Increased Chinese security presence in the region does not eliminate Russian influence, according to Sardor Allayarov and Douglas Brenton Anderson. According to the authors, it is in the interest of Central Asian countries to diversify their alliances and not to make unilateral commitments in favor of one side.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom has long claimed that Central Asia is under the auspices of Russia and China due to the region’s geographic location. Namely, Moscow has approached the area through an imperialist security lens, while the latter has prioritized the economic realm. However, recent critical changes in the region’s geopolitical dynamics have altered the situation, diminishing the argument’s credibility.
The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 allowed Russia to further solidify its dominance in Central Asia as the principal regional security power. The Kazakhstan crisis in the following year further supported the argument that Russia is the undeniable security guarantor in the region. However, the Ukraine War has sent an important message to Central Asian leaders to reevaluate their strategic cooperation with Moscow, evidenced by a shift in economic, political, and security-oriented priorities
This is not to say that Russia’s dominance has completely waned, but meanwhile, China has further established itself as a primary trading partner and continued to grow its economic footprint by uniting the ‘Stans’ under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Met with varying degrees of success, China began to gradually add a ‘security’ element to its ties with the region through the emergence of the Global Security Initiative (GSI). In summary, Beijing has not hesitated to declare its intention to more actively engage in security-related matters that were previously left to Russia. Consequently, its growing presence in Central Asia has created a favorable opportunity to expand and enhance its security posture in the region, which serves its own agenda surrounding the eradication of the “Three Evils” – terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.
This piece evaluates the impact of the Ukraine War on Central Asia’s security landscape and China’s strategic utilization of this event. In this regard, Russian and Chinese influence in the region is analyzed from a security standpoint in the context of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, both pre- and post-conflict, with a particular emphasis on the region’s engagement in regional bilateral and multilateral frameworks.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia has been marked by the Kazakh people’s determination to strengthen their national identity and reaffirm their sovereignty and independence, all while simultaneously maintaining strong bilateral military and economic ties. The Ukraine war has complicated Kazakhstan’s strategic calculus, characterized by a slowly shifting multi-vectorial security strategy, to diversify its dependence on Russia––which positions China to exert a greater influence in the region.
Amidst the aftermath of “Bloody January,” the deadliest political unrest since 1991 that claimed more than 200 lives, President Tokayev evoked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russian-led intergovernmental military alliance – to restore order, which highlighted Russia’s status as a security guarantor in the region. Nearly a month later, Kazakhstan quickly refuted Russia’s territorial aggression in Ukraine, and to this day has not recognized Moscow’s territorial claims over Donetsk and Luhansk. This represents a careful calculation on the part of the Kazakh government––balancing its relationship with Moscow while simultaneously signaling that it does not unequivocally support it. Additionally, much to Russia’s frustration, Kazakhstan had become home to nearly 200,000 Russian draft dodgers.
Source: «United Nations Comtrade database».
Russia’s growing isolation in the international community has not prevented it from maintaining a substantial influence in the region, with Putin having visited Kazakhstan over 10 times in 2022, but China has taken over as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner, despite record levels of trade between Russia and Kazakhstan in 2022-2023. Furthermore, Tokayev’s call for defense cooperation with Central Asian nations and the creation of a “regional security architecture,” coupled with Russia-free military drills, all indicate that Russia’s influence is waning to some extent. Consequently, this has signaled to Beijing that there are a growing number of opportunities for implementing its security strategy in the region. However, President Tokayev recently stated that “Kazakhstan was and remains a reliable strategic partner of Russia, an ally in these challenging times.” Ultimately, Russia still maintains a significant security and economic presence in Kazakhstan, but its multi-vectorial security strategy and views on Russia have been impacted.
Uzbekistan
Until 2016, Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia was characterized by both cooperation and tension. Furthermore, President Karimov’s isolationist policies had an indelible impact on the current security landscape. To this end, Uzbekistan has had a complicated history with CSTO membership, having formally left in 2012. Nevertheless, this has impacted the current security landscape and has strained tensions between Tashkent and Moscow.
