The SCO Summit in Samarkand, the military conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, another early presidential election in Kazakhstan, growing tensions of Russian invasion of Ukraine, relations with Iran and India – these are some of the topics from Central Asia that were on the foreign press agenda this September.
Why Is Kazakhstan’s President Calling a Snap Election?
An article published by Radio Free Liberty / Radio Liberty discusses Tokayev’s call on September 1 national address for a snap presidential election this fall. Explaining the decision for the snap vote, Tokayev said a new mandate is necessary to implement “fundamental and comprehensive reforms” needed for the creation of “a just Kazakhstan” – a slogan he used more than once in the address in the Kazakh parliament.
The more than hour-long speech was peppered with populist policy proposals, including a pledge to use funds recovered through anti-graft investigations to build schools and the suggestion of a tax on luxury goods. Tokayev also said he would seek fresh constitutional changes – just months after the country amended the basic law via referendum in June – to make presidential terms seven years and limit incumbents to just one term.
According to Vyacheslav Abramov, founder of the independent news site Vlast.kz, “Tokayev and his team want to use the momentum that they still have” after the deadly mass uprising in January that left more than 230 people dead and allowed the president to outmaneuver rivals loyal to former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Tokayev’s team is likely to present the election as “a referendum of trust” in his reform agenda, Abramov argued.
Concerns regarding Moscow and Tokayev’s need to further his consolidation of power after January are both motivation for an early election, according to Gaziz Abishev, who runs a popular politics-themed Telegram channel called Abishev Analytics. Had Tokayev sought reelection when his current term ends in 2024, his campaign could have coincided with Russia’s own presidential vote, Abishev pointed out, and “it is impossible to know how far our neighbor will go” in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, the analyst said. Moreover, Abishev points out that the former president Nazarbayev’s extended family still controls large swathes of the economy and still has some bargaining power. For the moment, the chances of a “restoration, or countercoup” involving Nazarbayev’s circle appear unlikely, yet “Tokayev, as an experienced politician, will not rule out the threat entirely,” Abishev told RFE/RL.
Finally, economic hardship is also a factor for Tokayev’s decision to hold early elections. Kate Mallinson, founder of the U.K.-based political risk company PRISM., stated that while Tokayev is presently “riding a wave of confidence from the population, who support his recent initiatives to remove the Nazarbayev family and reduce corruption,” the coming winter is “set to be extremely difficult for many households”. “A snap election will see Tokayev secure his mandate before this hardship sets in.”
Between Scylla and Charybdis: Kazakhstan Foreign Policy in Pursuit of a New Equilibrium
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst published an article by Nargis Kassenova, a Senior Fellow at the Program on Central Asia, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, on the challenges for Kazakhstan to establish its new foreign policy equilibrium under the current geopolitical situation. Kazakhstan’s consistent and quite successful multivector policy is being challenged by Russia’s war in Ukraine, and it is now impossible for Kazakhstan to please both Russia and the West.
The article provides an overview of Kazakhstan’s relations with major geopolitical actors in the recent years and discusses the factors that affected Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Dr. Kassenova states that there is little public debate on foreign policy due to the lack of full-fledged political opposition or an epistemic community in foreign policy. However, there is a number of critical issues and dilemmas present in media publications and social media discussions, such as whether Russia is a threat to Kazakhstan’s security and territorial integrity, how Kazakhstan can deal with the damage arising from the geopolitical split between Russia and the West, the possibility of the emergence of strong partnerships with Turkey, China, or fellow Central Asian countries. The article discusses the government actions taken to avoid secondary sanctions by the West and diversify trade routes, including the efforts to develop the Trans-Caspian corridor and cooperation projects with Turkey and Iran.
