protracted process of discussion, in 2020, the concept for the development of civic identity “Kyrgyz Zharany” for 2021-2026 was adopted.[2]
It is noteworthy that the proportion of urban and rural residents that has developed over the period of independence has remained practically unchanged, as it has been over the past hundred years. Today, as in the 20th century, a little more than a third (34%) of the population lives in urban settlements, and more than two thirds (66%) – in rural areas.
Kyrgyzstan today remains a country with a predominantly rural population and a primarily traditional society.
Despite the episodic decline in the birth rate in the 90s of the last century, over the thirty-year period of independence, the population increased by one and a half times: from 4 million 502 thousand people in 1991 up to 6 million 636 thousand people in 2020. Demographically, the population of Kyrgyzstan is quite young. The average age at the beginning of 2021 was 27.9 years. Young people aged 14 to 28 years accounted for 25%, and children and youngsters over 34% of the total population.[3] For an inexperienced observer, such a demographic alignment seems to be a positive phenomenon, to some extent a natural achievement in our progressive development as a sovereign state. However, a large proportion of young people in a weak economy is not always good for society. For example, according to the theory of the “youth bulge” (or as some authors call the “malignant demographic priority of youth”), the prevalence of young people in the age composition of the population is regarded as a conflict-generating factor.[4] In societies where there is a high proportion of young people (according to various estimates, if it exceeds 25-30%), the “youth bulge” can provoke prolonged socio-political turbulence in the country. This is facilitated by the inability of the national economy to provide a dignified existence for young people. In conditions of fierce competition for access to public goods, unemployment and poverty, young people are turning into a revolutionary resource. As a result, we have experienced three political “revolutions” over the past fifteen years, each time accompanied by significant negative consequences for the economic system of the state.
“Geo” – prerequisites
Kyrgyzstan has embarked on the path of independent state formation with a solid infrastructure and agrarian-industrial Soviet legacy. However, during the period of independence, the country has incompetently lost the economic “charge” accumulated in Soviet times for a further leap towards industrialization and technologization of the state.
It is worth mentioning here that the construction of the existing strategic Bishkek-Osh highway began back in 1952, and a new alternative North-South highway has been under construction for the last 6 years. There can be no question of railways.
Thus, by the thirtieth anniversary of sovereignty, the country was unable to fully overcome natural geographic barriers. This is very relevant if we bear in mind that Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous country, where almost 90% of the territory is located at more than 1,500 meters above sea level. Mountain ranges give rise to a sharply continental climate, and also largely determine the way of life of the country’s population. In addition, mountain ranges, forming natural barriers, are a disintegrating factor of administrative-territorial divisions (regions and districts) and weaken internal communication. Geographic fragmentation worsens the effectiveness of public administration, creates conditions for the growth of social contradictions and inequality in the cultural, ethnic, political, and economic aspects. Territorial fragmentation in terms of the intensity of communications prevents the formation of a single socio-cultural space, the development of an agreed point of view on important events that took place (and are happening) in the country. For example, the results of focus groups, as well as expert interviews conducted as part of a sociological survey in 2018, showed that residents of the southern and northern regions perceived and interpreted the political revolutions of 2005 and 2010 differently.[5] The respondents from the southern regions assessed the events of 2005 in a positive way, and in relation to 2010, in particular to the forced flight of the then president, on the contrary, expressed a negative opinion. They considered the work of the fugitive president quite worthy and blamed the close circle of the head of state for what happened. The majority of the surveyed representatives of the northern regions in relation to the change of power in 2010 was dominated by a “calm” point of view. We still have to analyze the social attitudes of the Kyrgyzstanis towards the third political revolution of 2020.
The geographical factor also determined the political transformation of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.
