“Politico-institutional inflexibility remains a hindrance for Kazakhstani ethnic policy. The government must establish a comprehensive evaluative framework for regular ethnic policy review”, – argues Ildar Daminov, an independent researcher and a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna in a special article for CABAR.asia.
Kazakhstan likes to portray itself as a stronghold of interethnic peace and harmony in the tumultuous post-Soviet region. Its first President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was actively promoting the ideas of inter-ethnic tolerance as an important ideological principle throughout all 28 years of his presidency. At the same time, since the first days of Kazakhstan’s independence, its government had to delicately balance between the nationalist demands for increased “kazakhization” and protecting the rights of ethnic minorities. Maintaining that balance has always been a tricky task, but it has also become a key driver of the policy’s evolution in the last 30 years.
The government’s ethnic policy today is coordinated and implemented by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. Officially, it aims at creating a Kazakhstani identity for all ethnicities – an objective enshrined both in Kazakhstna’s legal and institutional framework[1]. The government never misses a chance to stress how vitally important interethnic peace is for Kazakhstan’s future. All the more shocking, therefore, was the increasing occurrence of major violent ethnic conflicts in the past five years. Indeed, the most recent violent conflicts in Masanchi (2020) and Penzim (2021) have cast a dark shadow over Kazakhstan’s ethnic policy[2].
Despite all the questions about its ethnic policy, Kazakhstan has regularly downplayed the scale and potential of interethnic conflicts in society. Indeed, the questions of ethnic tensions have almost become a taboo in the public communication of the Kazakhstani government[4]. Therefore, as some tensions flare up in the context of a poor socio-economic climate of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is essential to reflect upon two crucial questions. What are the current challenges and what needs to change to address them? To answer these questions, first we need to understand how Kazakhstani ethnic policy has been evolving in the post-independence period.
Kazakhstani ethnic policy: Evolution of the conceptual model
The heart of the contemporary Kazakhstani policy model was shaped in the context of the early 1990s, when the total share of ethnic minorities outweighed the Kazakh majority (see Table 1 below). Russians throughout the whole period of independence have remained the sole biggest ethnic minority in the country. Choosing a policy line aimed at fostering ethnic Kazakh nationalism in such conditions would have been political suicide for any government, especially in the light of Kazakhstan’s efforts to maintain good relations with Russia. Therefore, the Kazakhstani model essentially combines two different theoretical approaches – a national-identity building approach combined with a hegemonic one[5]. This duality also reflects the delicacy of the situation with the government having to balance between ethnic minorities and Kazakh nationalists.
Table 1. Ethnic dynamics: Main ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (1991-2021)[6].
The national identity-building approach is based on the idea of creating a common civic identity for different ethnic or racial groups living in a country. Practically, it usually implies at least four policy lines, which are all present in Kazakhstan[7]. The citizens must adhere to the same system of values and institutions; the government imposes a single national language in education; the distribution of jobs and benefits has to be inclusive (i.e., not based on one’s ethnic background); there needs to be a powerful or dominating political force to push through unpopular but necessary policy measures or to suppress occasional surges of radical nationalism.
On the other hand, the government also uses a hegemonic exchange strategy. The strategy helps authoritarian governments to deal with ethnically diverse communities, while maintaining regime stability. Their central idea is that the government should either bargain with various ethnic groups or regularly threaten them with the use of force[8]. Once again, Kazakhstan ticks the boxes here as the government is quite liberal in terms of language usage and providing cultural autonomy, but strictly bans any ethnicity-based political campaigning and ethnic political parties to prevent separatism. At the same time, ethnic groups also receive various benefits (e.g., maintenance of their linguistic rights; culture preservation through the cultural centers of the Assembly of the People).
The evolution of the Kazakhstani ethnic policy model is rather hard to trace since it was designed and conducted by the same political regime throughout 1991-2021. Theoretically, however, it can be separated into three main periods based on the adopted conceptual documents. First was the inchoate period of 1991-1995 with no institutional framework in place. Then came the period 1995-2010, when the country established the Assembly of the People as a broad institutional framework for ethnic representation. The period from 2010 signified a transition to full-fledged nation-building with the establishment of the Doctrine of National Unity and the Concept of Strengthening and Development of the Kazakhstani identity. Both documents were, however, built on the founding principle of ethnic Kazakhs being considered a dominant, “state-forming” ethnic group[9]. This had serious political implications both for ethnic minorities and inter-ethnic situation in general.