Under current President Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has improved its relations with neighboring countries and the major actors in the region, including Russia. Firstly, Uzbek-Russian relations have improved to a new degree, categorized by deepening high-level economic, energy, and security ties between Tashkent and Moscow. Secondly, Uzbekistan’s attempt to reinforce its national identity began taking initial steps in 2016 since Russian ideological influence and propaganda started to be anathema to Uzbek elites. The Ukraine war added extra weight to this issue. Namely, international music festivals of “Z-artists” that support the Russian special military operation in Ukraine were canceled due to a boycott by Uzbek citizens. It was followed by the calls to implement a ban on Russian propaganda channels broadcasting in Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan carried out prudent foreign policy regarding Russia’s action in Ukraine, maintaining a neutral and balanced stance. It opted out for ‘abstention’ in the UNGA resolution on the Invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Abdulaziz Kamilov, the country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, officially stated the country’s position that Uzbekistan respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine and did not recognize the independence of newly-created republics.
However, this development does not imply that Uzbekistan completely distanced itself from Russia as the elements of trade, energy dependence, migration, and security are hard to ignore. Starting from the former two, its gas imports from Russia have increased significantly, for instance, an estimated 3.8 bcm in 2024 and an expected 11 bcm in 2025, which was seen as leverage for Moscow to influence Tashkent. In 2021, Uzbekistan established a strategic partnership program in the military sector for the years 2021 to 2025 – a new level of military-technical cooperation for the short term. Recently, the two countries have renewed their military cooperation until 2030. As of 2024, Russia is the leading provider of military equipment and weapons to the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan. However, given that Russian initial casualties in Ukraine and its occupation with the war raised questions about ‘invincible’ Russian military power.
Source: «United Nations Comtrade database».
With respect to China, the BRI brings a strategic advantage to Uzbekistan, addressing its ‘landlocked’ problem to a certain extent by transforming it into an important connectivity point in the area. Looking at the import volume from China and Russia, there was an increase from 2019 to 2023. Imports from China rose significantly after 2021, reaching approximately $12 billion in 2023. In contrast, imports from Russia grew steadily but at a slower pace, remaining below $7 billion in 2023.
Moreover, Tashkent shares congruous security interests and values with Beijing. The first meeting of the Uzbekistan-China law enforcement and security cooperation mechanism on September 26, 2024, supports this argument, where the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding and discussed the need to enhance cooperation in transnational organized crimes and maintain regional security, particularly in Afghanistan. Unlike other Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan is a more secure environment for Chinese investments and strategic investments in the absence of anti-China protests. In the foreseeable future, China is likely to focus on addressing traditional and transnational threats in its strategic cooperation with Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is the least politically stable country and turbulent democracy in Central Asia often explained by numerous protests and revolutions that took place between 2005 and 2020. Russia’s influence in the country is enormous exerted through economic, political, and security tools. Bishkek is a loyal ally of Russia, and almost all political leaders of Kyrgyzstan attempt to gain Moscow’s trust, not to mention its significant security dependence on Russia within the frameworks of the CSTO. There are a few military bases and communication centers across Kyrgyzstan which constitute the Russian Joint Military Base. In 2023, the countries agreed to establish a shared air defense system at the Kant Russian military base. On the one hand, like other Central Asian countries, Bishkek turns to Moscow for issues connected with Afghanistan. On the other hand, strong support from Moscow means the regime’s survival.
The war in Ukraine has several ramifications for Kyrgyzstan, too, although it navigated a position of neutrality. Russian military blurs in the first year of the conflict and Moscow’s narratives on Kyrgyz statehood, designating it as an artificially created one during the Soviet era urged Kyrgyzstan to reconsider its relations with Russia and to strengthen ties with other Central Asian countries and major actors, such as China and Turkey.