Tribal relations, which were “reanimated” in the period of independence in the form of clan-corporate tribalism, began to play a basic role today not only in the political structure, but also in interpersonal communication. Today, seven regions of the republic are peculiar political formations isolated by mountain ranges. Each region has its own tribal and clan isolation, adherence to tribal cultural values and lifestyle. Indeed, the modern Kyrgyz clan has turned into a political phenomenon, representing not only a collection of influential families and tribal criteria, but also a community based on a regional characteristic. Such a model of relations implies the principle of patronage, where recruiting into the political circle is carried out by strict selection from among relatives, fellow countrymen, representatives of the right kind. This communication scheme is deeply rooted in society, giving rise to a corresponding model of political culture. Thus, for the political realities of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, it has become the norm to organize “operational” rallies from several hundred to several thousand people from among their fellow tribesmen in case of problems with an official – a representative of the clan. Thus, the features of the geographical landscape with a high degree of probability can be projected onto the political landscape of modern Kyrgyzstan. Here, the watershed line, which determines the formation of the ruling class, and the overall internal political situation in the country, runs between two geographical segments – the south and north of the republic.[6]
This geopolitical location of the country has led to a multi-vector foreign state policy. At the same time, this situation creates a lot of difficulties in determining priorities. This issue became especially acute during periods of political turbulence. It should be noted that the overthrown political regimes often used the foreign policy issue for personal (family) enrichment, which caused serious damage to the international image of Kyrgyzstan. This issue has not yet been removed from the agenda. The country is today at the center of a clash of global interests. However, this is already a topic for separate consideration.
Sociocultural prerequisites
Gaining state independence led to tectonic shifts in the public consciousness of the Kyrgyzstanis. An identity crisis arose against the background of the natural destruction of the ideological construct (ideologeme) “Soviet citizen”, which had ensured the viability of the Soviet nation for decades. In conditions of ideological disorientation, the natural process of searching and determining coordinates in the new socio-cultural space started. Indeed, as practice has shown, this process developed mainly spontaneously, under the influence of objective historical, demographic, and socio-economic circumstances that have developed in the new realities of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. I have mentioned some of them earlier in the article.
Until 2010, political discourse did not voice any identity, in particular civic, in its modern scientific interpretation. Nevertheless, at the level of state policy, various unsystematic attempts were made to form a civic identity, although they were designated in their own way. Thus, during the reign of the first president of the republic (1991-2005), the concept of “Kyrgyzstan is our common home” was implemented, as well as national events were held. Of course, these include the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Manas epic and the 2200th anniversary of Kyrgyz statehood with international recognition. In the ideological policy of this period, an important place was assigned, first of all, to the preservation of unity and ensuring the peaceful coexistence of citizens in the country. This was dictated by a conflict-generating interethnic circumstance, including the tragic interethnic clashes of 1990, as well as the growth of radical nationalist sentiments among young people. During the second president (2005-2010), the above concept was practically forgotten, and nothing was proposed in return at the national level. Since 2005, Kyrgyzstan has entered a phase of protracted political turbulence that continues to this day. Despite the agenda, which for fifteen years now has been determined by the confrontation of clans and the struggle for the resource of power, during the reign of the fourth (third, if not considering the transitional presidency after the bloody change of power in 2010) president, there was a kind of return to the policy of forming civic identity. The project “Kyrgyz Zharany” was initiated, proclaiming the line of the state towards the formation of a new model of identity, based on citizenship. In this regard, for example, it was proposed to remove the column “nationality” from the general civil passport, which was later partially implemented. In addition, this period (2011-2017) was marked by the holding of national-scale events such as the “Nomad Games”, which received a positive response from the population and an international response. There were also a number of other resounding initiatives that, during the period of the next, fifth president (2017-2020), were either consigned to oblivion or were pushed to the periphery of the political agenda. Thus, over the thirty-year historical period of independence in Kyrgyzstan, there was no state systemic policy for the formation of civil identity, the construction of a nation that would meet the challenges of the new, post-Soviet reality. In fact, all this time we have been observing the process of spontaneous, uncontrollable transformation of the old Soviet identity into something new. Various state projects, in one way or another, related to the problem of nation-building, failed to form a “working” post-Soviet model of civic identity, to create an acceptable and understandable image of the future. Because almost all the ideological constructs of the post-Soviet period are retrospective, that is, they are directed to the past, “great” past, which is artificially recreated, exalted in the form of numerous monuments to biys and manaps, without proper ideological content, without guidelines for the future.