The strengths and weaknesses of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy approach are also analysed in the article. The author states that the foreign policy concept’s focus on nation-building and protection of Kazakhstanis has practically resulted in the government’s efforts to evacuate its citizens from dangerous areas. A weakness of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy approach during the Nazarbayev era would be excessive investment in vanity projects, , such as hosting Congresses of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions and the OSCE summit in Astana, and the aggrandizement of the First President.
The article concludes that whether Kazakhstan will be able to find a new equilibrium remains to be seen. It is clear that the development of the Trans-Caspian corridor and partnerships with the states of South Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran will be a priority over the next several years. Turkey is of particular importance as a brotherly Eurasian power ready to provide Kazakhstan with all kinds of support. There will be efforts to tap more into the potential of the relations with the Gulf countries. They are seen as a source of investments and as power brokers in the global energy sector. Cooperation with Central Asian states will also be high on the agenda.
Kazakhstan Seeks Alternative Transport Route as Russian Relations Weaken
Caspian Policy Center discussed Tokayev’s meeting with the president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev in Baku in light of the worsening economic and energy situation caused by Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The two leaders signed multiple documents including a declaration on strengthening strategic relations which enumerated on trade and economic cooperation, cooperation between their Ministries of Foreign Affairs for 2023-2024, a program of cultural cooperation, establishing sister cities relations between Shusha and Turkestan, and most notably on plans that will strengthen ties, and possibly help facilitate greater use of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. Additionally, Kazakhstan’s national gas company, QazaqGaz, and Azerbaijan’s state-owned SOCAR signed a memorandum of understanding covering new joint gas projects.
As the report notes, the meeting was held only days after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) announced its fourth pipeline disruption this year. These agreements will help meet Kazakhstan’s need for alternative routes to transport its gas west given strains in its relations with Russia and European and global energy needs. Aliyev and Tokayev expressed confidence in the alternative transport route in their joint press statement, stating they “have also identified future cooperation directions to increase the Middle Corridor’s capacity further.” Although the CPC is still Kazakhstan’s most efficient means to transport oil, both Presidents are hopeful in utilizing the Caspian trade route to mitigate the CPC disruptions.
Military Standoff Re-Ignites Between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
The Jamestown Foundation article analyses the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan conflict on September 14-17 that left behind at least 110 dead and 218 wounded on both sides. As the article reports, Kyrgyzstan called the conflict “a premeditated armed act of aggression” and stated that Tajikistan “treacherously encroached on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan”, whereas Tajikistan accused Kyrgyzstan of “an act of aggression” and escalation of the conflict. On September 19, the heads of the national security services of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a protocol on stabilizing the border situation and establishing peace between the two countries.
The article states that among 150 border conflicts erupted between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, nothing has ever come close to the latest conflict in terms of its scale and intensity. Fighting ensued along the whole perimeter of the Kyrgyzstani-Tajikistani border. Armed forces from both sides used tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, armored vehicles, attack drones and military helicopters, leading to unprecedented level of death and destruction.
The underlying reasons for the border conflict between these two countries were the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent need to have demarcated borders. Former Soviet republics pushed for materialization of their borders through infrastructure such as roads, fences and outposts, which gradually led to securitization of daily life in border areas. Proliferation of checkpoints and other infrastructure that limited free movement created a situation in which people often faced corruption and disrespect from border guards of neighboring countries. People living along the Kyrgyzstani-Tajikistani border were no exception to this trend, and their dissatisfaction with the situation created a problem for authorities and politicians to solve.
However, instead of expressing the political will to address the disputed territories and a commitment to long-term, and often unpopular, negotiations, Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani politicians exploited growing nationalist rhetoric to garner public support and mobilize voters with promises to demarcate the border without giving up a single centimeter. For example, Kyrgyzstani President Sadyr Japarov and National Security Service Chief Kamchybek Tashiev prioritized the issue of demarcating borders in Kyrgyzstan’s interests during their 2020 parliamentary election campaign. If securitization of borders planted seeds for border conflicts, politicization of borders led to their proliferation and intensification.
