The November analytical articles in foreign press outlets discussed the results of presidential elections in Kazakhstan, tightened media freedom in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan’s drone factory in partnership with Iran, Turkmenistan’s economic and political developments, as well as Uzbekistan’s economic growth and priorities.
Kazakhstan: Expanding the West’s Footprint in Tokayev’s ‘New Kazakhstan’
In the article published by the Center for European Policy Analysis, political and economic analysts Ben Godwin discusses the implications and possibilities that President Tokayev’s reelection provides for the Western countries. Tokayev secured a victory in the presidential election on 20 November, receiving 81% of the popular vote, though the poll “lacked competitiveness” according to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
In terms of democratic reforms, Tokayev has passed a series of measures that have seen the death penalty abolished and elements of competition injected into Kazakhstan’s otherwise ossified political system. However, progress is slow and, by altering the constitution on his term limits, the president has undermined many of the reforms that were designed to make elections more pluralistic. Democratic nations should also continue to hold the Tokayev administration to account for the response to the unrest seen in January, when security forces used lethal violence against protestors in Almaty and Russian forces were deployed to the country.
The economy is a less knotty area in which Western nations can engage Kazakhstan, Godwin believes. The economic developments will be closely watched by Russia and China and will not be welcomed by them. But for now, the West has an opportunity to expand its interests in Kazakhstan in the best possible way; its companies and financial markets can help bring greater wealth, the article concludes.
US Backing for Kazakhstan Remains Firm Despite Flawed Election
Navbahor Imamova’s article for “Voice of America” also discusses the Western, specifically American, reaction to Tokayev’s reelection. While pledging to work with Tokayev, whose country represents the largest U.S. business partner in Central Asia, the State Department concurred with the findings of the OSCE observer group that judged the election seriously deficient.
U.S.-based independent analysts joined the OSCE in expressing disappointment with the election, in which five other candidates for president were on the ballot, but none of them directly challenged Tokayev. He also did not debate any of the other candidates. “This election was rushed,” said Gavin Helf from the U.S. Institute of Peace at a Caspian Policy Center discussion in Washington, stressing that “Tokayev’s guaranteed reelection is not going to help with external legitimacy in the West.”
Nevertheless, the United States is anxious to encourage reform in the oil-rich nation and perhaps exploit growing concerns about Russian territorial ambitions following Moscow’s attempt to forcibly annex parts of Ukraine, another former Soviet republic. Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed support last month for a reform agenda introduced by Tokayev following anti-government protests in January that, according to Kazakhstan’s Chief Prosecutor, left 232 dead and hundreds detained. The government did not permit an independent investigation, but Tokayev promised accountability, which Human Rights Watch and other groups say he has yet to deliver.
Did Kyrgyzstan turn into an authoritarian state overnight?
An OpenDemocracy article analyses the recent developments in Kyrgyzstan, where arrests of opposition and attacks on media have been heightened. On 23 October, 22 civic activists and public figures – including politicians – were jailed by a court on suspicion of “attempting to organise mass riots” for two months. All are members of a new committee created to protect the Kempir-Abad reservoir that spans Kyrgyzstan’s border with neighbouring Uzbekistan.
Shortly after, Kyrgyzstan’s government issued a two-month ban on Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyzstan service of US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which is now blocked in the country. The reason for the block was Radio Azattyk’s broadcast of a programme last month on the armed conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. One of the laws the Parliament has passed on media freedom, designed to protect the public ‘from inaccurate and false information’, was used to block Radio Azattyk without requiring a court decision.
For several years in a row, Kyrgyzstan had the best indicators of democracy and freedom of speech compared to other countries of Central Asia, where government-controlled and censored media prevail. But in 2022, Kyrgyzstan made it to the list of authoritarian countries for the first time, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index.