Today, despite the declaration at the state level and the adoption of regulatory documents, we know little about the civic identity of modern Kyrgyzstanis. Very little research has been carried out on this issue in the country. In the academic sphere, the first attempts at scientific study began in 2009, thanks to the initiative of the head of the Sociological Association of Kyrgyzstan (SAK), Professor K. Isaev, and the first empirical studies on a republican scale based on representative samples from 2011. Practical recommendations based on the results of the 2011-2014 surveys were given to the administration of the then president as an empirical basis for developing the concept of civic identity. Further, similar studies were carried out by SAK scientists in 2016-2018.[7] Judging by open sources, there was no large-scale research in this direction by order of the government. What empirical data formed the basis for the concept of development of civic identity “Kyrgyz Zharany” adopted this year, we do not know. Nevertheless, based on some results of already conducted academic research, we can give certain characteristics to the process of forming the identity of the Kyrgyzstanis and identify some of its features. In other words, from the height of the past thirty years of independence, to try to answer the question “Who are we?”
So, as studies have shown, today the identity of Kyrgyzstanis is a complex social phenomenon. It consists of several components, each of which represents a separate type of social identity. For example, religious, ethnic, territorial / regional, gender, civic, etc. Sociological observations have shown that the identity model, which is a “multi-storey building”, where various types of social identities are arranged in a hierarchical order, does not correspond to our dynamic reality. That is, it cannot be argued that the basis, the foundation of the “home” is formed by any specific type of identity, for example, ethnic or tribal, and then the following are arranged in decreasing order of relevance. I think that the situational model of identity is more appropriate and relevant here. It can be represented in the form of a spinning “roll” with a set of social identities, where they all have an initial equal value for a person or a social group. Depending on the situation, the “roll” spins and actualizes one or another type of identity, channeling the social behavior of a person, and the rest at this time perform a background function without losing their significance. This is evidenced by empirical evidence.
In this vein, the overwhelming majority of Kyrgyzstanis (on average more than 60%) during the polls, and specifically when asked about the portfolio of identities, always note civic identity as a priority. That is, they consider themselves, first of all, a citizen of the country, and only then “a resident of their city/village”, “a representative of their ethnicity, clan, religion, etc.”. It can be assumed that in a specific research situation, Kyrgyzstanis declare their civic identity, correlate, and identify themselves with the citizens of the republic, pushing their other identities to the periphery. At the same time, however, other indicators show that Kyrgyzstanis feel the strongest connection with their close social environment (primarily with family, relatives) and the place where they were born, grew up (with a village, city). This is partly due to the consistently low level of citizens’ trust in state and political institutions, recorded by sociological measurements over the years. Based on this, we previously assumed that Kyrgyzstanis simply declare their civic identity, putting it above others, and this depends on the nature of the question asked or the research situation itself, the influence of the interviewer. And that, in fact, territorial identity plays a priority role in the portfolio of citizens’ identities, then, in descending order, ethnic, religious, tribal, and other types of identities “work”. Indeed, in everyday life, the Kyrgyzstanis are dominated by territorial identity. For example, almost every provincial village, community, small town, large city, entire regions are “marked” by entrance arches.
Arches are placed everywhere and by everyone: from officials to high school graduates.
This is how we designate our territory, exalt it, cultivate, and demonstrate our territorial identity, competing with whom is the coolest, and spending millions on this occupation. It was always incomprehensible to me: what real function do arches perform? In addition, people living or temporarily working in large cities of the republic, in particular in the capital, do not lose social ties with their fellow countrymen. They are supported in the form of various “yntymaks” (territorial communities), meet regularly, and help their villages.
The coronavirus pandemic, which swept the republic in 2020 and constrained the vital activity of citizens for two years, showed the viability of the situational model of identity. Kyrgyzstanis have demonstrated an incredible level of citizenship that we doubted earlier. We considered civic identity to be only a declaration, while real, “working” identity is based on territorial and ethnic criteria. However, self-organization and mobilization of people in the name of common, supra-individual interests during a pandemic showed new properties of civic identity. In other words, our identity is a system, certain components of which “work” (become actualized) in a suitable situation. Thus, we today have an identity that has historically evolved over the past thirty years in “natural” conditions. It functions according to its “natural” laws, gathering and re-gathering depending on the socio-economic and political situation in the country. At the same time, the role of state policy here was minimal. Who are we? Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic? Representatives of our ethnic group? Representatives of our village? Representatives of our religion? There is no single answer to this question. Therefore, I believe that our identity today is the same resource as gold or other valuable minerals, necessary for the development of the republic. It is a raw, unprocessed resource. For the formation of our identity, directed not at the past, but representing the image of the future, and oriented towards the future, a state purposeful policy is needed.
