Almost 30 years into independence of Kazakhstan, the government has still not decided to give Kazakh names to Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar located in the north of the country. The reasons and possible repercussions of renaming the cities are discussed in the article by political scientist Alimana Zhanmukanova (Kazakhstan), exclusively for the analytical platform CABAR.asia.
When Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991, following the example of the other post-Soviet states, the government chose to identify and construct its nation-building through the prism of the core ethnic group – the indigenous Kazakh nationality. This influenced the enforcement of the Kazakh ethnic identity and ethnic elements and names across the country. Despite the political and economic disruption, the government tried hard to reinforce the previously weak and vague idea of Kazakh statehood and everything that comes with it, including giving Kazakh names to geographical locations. Before the independence, the Russian language and culture were dominant in the country, and many names of Kazakhstan’s geographical localities and settlements were named to Russian manner or simply kept the titles given in the period of the Russian Empire. Taking this into account, the authorities began to actively change their names, during which hundreds and hundreds of settlements of different sizes and importance across the country were renamed in rapid speed to Kazakh sounding names or were given totally new names in Kazakh. Exceptions to this are Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar, 2 out of 17 major cities of Kazakhstan, that neither have new Kazakh names nor Kazakh sounding versions of their original names. The question is why did not the Kazakh government change the names of all the major cities in one wave right after gaining the independence, closing the question then and there? To find an answer to this question it is important to study the ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, historical background of the cities, and Russian-Kazakh relationship and Russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet states.
Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar: History and attempts to rename them
The history of the two cities starts in the XVIII century, when during the reign of Elizabeth of Russia, it was recognized that in order to strengthen the Russian Empire’s Southern borders on the newly attained territories, there was an urgent need to start building a new Ishim line. Fortification fortresses were built and protected by Russian Empire’s militant groups – Cossacks. Modern ethnic Russians residing in North Kazakhstan can trace back their roots to the Cossacks, many of whom stayed and started families on this territory.
Pavlodar, one of the oldest cities in Northern Kazakhstan, was founded in 1720 as Koryakovsky fort, an Imperial Russian outpost. The outpost was built in order to gain a foothold in new lands and protect the Cossacks from the attacks of the Dzungars. Although the settlement was first called Koryakovsky fort, it was later expanded and given the name of the city of Pavlodar. Since 1861, the city of Pavlodar is named after the son of Emperor Alexander II, Grand Duke Pavel Alexandrovich, who was born in 1860.
Petropavlovsk was founded in 1752 as a military fortress of St. Peter and was established on the site of the Kyzyl-Zhar tract, on the right bank of the Ishim River. The city was called after the holy apostles Peter and Paul, who were regarded as patrons of the military. Moreover, Peter was considered to be the keeper of the keys to paradise, which can be interpreted as Petropavlovsk being the gate to greater conquests to the South, namely to the rest of Central Asia.
Petropavlovsk News. Petropavlovsk is 265 years old, https://pkzsk.info
Despite the long-established nature of the names, the two cities always had Kazakh alternatives, such as Kyzyl-Zhar for Petropavlovsk, and Saryarka and Kereku for Pavlodar. There were several attempts to rename these cities, but they were all met with a strong backlash from the local populations, usually from the Russian speaking residents, including ethnic Kazakhs themselves. The most notable attempt happened in Petropavlovsk in 2010, when representatives of the government started the discussion and put forward the idea of renaming the city. Usually very passive and apolitical residents of the city unexpectedly launched a full-fledged campaign against the renaming. The residents mobilized very quickly and assertively, using yellow ribbons as a sign of protest to express their desires and demands to allow Petropavlovsk to keep its name. In Pavlodar the question of changing the name comes up frequently but never gets to the stage when the government or the public are serious in their pursuits.