Kyrgyzstan: Expelled Journalist Should Be Allowed to Return from Russia
Human Rights Watch published an article regarding investigative journalist Bolot Temirov, who has been deported to Russia by court’s decision on November 23. The prosecution asked that the court apply Article 70 of the Criminal Code, claiming Temirov should not be considered a citizen of Kyrgyzstan in light of the forgery charges and should be expelled. The court agreed with the prosecution. HRW states that given the significant concerns about due process in his case, including the removal of his Kyrgyz passport, Temirov should be allowed to return to Kyrgyzstan to challenge his removal and continue his work as a journalist.
Bolot Temirov, director of Temirov Live, an independent online outlet, was born in Kyrgyzstan but had used a Soviet passport until 2001, before using a Russian passport he received while studying. He received his Kyrgyz passport in 2008. In May 2022, his Kyrgyz passport was annulled in connection to the criminal case against him.
Temirov was arrested in January on charges of manufacturing illegal drugs. During the arrest, the police also confiscated computer processors, hard drives, and documents from his office. Temirov maintains that drugs allegedly found during the search had been planted. Many in the Kyrgyz media viewed the case as retaliation for his team’s investigation into fuel export schemes. The report of that investigation had premiered on the outlet’s YouTube channel just days before the authorities raided his office and detained him. In April, Temirov Live released another investigation into the state purchase tenders, shortly before two more criminal cases were brought against Temirov. On this occasion, he was charged with forgery of documents (Article 379 of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code) and illegal crossing of the state border (Article 378).
Filling The Geopolitical Void in Central Asia – Analysis
Foreign Policy Research Institute article by Bruce Pannier discusses the recent aggravation of the situation between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the geopolitical developments in the region. According to the article, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are reportedly strengthening their military potential, especially in the sphere of drones. Pannier states that should further conflicts take place in the future, it is likely military drones will play a large role.
In terms of geopolitical relations, as the author states, some people in Kyrgyzstan believe Russia is quietly siding with Tajikistan. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon was in Moscow shortly after the first Kyrgyz-Tajik war, though Rahmon’s visit was timed with the May 9 Victory Day commemoration of the end of World War II. Rahmon was also the only Commonwealth of Independent States leader at the ceremony in Moscow, but images of him with Russian President Vladimir Putin were interpreted by many in Kyrgyzstan as Russia supporting Tajikistan. These suspicions deepened when Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Rahmon the “Order of Merit for the Fatherland” for Rahmon’s contributions to ensuring regional stability.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan purchasing drones from, respectively, Turkey and Iran is an example of two Central Asian countries looking beyond Russia for help in meeting their needs and this process is happening across Central Asia. All the Central Asian states are finding new weapons suppliers, many in the Middle East, but also China and some European countries.
China stepping up military cooperation with Tajikistan
An article by Eurasianet states that Tajikistan’s relations with China, which were mainly of economic nature in the past, are moving towards the military realm. According to an agreement published on Tajikistan’s Justice Ministry website on November 21, Dushanbe has committed to conducting joint anti-terrorism drills with Chinese forces once every two years.
Although bilateral military exercises have taken place before – in 2006, 2015, 2016 and 2019 – this document will put the arrangement on a more formal and systematized footing. Tajikistan’s relations with Beijing have in recent history been mainly contingent on its status as a debtor – around $2 billion is owed by Dushanbe at last count. Things took a turn around 2016, when it emerged that a Chinese military facility had been established in a remote eastern location of Tajikistan on the border with Afghanistan. Tajik officials have over the years issued increasingly desultory and unconvincing denials about the existence of the base.
In a September 2020 report, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that Beijing was “seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the People’s Liberation Army to project and sustain military power at greater distances.” It named Tajikistan as one of the countries where that goal was being pursued.
And then in October 2021, the Tajik government announced that China would build garrisons for a special rapid response unit in the village of Vakhon, in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.
Tajik-made Iranian Drones are Changing the Battlefields of Eurasia
Several analytical outlets discussed the tensions regarding opening of Iranian military drones’ factory in Tajikistan. Jamestown Foundation wrote that with Iranian drones raining over Ukraine’s cities and Israeli forces striking Iranian drone factory in Syria two weeks later, Iran’s drone program is now beyond Iran, both in terms of production and operational impact.
