“In the case of TPNW strategic silence or a “wait and see” approach may only benefit the status quo, in which the complete nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of NPT might never be realized, or nuclear weapons be tamed illegal as every other WMD”, – writes participant of CABAR.asia’s School of analytics Doniyor Mutalov (Uzbekistan), exclusively for CABAR.asia.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine certainly heightened the risks of the use of nuclear weapons in the war. President Putin has repeatedly resorted to atomic blackmail, threatening any countries who would dare to intervene in the war in Ukraine. He had also conducted sham referenda to annex occupied territories, while hinting at an atomic retaliation if those newly incorporated regions were “attacked”. Andrey Baklitsky, the UN expert on nukes, has claimed that it can be considered as meeting the nuclear use condition under vague Russian interpretation. As of 2022, the risk of nuclear war is at an all-time high since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Current developments only reinforce John F. Kennedy’s words that as long as nuclear arms exist, they hang like “Damocles sword” over every man, woman, and child on the planet and that they must be abolished before they abolish humanity.
Therefore, the relevance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is at its peak, as it is the only Treaty that has finally achieved the prohibition of nuclear weapons and strives for complete and irreversible disarmament. It entered into force in January 2021 after 50 ratifications. The same day, the sign “nuclear weapons are now illegal” was projected on the UN headquarters building, noting the ban on the deadliest weapon of mass destruction. As of October 2022, the number of State Parties to TPNW had reached 68. The Treaty symbolized a protest of non-nuclear weapon states by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Not a single nuclear power has signed or ratified the TPNW, yet the normative framework it provides is crucial to stigmatize the sheer nuclear arsenals of the few.
The latest Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) annual report concludes that nuclear disarmament might be over, as all nine nuclear powers are said to be enhancing or increasing their arsenals. According to the document, the Russian Federation, with 5,977 warheads, and the US, with 5,428, still possess about 90 percent of all nuclear warheads in the world, and SIPRI expects a further increase in the coming decade. Non-NPT states, such as Pakistan, also continue expanding their nuclear stockpile. The cost of retaining such staggering arsenals is also enormous; more than 82,4 billion USD is spent annually to maintain those weapons of mass destruction, a sum 8300 times more than the annual budget of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.
States of Central Asia
Central Asian states have a different perception of nuclear disarmament; on the one hand, one state in the region has experienced the devastating humanitarian impact of those weapons, and on the other hand, no atmospheric atomic tests were conducted in other CA counties. Therefore, public discussion on nuclear disarmament is not common in those states.
Kazakhstan’s nuclear legacy is synonymous with the environmental and societal scars from forty years of nuclear tests in the infamous Semipalatinsk Polygon, the home of the Soviet nuclear program, where 456 nuclear tests had been conducted, both underground and in the atmosphere [2]. This testing ground was finally closed in August 1991. However, public opinion remained strongly anti-nuclear, which might have guided Kazakhstan’s decision to voluntarily dismantle more than 1400 atomic warheads and join the NPT [3]. The dismal atomic legacy might have also steered Kazakhstan to lead the world in nuclear disarmament by providing the venue for negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program or actively participating in the formation and negotiations on the TPNW, and being the only CIS country that had signed and ratified it.
Moreover, Kazakhstan also hosts an ex/Soviet missile defense polygon – Sary Shagan leased by Russian Federation since the 90s. Nevertheless, occasionally Russia conducted ballistic missile trials there. In 2019, before TPNW entered into force, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Topol was tested there. Article 4(2) of the TPNW explicitly calls for “the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities”, which might include Sary-Shagan if used for ICBM testing. However, since January 2021, no such tests have been performed, and Kazakhstan’s MFA has stated that it will continue bilateral consultations with its Russian counterparts regarding the future of missile polygons. The first Meeting of State Parties of the TPNW Action Plan did not explicitly mention the facility, as it focused on other aspects of the agenda.
Kazakhstan is also in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance led by nuclear-armed Russia. Article 4 of the Tashkent Treaty states, “in case of aggression, all other States Parties shall provide necessary assistance, including military assistance, and shall also support it by all means“. If translated, all means can be interpreted as a possibility for nuclear retaliation, per the latest Russian nuclear doctrine. However, CSTO does not practice “nuclear sharing”; therefore, Article 4 obligations do not violate TPNW. Thus, CSTO members in CA, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, can join TPNW without leaving CSTO, as the former does not prohibit joining the latter.
Regarding the nuclear umbrella of Russia and Kazakhstan’s ratification of the TPNW, a Harvard study shows that latitude might exist in interpreting the nuclear-related practices in military alliances and examines the national policies of some NATO members. For instance, Iceland and Lithuania do not allow nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory, even during the war. Likewise, a divergence of nuclear policies in the CSTO may exist.
The search for the words TPNW or Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs websites for four other CA states wields no result whatsoever. This situation is a perfect example of the “tied-tongue” approach adopted by the reluctant countries, where they abstain from publicly commenting or speaking about this Treaty. Silence, inaction, or non-support from Central Asian states is generally considered a subtle critique, as exemplified by the muted CA response to the ongoing war in Ukraine and their general staunch non-support of Russian actions [4]. Nevertheless, in the case of TPNW, strategic silence or a “wait and see” approach may only benefit the status quo, in which the complete nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of NPT might never be realized, or nuclear weapons be tamed illegal as every other WMD, things that persevere, contrary at least to the spirit of NPT.
CANWFZ and TPNW
Central Asia is already one of the few regions of the world that had agreed to never “research, develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess or have any control over any nuclear weapon” and established a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) in 2006, commonly known as the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, founding one of the five NWFZ in the world.