Source: «United Nations Comtrade database».
Kyrgyzstan’s active participation in the BRI resulted in its gradual deviation from Russian orbit, especially in the economic domain. Namely, large-scale investments in strategic projects and infrastructure, such as energy cooperation or China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, granted a greater degree of influence to Beijing. For instance, China became the largest investor in the country in 2016. To this strategic relationship between Kyrgyzstan and China, a ‘security’ element was added moderately within various frameworks like the SCO, the GSI, and the C+C5 mechanism. Interestingly, the latter, which is a multilateral platform between China and Central Asia in its nature, excludes Russia for the first time. Chinese security interests in Kyrgyzstan include addressing both traditional and non-traditional forms of security threats. To protect strategic Chinese projects in Kyrgyzstan, China opened the branches of private security companies like Zhonghun Junhong Group and China Security and Protection Group.
Security cooperation in the Kyrgyzstan-China strategic partnership is likely to continue growing in the future. In that sense, both countries jointly cooperate to combat emerging threats, including the “Three Evils.” Given the longstanding border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, their membership in the CSTO has been unable to bring an effective solution. Notably, during the Kyrgyz-Tajik border conflict in 2022, a cease-fire was reached not by the CSTO but rather at the CSO summit in Uzbekistan, where Russia played a limited role in mitigating the conflict.
Tajikistan
The fragility of Tajikistan, the poorest of the five Central Asian countries, has directly shaped the economic, political, and security realms following the onset of the Ukraine war. As a member of both the CSTO and the Beijing-led SCO, it occupies a unique place in Central Asia as the ‘weakest link.’ Russia is the country’s largest trading and security partner and remains the destination for the majority of its migrant workers––with remittance payments comprising over 30% of the Tajik economy. The intertwined nature of Moscow and Dushanbe increases the former’s vulnerability to Western sanctions on the latter. In addition, China-Tajikistan trade has been increasing rapidly over the past several years, only to be accelerated by the war.
Beyond trade, reports of Beijing’s increasing security presence in the region through the construction of military bases in Tajikistan reflect China’s growing security ambitions in the region. An elevated Sino-Tajik security relationship bolsters the capacity for border surveillance and counter-terrorism operations, as China has demonstrated a greater willingness to provide security goods in the region, but this does not directly threaten Moscow’s presence in the region. A significant critic of the Taliban, Dushanbe has been challenged by the militant group’s resurgence, which has also pushed the country closer to Moscow––and there has been no significant change in Tajikstan’s strategic calculus regarding this security relationship following the onset of the Ukraine war.
Source: «United Nations Comtrade database».
Thus, Tajikistan has given little pushback over the war in Ukraine and merely abstained from voting during the 2022 and 2023 UN General Assembly resolutions on the issue of Ukraine. Despite the failure to condemn Russia’s actions, there have been several instances where Tajiks have been caught in the crossfire, including reports of Tajik soldiers fighting in Ukraine; heightened xenophobia following the Moscow Crocus City Terror Attacks; and instances of propaganda, where the Tajik Foreign Ministry has rejected Moscow’s claims that Kyiv has actively been recruiting Tajik soldiers. These instances illustrate the harsh effects that the Tajik people have been forced to endure as a consequence of the war and have opened the door for an increase in Chinese influence.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is often viewed as the ‘North Korea’ of Central Asia due to its status of positive permanent neutrality, established by a UN resolution in 1995. It is not a member state of the CSTO, SCO, or the EAUE (Eurasian Economic Union). The country has a long-standing relationship with Moscow, particularly in the areas of energy, trade, and security cooperation. However, a joint security cooperation agreement finally came into effect in 2020. The close ties between Turkmenistan and Russia can be attributed to both domestic and external challenges. Namely, a domestic economic crisis, over-increasing economic dependence on Beijing, and the Taliban regime prompts Turkmenistan to strengthen its ties with Moscow.