In this light, opening of an Iranian drone factory in Dushanbe in May 2022 is particularly crucial because it marks the first official and open announcement of an international Iranian UAV production line. Tajikistan’s potential purchase of Iranian drones would directly escalate tensions in the region, especially vis-à-vis Turkey’s ally, Kyrgyzstan. As Kyrgyzstan hosts a Turkish TB-2 base and is a fresh customer for the Turkish produced Akinci UAV bomber, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan share significant military-strategic ties that cause concern for Iran, if not also Iran’s ally, Russia.
The Diplomat also addressed the allegations that Tajikistan has been providing Russia with drones to use in the Ukraine war. On October 30, the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted these claims. “We emphasize that the Republic of Tajikistan does not export military equipment to third countries,” the statement noted. Indeed, according to the article, it looks like the drones that are reportedly being designed in Tajikistan’s factory are not the same drones that are being used in Ukraine.
Finally, discussing Iran’s booming drone industry, Eurasian Times noted that Tajikistan is the only Central Asian Republic where a sister language of Iranian, namely Tajik, is spoken. Moreover, both Tajikistan and Iran are in unison in opposing the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. While Tajikistan supports the warriors of Panjshir Valley, the Iranians have demonstrated fraternal ties with the Hazara of Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan: Send in the clowns
The Eurasia.net article argues that in Turkmenistan, even though Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov stepped down as president in March to make way for his son, Serdar, he has been increasingly behaving like he still runs the country. The article mentions that on November 12, former president went to the Mary province to conduct a personal inspection on the progress of the cotton harvest and the sowing of wheat. While President Serdar Berdymukhamedov has complained at times of the weakness of the irrigation system and demanded that farmers work faster so as to meet cotton and wheat targets, Berdymukhamedov senior seems to feel that he is the one to get the job done.
The article quotes the editor of the Turkmen News website who argued that this is institutionally inappropriate, since the elder Berdymukhamedov is now a mere head of the upper house of parliament. In another instance, the article further argues, in October, the former president presided over a meeting of regional officials and berated them over the potential prospect of the wheat harvest falling short of expectations.
The article states that none of this is technically within Berdymukhamedov senior’s purview, although the line offered by state media was that it is parliament’s role to ensure political stability and strengthen social harmony. The solution looming on the horizon is for a rejigging of territorial administrations – a process that the former president intends to handle personally.
The article concludes with former president’s curious priority-setting. The states that Parliament is now going through the motions of adopting legislation regulating the circus arts since the late President Saparmurat Niyazov had once banned circuses, deeming them alien to his nation’s culture. The draft will, according to its authors, “define the legal and socio-economic foundations of state policy” on circuses.
Turkmenistan Is Booming: Why?
The Silk Roads Briefing article asks the question of why Turkmen economy has been booming in 2022 growing at 6.2% from January to September. The answer seems to lie with the country’s ability to take advantage of high gas prices. The article states that Turkmenistan is ranked 44th globally in terms of oil reserves and 6th in gas reserves. The article argues, higher energy prices during 2022 have been a boost to its economy – and to others, such as Kazakhstan, in Central Asia.
According to the latest European Reconstruction & Development Bank (ERDB) report, Turkmenistan’s external positions have significantly strengthened as increased gas prices are likely to further boost government revenues, contributing to the country’s borrowing capacity. Turkmenistan is also developing trade and transport relations with its neighbors and has recently signed up to be an official partner of the INSTC, which helps transit goods from Central Asia to the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe. The country has agreed to develop bilateral trade, simplify the visa regime, and ensure better transport connectivity with its neighbors. The recently signed agreement on the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway corridor opens up further opportunities for Turkmenistan as a transit hub to Europe via Turkey and to India via Iran, the bank’s report says.
Uzbekistan Wants New Trade Relationship with U.S. To Compensate for Russia Sanctions
Kenneth Rapoza’s article at Forbes analyses Uzbekistan’s attempts to receive the Permanent Normal Trade Relations status and a membership at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Permanent Normal Trade Relations, or otherwise known Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, requires a country providing a trade concession to one trading partner to extend the same treatment to all.