That unfortunate development is peculiar since the TPNW mostly repeats the language of the CANWFZ regarding prohibitions. Albeit, the Treaty only goes a step further in nuclear disarmament. Thus, the divergence is apparent, as one of the Central Asian countries has entirely accepted the TPNW and promotes it internationally. At the same time, four others have refrained from it, although they have previously acted together to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region.
The joint statement of CANWFZ states on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Semipalatinsk Treaty at the NPT 2020 RevCon, does not mention TPNW at all, even though such an ardent supporter of the Treaty as Kazakhstan spoke on behalf of others [5].
All five Central Asian countries had voted approvingly for the “humanitarian pledge” resolutions at the UNGA both in 2015 and 2016, which had urged “all States to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”. To pursue those goals, another resolution was passed that settled to convene a UN conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. However, by that time, unanimity within Central Asia had started to fracture as only Kazakhstan and Tajikistan had voted in favor of this resolution. Nevertheless, even Tajikistan had not formally participated in the negotiation for TPNW and did not vote on the Treaty, joining three other reluctant states of the region.
Impediments
TPNW strengthens the atomic taboo; however, the chances that, in the foreseeable future, any of the nine states possessing nuclear weapons would join it are slim. At the same time, atomic states such as Russia, the UK, and France had ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and China and the United States have to ratify it for the Treaty to enter into force. CTBT is a success story as since 1998, only one state, North Korea, has conducted a test of a nuclear bomb. TPNW may inadvertently compromise those agreements, as although TPNW also prohibits the testing, it is not interchangeable with the CTBT. Thus, policymakers in CA may perceive CTBT being more important than the TPNW, and therefore, sticking with the current NPT regime.
The article that drew the most contention in the text of the Treaty was Article 12, which requires all State Parties to encourage accession of the State Non-Parties to the TPNW, seeking a universalization of the accord. It is evident that such actions could have antagonized most of the nuclear-armed states. Perhaps that is why the remaining Central Asian are cautious about the ramifications of their accession. Two major nuclear powers are neighboring Central Asia, and Russia and China are CA countries’ most significant trade partners. Russian Federation is also one of the fiercest critics of the Treaty, using every opportunity possible, from Conference on Disarmament to the press commentaries, to denounce the newly formed accord. The Russian representative characterized the ban as a “destructive” and “hasty” initiative that would undermine the NPT. Moreover, he argued that the possession of nuclear weapons by the five Nuclear-Weapon-States was “absolutely legitimate” under NPT. Russian Federation, being the successor state of the Soviet Union, is also highly allergic to financial compensation to the victims of relentless nuclear testing in Kazakhstan, a provision under Article 6 of the Treaty. In his communication with the author, a former Russian diplomat from Geneva noted that Russia was “irritated” by Kazakhstan’s position on TPNW and abstained during the Kazakh UN GA resolution as a response [6]. That case is one example of when Russia had explicitly expressed its discontent over the TPNW position of its neighbors. Thus, four other CA countries may perceive TPNW as an obligation that might jeopardize bilateral relations with the Eurasian great powers. ICAN’s checklist on the implementation of Article 12 requires State Parties to include TPNW in their bilateral dealings, through embassies, and by meeting with foreign missions at home. It also necessitates states to use the UN structure to advocate the TPNW in various disarmament venues, such as the UN Disarmament Commission, UNGA First Committee, or NPT RevCons. Kazakhstan had encouraged CANWFZ Parties to accede to this vital Treaty as part of those obligations.
Recommendations
Therefore, in the spirit of good neighborliness, regional security, and existing political commitments, it would be relevant for all states to deliberate the accession to the TPNW by making a concerted regional effort as part of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. However, if they are not yet ready to accede, it would be relevant to do the following:
- Relevant ministries and departments, in particular, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and, if applicable, Ministries of Defense of the four other Central Asian republics, should consider analyzing the experience of Kazakhstan in implementing the practices of ratifying the Treaty while maintaining a balance of conducting a pluralistic policy between prominent geopolitical actors.
- Conduct joint research by think tanks in the region to explore the potential for implementing the Treaty to provide conclusions for evidence-based policymaking.
- Conduct public presentations and round tables, as well as inform the public about the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and raise awareness about the Treaty
- Consider adding TPNW to the tentative agenda of yearly Consultative Meetings of the Central Asian states.
- Contemplate participation as observers in the Second Meeting of State Parties of the TPNW in 2023.
Acknowledgments:
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Akrom Avezov, Fazliddin Djamalov, and Nargiza Muratalieva for reviewing my work and offering relevant suggestions. I would also like to thank Boris Bondarev for his invaluable commentaries as a diplomat at the Conference on Disarmament.
References:
- Hajnoczi, T. (2020). The Relationship between the NPT and the TPNW. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3(1), 87–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1738815
- Kassenova, T. (2022). Atomic Steppe : How Kazakhstan Gave up the Bomb (pp. 29–73). Stanford University Press.
- Kassenova, T. (2022). Atomic Steppe : How Kazakhstan Gave up the Bomb (pp. 145–185). Stanford University Press.
- Dadabaev, T., & Sonoda, S. (2022). Silence is golden? Silences as strategic narratives in Central Asian states’ response to the Ukrainian crisis. International Journal of Asian Studies, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1479591422000183
- America Times News. (2022, August 22). Joint Statement of Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone States Parties at the 2022 NPT Review Conference. The America Times. https://www.america-times.com/joint-statement-of-central-asian-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-states-parties-at-the-2022-npt-review-conference/
- Personal communication with the Russian representative to CD.