The Ukraine War did not significantly alter Turkmenistan’s perspective on Russia. Despite maintaining a neutral stance regarding the conflict, public opinion in Turkmenistan has remained pro-Russian, often criticizing the West for the war. Turkmenistan’s key priorities are stability and the preservation of power. In this context, the country must rely on a few regional actors. For the ruling family, Russia and China are the most viable options, especially given the geographic distance of the U.S. and European countries from the region. Within this framework, the permanent status of neutrality and the regime itself would be upheld through support from Moscow and Beijing.
Source: «United Nations Comtrade database».
The primary arms importers for Turkmenistan are Turkey, Russia, and China. While Turkey has consistently ranked as the largest military supplier to the country, Turkmenistan has received over 20% of its arms from Beijing since 2013 already surpassing those of Russia. The economic dependence of Turkmenistan on Beijing is substantial, as it remains the largest natural gas supplier to China—surpassing Russia in terms of revenue from gas exports. In light of recent military and security developments in China, Beijing is poised to become the primary arms supplier to Turkmenistan in exchange for Turkmen gas. Most importantly, China holds a comparative advantage over Russia in supplying sophisticated technologies. For instance, the importation of weapons and surveillance technology is essential for the regime’s survival.
Synthesis and Implications
Russia has long maintained a dominant presence as Central Asia’s security guarantor. The Ukraine war has challenged the status quo, leaving room for China to expand its presence in the realm of security. Thus, Beijing’s close diplomatic engagement in Central Asia has the potential to deter their solidarity with Uyghurs considering the common religion and cultural closeness. In addition, the situation in Afghanistan may heighten Central Asian countries’ dependence on Moscow, and the emergence of religiously motivated ideologies could have long-term effects on Xinjiang.
The nature of China’s bilateral and multilateral meetings with the Central Asian nations has become increasingly more security-oriented following the onset of the Ukraine war. Xi Jinping has repeatedly echoed calls for creating a “Shared Future,” bringing the region closer to China in the economic, military, and political realms. The China-Central Asia Summit, held in 2023, brought the five Central Asian heads of state to Xi’an and culminated in the signing of the Xi’an Declaration, which stresses the Central Asian nations’ willingness to “actively implement” the Global Security Initiative.
The summit stressed China’s role in working to “safeguard regional security” and fight the three evils, where Central Asian and Chinese security interests align. The next summit will take place in 2025 in Kazakhstan, where Xi Jinping visited for the fifth time this past summer. Similarly, in a meeting with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in July 2024, Xi Jinping reaffirmed the need to “deepen security…and jointly act on the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security…[and] crack down on terrorist, extremist, and separatist forces such as ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement).” Xi Jinping, in a visit to Almaty in 2022, emphasized Beijing’s support in defending Kazakhstan’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. As highlighted above, the resurgence of the Taliban has also spurred a need for greater security assistance in the region, in which China is playing an increasingly active role. For Beijing, Central Asia’s vulnerability regarding Afghanistan would mean closer security ties with Moscow.
Trade data also indicate a growing economic link between Central Asia and China, surpassing that of Russia. Moreover, this economic activity is linked closely to security through the proliferation of arms trading, notably in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. However, Kyrgyzstan has become a hub for the reexport of Western weapons and military parts to Russia. Importantly, growing numbers of Chinese companies, investment projects, and trade corridors spanning Central Asia under the BRI raise security concerns in the region. As a result, for Beijing, security interests can be safeguarded through close security cooperation with the region.
Source: «United Nations Comtrade database».
