“China’s presence in the security dimension in Central Asia is closely related to its national interests, and unlike Russia, which sees the region as an extension of itself, China is not willing to overcommit, and it rather employs soft powers as its main strategy in cooperation with Stans,” experts conclude on the roundtable organized by IWPR CA and OSCE Academy on June 30th, 2022.
How does the debt trap affect cooperation between China and the countries of Central Asia? What is China doing to improve its image in the region, and how effective is its soft power? To raise these and other questions, more than 50 participants gathered in the hybrid-mode event for a discussion with experts on the topic of “Perceptions of China in Central Asia: problems and perspectives” in person in Bishkek and online.
Dr. Alexander Wolters, Director of OSCE Academy, opened the roundtable by highlighting the strategic interest of the Academy in having roundtables, research projects, and creating platforms for discussing and studying the rising power and influence of China in Central Asia states. Even though China is not a part of OSCE and is not even a “partner in cooperation,” inclusion in the analysis is vital for a better understanding of security and development in the region. Nargiza Muratalieva, a CABAR.asia analytical reports editor, also made opening remarks and stressed the relevance of the roundtable in light of the launch of a railway project in China, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The opening speeches celebrated the cooperation and support of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, IWPR CA, CABAR.asia, and OSCE Academy in Bishkek for this and other events.
The discussion was moderated by Aibek Samakov, Research and Training Specialist at OSCE Academy.
In his keynote speech, Dr. Raffaelo Pantucci, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore and a Senior Associate Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the United Kingdom, looked at China’s responses to some of the recent events in Eurasia with a particular focus on the many instabilities created.
Starting the analysis with Kabul, Dr. Pantucci singled out how China almost seamlessly moved its engagement with the republic government of Afghanistan to that of the Taliban. Whoever is in power in Kabul, China is an important actor to engage. Therefore, they maintain a careful relationship with Beijing, which, on its side, gets a set of cards to play. Notwithstanding this transition, many problems faced by Beijing continue to exist. China has been quite worried about the events in Afghanistan, especially the presence of military forces in the north that poses an enduring concern to its security interests. Even though China has become more prominent in Afghanistan with the Taliban, creating a noticeable job environment and fostering the surge of entrepreneurs and traders on the one hand, and increasing the official activity (e.g., governmental aid) on the other hand, none of its efforts has been game-changers. Beijing is leaning towards Kabul, which is of great interest to the Taliban and serves as a bolster. However, the primary concern of Beijing is that Kabul could fall back to chaos, resulting in a fragmentary government. Because of these difficulties in engagement with Afghanistan, China has not committed to the required massive investment and launch of big mineral or mining projects. It preserves its hedging position like back in the times of the US presence.
Turning to Kazakhstan and the January events there, Dr. Pantucci depicts the reaction of Beijing as observational. The scholar challenges the widely popular rhetoric that the deployment of Moscow-led forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Kazakhstan undermined the Chinese influence in the country. In contrast, “China was happy that Moscow stepped in,” proposes Pantucci, explaining that Beijing has no capacity nor experience for intervention with stabilization purposes. Besides, Kasym-Jomart Tokayev recognizes the economic gravity of China. Thus, the events have not posed any major damage to China’s interest nor induced any changes in their policy.
The speaker also provided remarks on the context of the war in Ukraine, depicting the complicatedness of the issue for Beijing. It is clear that China has been a strong supporter of Russia, not appearing to be piling too much into Russian narratives, though, and still somehow reinforcing the rhetoric of blaming the Russian war in Ukraine on NATO. “However, Ukraine said nothing about the hedging position of China and its support of Russia. Instead, they recognize that China was their biggest trading partner, and it is very likely to continue being an important actor to Ukraine however the conflict shakes out”, suggests Dr. Pantucci. From the Chinese perspective, they aim to maintain relationships with both and “thread the needle somewhere on the way through.”