The article states that the shooting has ended, but the underlying reasons remain unaddressed. Both sides continue to blame each other for what happened, and negotiations do not seem to be a prospect in the near future. Such behavior presents a worrisome trend of Bishkek and Dushanbe moving away from diplomatic solutions toward further escalation through use of force. If Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fail to reach a sustainable agreement on their shared border, the wider Central Asia region and its neighbors risk finding themselves in an increasingly precarious security situation.
Why Western Analyses of Kyrgyz-Tajik Clashes Fall Short
In his piece for Eurasia Review, Dr. Theodore Karasik, a senior advisor to Gulf State Analytics and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Lexington Institute in Washington, D.C., argues that analysts and policymakers are “missing some major points in what is going on between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan” because they do not account for the anthropological setting in Central Asia and focus on human rights issues.
“Missing from analysis is the cultural-religious-political aspect of the disputed region and how clan behavior plays into the larger international misunderstanding of the events that are going on in this part of Central Asia. The fact that SCO leaders met for an informal dinner, which was well documented, and then visited a key Samarkand mosque, Bibi-Khanym, for a group photograph, was highly significant. Met with sneers and comedy routines from Western analysts, the photo was highly illustrative. The mosque, and the city of Samarkand, have strong historical connotations. It was in Samarkand that Tamerlane ruled, and other empires also came to rule over this historic city in later centuries,” Dr. Karasik states.
Today, the bulk of the peoples of Central Asia have remained true to the basic anthropological essence of clans, and the re-eruption of violence between the two countries, just a day after the SCO conference, involved a serious mix of clan animosity and technology, the author argues. Japarov’s ability to use Turkish drone technology in a kinetic environment featuring Tajikistan’s Iranian-supplied drones is an example of outside powers empowering clan-like behavior and warfare.
Overall, the point is that a type of orientalism is augmented by a human rights agenda that masks these other, more dominant, local issues. Western methodologies and approaches to Central Asia need to dig into what makes these societies tick beyond the criminal scene, inequality issues and environmental concerns. These factors are all important, but a good foundation for analysis rests in the anthropological arena, Dr. Karasik concludes.
Europe’s Wait for Turkmen Natural Gas Continues
Bruce Pannier’s article for the Foreign Policy Research Institute discusses the challenges for Europe to wean itself off Russian natural gas. The article states that while the move makes sound geopolitical sense, cutting off Russian gas supplies has already caused economic pain. Before the war, Russia supplied 40 percent of Europe’s gas. The European Union now aims to achieve energy independence from Russia by 2030.
The article argues that Turkmenistan, with the world’s fourth largest gas reserves, would seem to be a possible supplier. The country has been experiencing an economic crisis for some seven years and needs customers for its natural gas. But there is still no physical connection between Europe and Turkmenistan to ship the crucial commodity, and Turkmenistan’s repressive government has a poor human rights record.
More importantly, Turkmenistan seems intent on privileging its ties with Russia and Iran over any potential market opportunities in Europe. As a result, there is no sign of urgency from Turkmenistan to export any of its gas to Europe. Serdar Berdymukhammedov’s choice of Moscow and Tehran for his first two foreign visits as president is an indication of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy direction.
The article concludes that Turkmenistan will likely maintain its ties with Russia and deepen cooperation with Iran while keeping the West at arm’s length. Turkmenistan would risk souring relations with Russia and Iran if it ever constructed the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, making it unlikely that Europe will see Turkmen gas any time soon.
President Mirziyoyev’s Strategic Urgency
The article by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute analyses two speeches delivered by President Mirziyoyev on August 31, Uzbekistan’s thirty-first Independence Day.