When Astana was renamed to Nur-Sultan in 2019, it became evident that the government is capable of renaming a major city without any consultations with the residents and can do it quite swiftly. Nevertheless, such a scenario is unlikely in the case of Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar: possible problems touch upon not only the democratic aspects and the opinion of the civil society. Here we are also talking about the risks regarding relations with the Russian Federation and the ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, which may also indicate threats to the territorial integrity of the country.
Factor of ethnic composition and identity
It is important to note that at the dawn of Kazakhstan’s independence the country was highly diverse in terms of its ethnic composition. Despite the fact that Kazakhs were made the titular nationality, they remained a minority with only 39,6 percent, while ethnic Russians constituted 37,8 percent of the whole population. This shaky ethnic composition of the newly independent state created the preconditions for conflict, separatism, and strained relations between the two ethnic groups. It is especially the case since most of ethnic Russians are concentrated in the north and east of Kazakhstan, making up the majority in the cities neighboring Russia.
The fragile political situation in the early 1990s and the sudden Kazakhization prompted many ethnic Russians to question their citizenship and contemplate about an autonomy from the newly formed Kazakh state. Several attempts were made in the strive to separate from Kazakhstan and join Russia or create their own Russian-centric autonomous territory. Despite the organized movements and strong narrative, the country’s first president Nursultan Nazarbayev and the ruling government managed to suppress, control, and weaken separatist sentiments in Kazakhstan. Learning from these conflicts, the government approached its nation building policy by adopting the idea of multiculturalism and unity of all under shared identity of Kazakhstanis, handling ethnic questions with sensitivity, tolerance, and caution. Still, the Russian issue is far from being resolved for Kazakhstan.
Even though there is a constant outflow of ethnic Russians from the country, a significant share of them still resides in the cities on the Russian border. For example, in the city of Petropavlovsk ethnic Russians make up 59,28 percent, while Kazakhs make up only 29,99 percent; in Pavlodar, ethnic Russians constitute 41,11 percent, while Kazakhs are 47,71 percent. This break of percentage is similar in other borderline northern and eastern cities such as Kostanay, Kokshetau, and Oskemen.
The ethnic composition of these cities poses a threat to national security in cases when the Russian Federation decides to exercise their imperial ambitions and attacks, physically or verbally, the territorial integrity of neighboring states. As a response, this activates the ethnic Russian minority on the ground in Kazakhstan, giving them an informational reason to revive the ideas of irredentism and separatism, and prompts them to create grassroot movements and agitations. The war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims about the “gifts” to post-Soviet states and Kazakhstan’s statehood – all causes turmoil among ethnic Russian communities and at the same time enrages Kazakh nationalists. When high-ranking Russian deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov claimed that Northern Kazakhstan should belong to Russia, the Kazakh public broke out with discontent. Especially were alarmed Kazakh nationalists who demanded immediate renaming of Pavlodar and Petropavlovsk, the major cities on the referred territories. The proponents of this idea argue that the assignment of Kazakh names to these cities will put an end to disputes and discussions between Kazakhs and Russians about the true ownership of these lands.
If we look at the history of ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, we can understand that many of them did not chose to come to “Kazakhstan”, they chose to settle and cultivate new conquests of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union or were forcibly brought to the country. As a resident of Petropavlovsk recalls her grandfather’s decision to move to Petropavlovsk, “there was not a big difference at the time, it did not matter if you move to Ekaterinburg, Petropavlovsk, or Omsk, all was one country”[1]. In this sense, the ideas of Kazakhisation and domination of the Kazakh ethnicity can be alien and undesirable for many. It is especially the case for a significant share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, who can trace their roots back to militant Cossacks groups, since for them, there is a strong understanding of the ownership of the settlements that were founded and protected by their ancestors. For them, renaming of the settlements to Kazakh manner may indicate defeat and encroachment on their historical rights. Although they are citizens and residents of independent Kazakhstan, living in a majority ethnic Russian and Russian named cities satisfies them and serves as a comfortable compromise. It is known that in the chaos of the collapse of the Soviet Union, around 25 million ethnic Russians were left “abroad”, outside their historical motherland. This traumatic experience still defines and confuses the identity of ethnic Russians residing in the post-Soviet area, making them question their place of residence, citizenship, and relation to historical motherland – Russia[2].