The concluding remarks of the keynote speaker touched upon the context of Tajikistan. From a Chinese security perspective, it is a “unique” Central Asian country for it has a Chinese military base and constant support of the local security operators, which is a rare practice of China’s foreign policy. This presence in Tajikistan is overwhelmingly a focus of China’s national security interest, namely an overwatch of potential security threats from Afghanistan. It contrasts with Moscow’s policy, which “treats the region as its soft underbelly, as an extension of itself.” During the recent turbulence in Tajikistan, Chinese media provided zero coverage of the events for China does not want to recognize the instability in the regions with which they share borders, and even their military presence in the country is to ensure their security concerns, not those of Tajikistan.
Another aspect of Sino-Tajik relations is how China is speeding through the construction of roads in the region. The government of Tajikistan sees infrastructure development as a critical component in ensuring stability, so increasing connectivity and attracting investment has been a political effort to stabilize the region. For that, China is rushing to support, and their projects get quite positive appraisals from the locals.
Dr. Pantucci summarized his analysis by reminding the audience that China is becoming the most consequential and vital player on the ground, increasingly driving its role by investment in digital space, e-commerce, and finance. But while China’s economic role in the region grows, it also acts as a “big player that does not want to take ownership for major problems in terms of security and others,” says Dr. Pantucci, and will preserve its observational role to “engage with whoever is left in the end.”
Following the keynote speech, a panel discussion started with reflections of Temur Umarov, Research Consultant at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Temur took on the war in Ukraine, suggesting it would change Russia’s policy in Central Asia and influence how China acts and sees itself in the region. Russia’s presence in Central Asia is too dominant for the ‘Stans’ to move away from; however, the crisis will eventually lead Russia to drive Central Asia away from itself. Thus, Stans will try “to find more connections, diversify their dependence on Russia, and, consequently, the first country to get more active in the region will be China,” asserted Temur. He added that Beijing’s presence could change in three dimensions; however, it also meets certain limitations.
In the economic relations of Central Asia states with the world, China is the most dynamic and the major trade partner for almost all of them. Another such is Russia, which is now increasingly isolated from the world since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. For some products that Central Asia used to import from Russia, there is now a shortage in Moscow to fulfill even their own needs, let alone export. In this context, “Central Asia will need to seek a replacement to Russian imports, for which China is a gateway.” Temur added, “Nevertheless, Russia and Central Asia also have strong labor migration ties, where China is not a replacement.” The difficulties Central Asian migrants face with tourist visas, lack of labor markets, and, importantly, language gap limit China’s increasing presence even in the economic sphere.
Temur proposed that there are even more barriers to Chinese presence in the region in political terms. He reminded us that Russia is always present in any big domestic political changes in Central Asian states and explained that there is much more trust between Central Asian and Russian political elites. Those are mainly people of one cohort born in the USSR and raised on the same ideology and values. Beijing lacks such cards to play with in the region and remains more distanced.
In conclusion, Temur reiterated a point raised before that despite talks about the growing Chinese presence in security matters in Central Asia, that policy is merely connected to its national interest. In contrast, Russia’s fact in the security dimension remains high, and there is no real evidence that it will change.
Aizat Shailoobek, a Senior Research Assistant at OSCE Academy in Bishkek, presented the outcomes of her research work on sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan. Aizat Shailoobek states that the growing Chinese presence and the huge debt of some Central Asian states create fear that China may take over a country and other conspiracy theories among the wider population. To analyze it, Aizat addressed the following questions in the study: How do local people in Kyrgyzstan perceive China and Chinese immigrants, and how do they express their sinophobia? What do Chinese immigrants experience in Kyrgyzstan, and how do they face the discriminatory behavior of locals? Through in-depth interviews, Aizat analyzed the experience of Kyrgyzstani bazaar traders, a local nationalist group, “Kyrgyz choro,” and Chinese immigrants in Bishkek. The research hypotheses were that both local groups, traders and “Kyrk choro” members, would be “sinophobic,” but for different reasons: due to economic competition and an extreme ethnic-nationalistic stance.