First, Mirziyoyev attended a memorial ceremony dedicated to the “victims of political repression”. The article states that this speech is notable for the fact that it declared the chief cause of Uzbekistan’s century and a half of woes to be not just Stalin or even Communism but Russian imperialism as such. He focused on the Uzbek reformers known as Jadids that were killed or suppressed in the early Soviet period. He also addressed at length Moscow’s singling out of Uzbekistan during the “cotton crisis” of the 1980s. In closing the President noted the dark clouds of conflict that hung over today’s world.
In contrast to the dark tones of the Martyrs Day speech, Mirziyoyev’s National Day speech that afternoon was upbeat and celebratory, the author reports. He congratulated young Uzbeks for winning the World Chess Olympiad in India and hailed progress in many areas. Next, in a kind of pledge to the citizenry, he enumerated the main thrusts of the present reform effort, listing one by on all the main areas, including education, public health, courts, etc. In the process he gave particular emphasis to the future expanded role he foresees for private entrepreneurship.
However, there is a particular part of Mirziyoyev’s speech that the article highlights. “The one task that remains our highest priority [however] continues to be to expand the power and potential of the country’s Armed Forces. We will devote ever more attention to increasing their war-fighting capability, the growth of military proficiency, and the patriotism of both soldiers and officers. On this renowned day I sincerely congratulate our glorious troops, who so staunchly defend the Homeland. I wish them energy and successes,” the President declared.
The significance of this statement is, first, that it indicates that the Uzbek government has no illusions about the gravity of world and regional events and their potential to derail Tashkent’s reforms; second, that Tashkent intends to prioritize national security and to increase resources going to the military; and third, that it judges the time ripe to present these sensitive matters bluntly to the public at large. Because this strategic priority was declared only hours after President Mirziyoyev had laid blame for the loss of hundreds of thousands on Uzbek lives on Russian imperialism, we can be sure that the reason his government is upgrading the Uzbek military is to meet the threat posed by Putin’s Moscow. Mirziyoyev fully acknowledged the danger that Putin’s Russia poses for Uzbekistan and is determined both to mobilize the country’s own resources to meet them and to link arms with his Central Asian neighbors to this end. He is not seeking to create formal ties with any of the many international security groupings that have links in the region, yet he would clearly be open to acquire equipment and skills from abroad, provided such ties are consistent with the “Uzbekistan first” thinking that was heard on August 31 and with the “Central Asia first” thinking espoused by the joint presidents on July 21 and at meetings before that over several years, the author concludes.
Uzbekistan Introduces Monthly Fees for Crypto Companies Effective Immediately
The information and media platform CoinDesk wrote about the new regulation in Uzbekistan according to which licensed cryptocurrency companies are required to pay monthly fees that will mostly go towards the state budget. The new rules set out by the National Agency of Perspective Projects, the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan are already in force. How much a firm will have to pay each month depends on the type of service it provides as well as a base figure set for crypto companies at the time the monthly payment is to be made, the document says.
The article states that Uzbekistan is cracking down on the local crypto industry. A crypto regulation framework published in April mandated crypto exchanges, custodians and mining pools operating in the country to register with regulators. In August, the country moved to block crypto exchanges like Binance, Huobi, FTX and Bybit, saying local regulations did not allow citizens to trade crypto on foreign platforms.
According to the new rules, 80% of the monthly fees paid by crypto users and companies will go to the country’s budget, while the rest will go to the treasury of the National Agency of Perspective Projects of the Republic of Uzbekistan (NAPM). Companies that fail to pay the new fee will face penalties including the suspension of their licenses.
What Does Iran’s Membership in the SCO Mean for the Region?
The main political event for Central Asia in September was arguably the 22nd Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit held on 15-16 September in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. It was the first SCO summit to take place in person since the COVID-19 outbreak.