The Uzbek government created a Working Group to get into the WTO in June after first engaging with the body back in the late 1990s. It is rare that a non-WTO member will ever get preferential trade treatment with the U.S. However, the war in Ukraine, U.S. competition with China, and U.S. interests in Central Asia may allow Washington to accelerate Uzbekistan’s access to WTO and grant it PNTR sooner rather than later. But this is the best-case scenario.
Economic ties to Russia have suffered, but GDP growth in Uzbekistan has remained positive. It is likely to reach 5.3% this year, according to the World Bank. The economy is doing better than most in the region.
Regarding the next moves for Uzbekistan’s WTO Working Party, chairman Taeho Lee of the Republic of Korea left further dates for discussion open and pending Uzbekistan’s progress in bilateral market access negotiations. Once they’re in, Uzbekistan will get what Russia once had, Permanent Normal Trade Relations. It may take some time, but it will happen.
For now, Uzbekistan is likely to accelerate access into Europe and India textile markets, building new supply chains that could lead to the U.S., the article forecasts.
To Withstand Global Shocks, Uzbekistan Needs to Continue Reforms and Build an Inclusive Market Economy
Continuing the topic of Uzbekistan’s economic growth, Anna Bjerde, World Bank Vice President for Europe and Central Asia, published her recommendations and an overview of the country’s economy following her visit to Tashkent.
According to Bjerde, Uzbekistan has made impressive development gains over the past five years by relentlessly pursuing the path of market-oriented reforms. It will need to sustain momentum to achieve its ambitious goal of reaching upper-middle-income status by 2030.
In terms of future areas of focus, Bjerde states that developments in the private sector and addressing the risk of vested interests holding back productivity and growth are needed. To raise its international competitiveness, Uzbekistan must further liberalize factor markets (such as land, capital, energy and raw materials, and the labor force) and cut the cost of trade. To address resource misallocation and raise labor productivity, completing the agenda of liberalizing prices, reforming state enterprises, improving financial systems, and strengthening the business environment will be critical.
Improvements in the quality of health and education services are essential, as are further investments in well-planned social safety nets that need to underpin reforms to shield the poor and vulnerable from the costs of transition, the statement highlights.
Russia’s Dying Eurasian Dream
An analytical article by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) states that cracks that were always visible within the Kremlin-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) groupings are now becoming ever more explicit. The immediate cause is Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which has laid bare and further exacerbated the inherent weaknesses and self-interest within its regional initiatives. The geographic scope of these organizations is staggering — from the Caucasus to the Tajik-Kyrgyz border — but the sheer size of the area concerned merely highlights Russia’s dissipated strength and focus.
In September, when the members of and candidates to the Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) met in Samarkand, Tajikistan launched a cross-border attack on neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Both are members of CSTO, and the presidents of both republics were attending the summit. Putin did not react, and nor did CSTO. At this point, Kyrgyzstan pulled out of the organization’s scheduled military exercises and openly complained about its inadequacy.
Flaws within another Eurasian integrationist project, the EEU, were seeded long before 2022, with Russia being the largest in absolute numbers and mostly dictating the terms to fellow member states. But since the invasion started, disagreements have worsened. EEU members complain they are unprotected and victims of Russia’s economic “egocentrism”. Recent examples include cutting Kazakhstan’s oil export pipeline with barely any notice, pressures on Central Asian migrants inside Russia, who provide important remittances to their home countries, and unilateral demands to lower trade barriers with little reciprocation.
The decline of Russian multilateral efforts could mark an end to the post-Soviet era in Eurasia. The Kremlin is seeing its influence thinning, its garrisons stripped of men for the war in Ukraine, its trade enmeshed by sanctions, while South Caucasus and Central Asia consider the prospects with rivals. A new period begins where Russia becomes just one of many players along with Turkey, China, and Iran; none are necessarily Russia’s enemies, but each has its own interests to pursue, the article states.