The findings of the study, presented by Aizat, indicate that local bazaar traders “have no concern as competitors, but more about cultural differences.” Residents show mistrust regarding Chinese migrants, are alarmed about China and believe in its expansion in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrk choro – “forty knights” – are a nationalistic group of Kyrgyz men who see their role in preserving Kyrgyz culture, customs, and language. They proclaim officials involved in Chinese projects traitors and blame them for generating corruption. Kyrk choro used to capture illegal Chinese immigrants and take responsibility for deporting them back; they also traced Chinese men and accused them of having leisure with Kyrgyz girls, disseminating aggressive and chauvinistic rhetoric on the internet. Even though in interviews they called themselves “positive” nationalists, working for “preserving the dignity of the nation, they expressed negative opinions about Chinese migrants, their marriage with Kyrgyz girls, and the ‘corrupted’ nature of their business,” illustrates Aizat. From the perspective of Chinese traders in the Junhai market in Bishkek, they confirm the discriminatory behavior of locals towards themselves. “Despite all the investment of China in Kyrgyzstan, we do feel that Kyrgyz people mistrust us,” says a Chinese businessman in Aizat’s citation.
Aizat Shailoobek found that sinophobia is prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, and particularly “Kyrk choro” appeared to be more sinophobic than bazaar traders; Chinese businessmen in Kyrgyzstan feel the discriminatory attitude more than other migrants.
Nargiza Muratalieva, a CABAR.asia analytical reports editor, presented on the development of China’s soft power in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. To introduce into context, Nargiza referred to findings of research of Central Asia Barometer that depicted increasing negative views on China in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan from 2017 through 2021 and consistently negative perception among Kyrgyz respondents. “In Kyrgyzstan, China is criticized not only for lack of transparency in cooperation and the prevalence of corruption cases but also for lack of large-scale and breakthrough projects. Unlike Nur-Sultan, Bishkek cannot boost any implemented multilateral projects under the Belt and Road Initiative”, reports Nargiza.
The speaker elaborated on the updates on the development of Chinese soft power in Kyrgyzstan. She started with the institutional adjustments, e.g., the C5+1 format introduced to promote multilateral relations and make Chinese strategy in Central Asia visible. Among others, Nargiza also highlighted the initiative of Kyrgyzstan to establish an SCO Cultural Integration Center in Bishkek, the Chinese vaccine diplomacy in the region, enlargement of scholarship programs list, educational exchange programs, and Chinese language schools. Nargiza also noted that to date, the structure of Chinese investment in Kyrgyzstan has not allowed for “green” projects. Yet, they are ramping up investment activities in hydroelectric and solar power plants.
“Nevertheless, China has limitations to its soft power, the main of which is the blurring of its ideological component. While the idea of liberal values, democracy, and human rights promoted by Western countries is universal, Chinese values have not yet acquired streamlined form and content”, Nargiza Muratalieva explains. Another major weakness in Chinese policy is that their agents focus on Chinese language speakers and learners despite the low number of such in Kyrgyzstan. It contrasts with the approach of the US, EU, and Turkey that also promotes their soft power to those limited to Kyrgyz or the Russian language.
Moreover, Nargiza shared the outcomes of interviews she conducted last year with alumni of Chinese universities. They expressed concerns about the sustainability of Chinese educational “infrastructure,” reflected in problems with diploma nostrification and employment opportunities compared to Russian programs. Among other barriers to the promotion of Chinese soft power in the region and Kyrgyzstan are the “polluted” image of China (despite the willingness for “green” investments), lack of NGOs (in contrast to the US, which concentrates most of its soft power in them), poor public diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan in creating platforms or events to bring parties together for prospects of bilateral cooperation. “The ongoing activities are more declarative and promotional in nature, where only benefits and positive results of cooperation are mentioned,” stresses Nargiza. Moreover, “the tough rhetoric of Chinese Wolf Warrior diplomats is difficult to synchronize with soft power and soft tools,” which poses a barrier to expanding their influence.
In its policy in Kyrgyzstan, China still relies more on hard power. The country’s debt trap and economic dependence are discussed more frequently than positive aspects of bilateral cooperation. A debate remains that Beijing’s soft power in Kyrgyzstan is characterized by inefficiency and a lack of creative approaches. “Implementation and sphere of influence of China’s soft power are hard to measure with the ever-increasing popularity of the soft power of Western countries,” Nargiza concluded.
Following a Q&A session with the audience, panelists summarized their points. They agreed that China’s growing presence in the region of Central Asia would take a more intensive turn in the face of the Russian war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is also met with limitations posed by the image and locals’ perception of Beijing’s projects.