Increased Chinese security presence in the region does not eliminate Russian influence, of which its long history of being the security guarantor of the region––albeit waning––will not completely diminish. To the dismay of the West, Central Asia acts as a bridge for indirect trade between China and Russia to overcome sanctions. Thus, Central Asia plays an important role in the Beijing-Moscow friendship, reflected by the increased securitization of the region. Nevertheless, the BRI has been a remarkably successful vehicle in expanding China’s regional economic influence and transitioning that into security and military development, which may spur negative developments in the China-Russia alliance. Therefore, it is important to consider the following recommendations.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Diversify Relations: Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war has created a space for other diplomatic strategies and summits to further engage with the region, including the United States’ C5+1, the European Union’s Strategy on Central Asia, the Gulf States’ GCC+C5, and others. Direct diplomatic engagement with countries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan also has the potential to assist in facilitating trade through the development of the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian trade route, where countries such as Kazakhstan have already benefited from Russian sanctions. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the Central Asian nations to diversify their alliances and not commit unilaterally to one side, which may shut out potential trade, investment, and security benefits.
Additionally, interconnected diplomacy can act as a tool to cultivate a stronger Central Asian identity. Western entities are geared towards diluting Russia’s influence in the region and have historically neglected the region as a whole. Should these institutions work towards fostering Central Asian cultural, ethnic, and linguistic identity, as well as human rights and security, they may have a greater chance of helping to diversify the region’s connectivity, while simultaneously helping to bring out a stronger multi-vectorial policy.
Regional Cooperation, Dialogue, and Identity: Given the evolving security situation, a waning Russia presents the opportunity for the development of interregional cooperation. Following Uzbekistan’s transition and subsequent easing of tensions, particularly with Kazakhstan, the two economic powerhouses of Central Asia can spur stronger high-level regional cooperation. The 6th Consultative Meeting of Heads of State of Central Asia, held in August of this year, culminated in the signing of a roadmap for cooperation until 2027 and the Central Asia 2040 strategy. In the context of advancing regional interests and a stronger, more cohesive Central Asian identity, cooperation among the five nations remains an essential tool. Integrating a security element into regional cooperation may prove to be a challenging task given the region’s increasing ties with China. However, creating a platform for dialogue and cooperation will help foster a stronger, more interconnected Central Asia.
Solving ideological differences presents a significant challenge to realizing a more unified Central Asia. As Tajikistan and Turkmenistan’s dependence on Russia continues to remain unchanged, there have been instances of frustration. In 2022, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon stated in front of President Vladimir Putin that “[We] have always respected the interests of our main strategic partner. We want respect, too.” While this statement has not significantly impacted Russia-Tajik relations, nonetheless if Central Asian nations can make clear their stances on issues of global importance, this will help to establish a stronger sense of agency in the decision-making arena. As 2025 progresses, the Central Asian republics are increasingly focusing on economic diversification, sustainable partnerships, and policies that uphold national autonomy while benefiting from foreign investments and cooperation.
Conclusion
The Ukraine War is enabling Central Asia, a region historically plagued by connectivity challenges and Russian hegemonic domination, to better leverage multi-vector foreign and defense policy – treading very carefully with both China and Russia. Given the historical nature of Central Asia’s economic and security ties with Russia, the Ukraine war has altered the context in which this relationship has emerged, creating space for actors such as China to utilize its influence and geographical proximity to influence the security landscape. Ideological differences over Russia’s actions have spurred a change in this relationship, particularly in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, although their relationship with Russia has changed minimally, have felt the harsh effects of war, making the prospects of alternative security and economic arrangements more viable.
Beijing’s engagement through the use of multilateral security architecture sheds light on the efficacy of multilateral diplomatic engagement in Central Asia. China’s presence in the region introduces new opportunities for the Central Asian nations and is challenging Russia’s traditional role as a regional hegemon, as Beijing seizes opportunities to expand its regional security initiatives and create stronger, security-based partnerships. However, it is important to keep in mind the friendship between Moscow and Beijing and how Russia continues to benefit indirectly from China’s encroachment in the region through indirect trade. However, it has been highlighted that an increasing number of institutional arrangements and partnerships, both economic and security-based, are emerging, which presents Central Asia with new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation. Thus, a multi-vectorial, diversified strategy is essential for Central Asia’s continual growth and development.