Conclusion
Thus, this article has attempted to survey from the height of thirty years of sovereignty some of the important social changes that have taken place in Kyrgyzstan. Of course, the reflections presented here represent a variant of the author’s interpretation of the prerequisites and consequences of these changes. One thing is certain – we must reflect more, research, analyze the past stage of the country’s development in order to work out appropriate conclusions.
The process of transformation of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan continues. We are witnessing obvious political changes, but at the same time, profound socio-cultural transformations are taking place, provoked by both internal and external factors. The latter are not so visible, but they have a long-term and strategic effect. Our current situation is the result not only of the demographic, geographical, geopolitical, and sociocultural prerequisites we have considered, but also of the processes of globalization and regional economic integration. These globalization challenges pose a new task for the Kyrgyzstanis: the formation of a civilizational identity, in other words, the development of a “correct” geopolitical attitude towards other civilizations or their blocs.
Today we can no longer talk about the transition period that was the paradigm of the 90s and early 2000s. To a certain extent, the state transit is over, we are living in a new phase of progressive development. And we should talk more about the future, of course, based on a deep analysis of the past and the present. Kyrgyzstan, in comparison with other states of the post-Soviet space, does not have rich mineral resources. However, the republic has one strategic resource – the almost irrational belief of citizens in a positive future. Despite political upheavals and economic discord, Kyrgyzstanis look to the future with enviable optimism. Sociological studies have repeatedly recorded this. People believe that the country will surely be prosperous in the future. It seems to me, that Kyrgyzstan today is able to retain (and retains) only the idea of the future. It is only necessary to give these positive expectations concrete outlines, to designate an understandable image of the future.
[1] 30 years of independence of the Kyrgyz Republic. URL: http://www.stat.kg/ru/publications/30-let-nezavisimosti-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki/ (date of access to the material 09/26/2021)
[2] https://www.gov.kg/ru/post/s/io-prezidenta-premer-ministr-sadyr-zhaparov-utverdil-kontseptsiyu-razvitiya-grazhdanskoy-identichnosti-kyrgyz-zharany (date of access to publication 02.10 .2021)
[3] 30 years of independence of the Kyrgyz Republic. URL: http://www.stat.kg/ru/publications/30-let-nezavisimosti-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki/ (date of access to the material 09/02/2021)
[4] The theory of the “youth bulge” is being developed by American and European sociologists. The most famous theory of the “negative demographic priority of youth” by the German sociologist G. Heinson
[5] Sociological research on the topic “The politics of memory as a factor in strengthening civic identity and statehood” was carried out within the framework of a grant funded by the Department of Science of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2018 on the basis of the Department of Sociology of the Belarusian State University. K.Karasaev. As part of the study, 50 expert interviews and 3 focus groups were conducted, covering 37 people.
[6] Syrgabaev SB, Isaev K. People’s revolutions in the Kyrgyz Republic: origins, consequences. Society and Politics magazine. – Poland, 2014 No. 3 (40); The Kyrgyz Republic in the system of coordinates of the modern world order. Society and Politics magazine. – Poland, 2014 No. 1 (38). –S.191-200.
[7] “Social identity of the peoples of the Turkic world in the civilization process: the example of Kyrgyzstan” (the project was implemented on the basis of KTU “Manas”, a representative survey across the republic with coverage of 2000 people, 2011-2012); “Social identities of citizens and problems of strengthening Kyrgyz statehood” (the project was implemented on the basis of KTU “Manas”, a representative survey across the republic with coverage of 2000 people, 2014); “Analysis of ways to strengthen the statehood of the Kyrgyz Republic” (the project was implemented on the basis of KTU “Manas”, a representative survey across the republic, covering 2000 people, 2016); “Formation of common civic identity and ensuring civil unity in the Kyrgyz Republic” (the project was carried out on the basis of the Karasaev State University, a representative survey of 800 people in the southern and northern regions of the republic, 2017);