The Diplomat article discusses one of the important events of this summit – the formal inclusion of Iran as a permanent member in the SCO. Acceptance of Iran as a full member of SCO will open up a new horizon of multilateralism, the article points out. It will be beneficial not only for Iran but for the whole region. Many analysts argued that even if Iran may not be able to reap many immediate benefits from joining the SCO, it indicates Iran’s willingness to pursue stronger relations with China and Russia, the organization’s two most powerful members. The SCO now has all the necessary players to solve regional challenges like security, connectivity, and economic development. The inclusion of Iran in the SCO gives the message of regional integrity and symbolizes the beginning of a new era of regionalism. Despite ongoing regional crises, the SCO summit in Samarkand reaffirmed its values and principles of shared destiny and win-win cooperation for the region, the article states.
In search of a new identity for SCO
An analytical article by East Asia Forum also discusses the outcomes of the SCO summit. It states that the 2022 summit featured an attempt by member states to transform the SCO into an organisation with clear economic and infrastructure-oriented goals. These goals include promoting new transportation routes, diversifying connectivity channels, securing the stability of supply chains, and promoting wider opportunities for growth generation. The Central Asian states and other participants see the SCO as holding untapped economic potential rather than being an organisation solely designed to deal with security issues.
The presence of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping inevitably led to discussions about the role of the SCO in managing the Russia–China rivalry in Central Asia and competition with the West for regional influence. But Central Asian states wanted to discuss constructing a safe neighbourhood, promoting sustainable development, strengthening transport connectivity and facilitating deeper cultural dialogue. In the lead-up to the summit, SCO member states emphasised the importance of rebuilding Afghanistan and incorporating Iran into regional initiatives to create a more inclusive neighbourhood.
Changing the organisational identity of the SCO to a more functional and issue-specific arrangement is instrumental for the organisation to reflect the concerns of its member states. If successful, this change will signal to the international community that the SCO’s understanding of security goes beyond borders and policing — the goals of the 2001 summit, the article highlights.
Why Xi Jinping Chose Central Asia for His First Post-COVID-19 Trip
Rafaello Pantucci’s article for Foreign Policy analyses the history of modern China-Central Asia relations and discusses China’s motivations and aspirations for Central Asia. According to the author, “The region is a propitious one for Xi to make his first foreign foray in over two years. He is visiting a region where China has consistently tested out new foreign-policy ideas, where the local governments will go to great lengths to ensure the visit goes smoothly, and where there is an appetite for economic cooperation on all sides.”
Although the SCO is widely derided in the West, it has only grown and expanded in remit during its 21-year existence, and it now encompasses almost 40 percent of the world’s population. It is an organization that has important Western allies (like India) as members, reflecting its appeal beyond the club for anti-western authoritarians that it is sometimes described as. For many of its members, the SCO is an expression of the “more just” international order that senior Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi described to the Russian ambassador to Moscow. It is showing the world that there are options out there beyond the western-dominated order that was created in the wake of World War II, the author states.
Central Asia has always held an important place in Chinese strategic thinking. It is a space where China has consistently tested out new ideas and has a web of relations and interests that are tied to some of its most sensitive domestic national security concerns. It is now also giving Xi the final step of his victory lap ahead of his likely third-term coronation at the 20th National Party Congress, the author argues.
India Is Building on Its Historic Links with Central Asia
Continuing the topic of the SCO summit, Eurasia Review piece focuses on India’s historic and present connections with Central Asia. At the summit, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that since the pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine had disrupted global supply chains, the SCO must make efforts to “develop reliable, resilient and diversified supply chains in our region, which will require better connectivity.” He also demanded the full right to transit for all. Modi discussed the development of a trade route to Central Asia through Chabahar in Iran at his meeting with the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Connectivity was considered key to unlocking the potential in this regard, including the greater usage of the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor.
It is apparent that India is completely in tune with the interests and aspirations of the Central Asian countries. Like them, it does not believe in blocs and military alliances and is wholly devoted to transparent and mutually beneficial development cooperation. While India has problems with Pakistan and China, it has adopted the line that it will be “multi-aligned” and will join any organization, irrespective of the membership, if the organization will help promote India, its capabilities and interests, the article concludes.