It is apparent that that the preservation of cities bearing the Russian names Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar in Kazakhstan gives the ethnic Russians a sense of belonging and understanding of their place in the country from the standpoint of power and ethnic ownership. Erasing that will drastically impact relations between the ethnic Russian minority and the Kazakh government.
Strong ties with Russia
The Russian Federation has not only a physical proximity to Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar but also great influence and significant presence in the daily life of the residents. The Russian media, including Runet, are very popular among the population of both cities. In the very beginning of the independence, due to poor quality and almost lack of Kazakh media content, Russian television was the only source of entertainment and remains so to this day for many.
Similarly strong is the influence of the Russian economy and business over these cities. Russia exports way more to Kazakhstan than imports from it, providing the country with essential products, agricultural raw materials, chemical industry products, and many more. Another important factor for economy of the region, is the Russian railroads that control Petropavlovsk’s rail station. Although the Petropavlovsk’s rail station is situated inside the territory that should be controlled by Kazakhstani railways, it belongs to the South Ural railway of the Russian Railways and subordinates to Moscow. It is unclear whether the Kazakh railways will take control over the station.
Regarding the agents of soft power, it will be fair to say that there are no visible or vocal organizations that operate in the region, as most of them were broken to pieces and eradicated in the 90s in the aftermath of attempts to separate. The two entities that do promote the interests of ethnic Russians and Russian culture and language are the Russian Orthodox Church and the Association of Russian, Slavic, and Cossack organizations that is a part of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. The head of the Russian Association in Petropavlovsk, Vladimir Vitchenko, is Kazakhstani-born and a prominent Nur Otan party member, whereas in Pavlodar, Tatyana Kuzina, the head of the Slavic Cultural Center, is Russian-born and affiliated with Russian soft-power agency “Russia World Foundation”.
Conclusion
It will be fair to speculate that the renaming of the two cities will take place within the next 5 to 10 years, especially if we take into account the recent and rapid Kazakhisation that was accompanied by nation-building programs, such as Rukhai Zhangyru, Latinization of the Kazakh alphabet, Serpin, and the 550th anniversary of Kazakh Khanate, and that it followed the aftermath of the Crimean annexation and Vladimir Putin’s ambiguous comments about Kazakh statehood. Moreover, worth mentioning is the fact that the rhetoric of the Akim (Mayor) of the North Kazakhstan has changed. In 2018 he claimed that it is “too early” to talk about the renaming and that it was not planned, while in June 2021, his comment was rather ambiguous, stating that he “will take the same position as people” and that “the society decides”. In case the renaming will happen, it may cause an unprecedented discontent among the ethnic Russian community in Kazakhstan. Whether they reside in the refereed cities or not, some of them may feel infringed upon or discriminated. The outflow of ethnic Russians is constant, with only 18,42 percent (3,478,287) of ethnic Russians remaining in Kazakhstan today comparing with 37,82 percent (6,227,549) in 1989. Nonetheless, it is important to note that most of the ethnic Russians reside in the borderline cities like Petropavlovsk and Pavlodar, which creates the situation where separatism and threat to territorial integrity is possible.
In the Russian Federation, the response to rename the cities will depend on existing relations with the current Kazakh government. For now, all is clear, the countries are allies. But in case change of power in Kazakhstan or its foreign policy, one cannot discount the possibility of a repetition, already on the territory of Kazakhstan, of what happened in Georgia and Ukraine.
[1] Zhanmukanova, A.A. (2020). The Perception of North Kazakhstan’s Russian Community on Post-2014 Nation-Building. Master’s Thesis. OSCE Academy. Bishkek
[2] Ibid