This chronological approach is sometimes criticized by those, who believe that the government’s ethnic policy is rigid and has not changed at all[15]. The argument is that the key objectives and institutional framework of the policy have remained the same since the 1990s. Indeed, while the key strategic documents were regularly revised, there is no evidence of progress with actual implementation. Reforms related to ethnic policy monitoring (e.g. aimed at identifying the underlying causes of conflicts) have been launched only in the aftermath of the deadly 2020 conflict, when the government created the so-called Institute of Applied Ethnopolitical Research. Half-hearted and openly inaccessible follow-up studies on the conflicts as well an analytical seminar have vaguely concluded that the main reasons behind the conflict in Korday was “a combination of minority seclusion, corruption, and demographic peculiarities”[16]. This as well as other reforms (e.g. new conceptual documents and programmes; change in the Assembly’s leadership) are slapped as mere window-dressing or as “too little, too late”[17].
Why are the changes happening only now? There are two major factors – a hindrance factor and a stimulating factor. Both conflict with each other, but at the same time only together they can explain the institutional problem of Kazakhstan’s ethnic policy.
The hindrance factor is the broader political rigidity and discourse monopolization by the government, which has prevented alternative viewpoints from emerging earlier. In many ways, Kazakhstan’s discourse on ethnic policy has become an important contextual tool for self-legitimation both domestically and internationally[18]. Admitting the existence of ethnic conflicts undermines the government’s 30-years-long narrative of interethnic harmony and, consequently, the government’s standing domestically and internationally. Thus, sweeping all inter-ethnic tension under the rug and referring to them as domestic conflicts or hooliganism seems like a better option. For example, the recent 2021 article by ex-President Nursultan Nazarbayev dedicated to the 30th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence does not mention anything related to potential challenges in inter-ethnic relations. Instead, it just repeats the old mantra of inter-ethnic peace and inter-religious dialogues as the founding ethnic policy principles[19].
The stimulating factor is that inter-ethnic clashes of 2020-2021 happened because of the deteriorating socio-economic situation in the light of the falling oil prices and COVID-19 pandemic[20]. This high conflict occurrence rate was unprecedented for the government from the perspective of the last 15-20 years, which have cemented discourse monopolization. The new crises, however, might have motivated the government to finally reconsider its ethnic policy approach. Below I briefly analyze the key challenges that the government faces in its reform attempts.
Reforming the rigid politico-institutional framework: challenges and problems
Based on the conceptual discussion above, I hypothesize that politico-institutional inflexibility remains a key hindrance factor for Kazakhstani ethnic policy. The theories of policy learning and institutional change show us that regularly reviewing and consequently altering policies in the view of attaining long-term goals is absolutely essential[21]. Political inflexibility, on the other hand, might cause various problems. In this sub-section I elaborate on three inter-related challenges that stem from politico-institutional inflexibility. These are the lack of feedback loops such as independent evaluations/assessments by professional experts; the lack of open public discussions and broad societal discourse about the policy; and the stagnating institutional setting. I discuss them in greater detail below.
When talking about the absence of feedback loops, I refer to open independent evaluations or assessments of the current ethnic policy (e.g., descriptive studies based on country-wide surveys or more complex counterfactual impact evaluations). One of the latest open projects of this kind was commissioned almost ten years ago in 2011[22]. Ever since there have been no other similar open-access studies that targeted the broad scope of the country’s population. Absence of such studies, however, might be problematic since the lack of data prevents informed and evidence-based decision-making. It could negatively impact effectiveness of policies or detect potential problems (such as outbreaks of ethnic violence). Recent creation of the Institute of Applied Ethnopolitical Research in 2020 could be seen as a step in the right direction. However, it remains to be seen whether its research activities bring any fruitful results, since it has not published any open-access studies as of late 2021.
Another barrier for reforms is the lack of a healthy societal discussion about the main provisions of the policy. According to Diana Kudaibergenova, ‘the absence of major intellectual discussions’ allowed the elites to re-appropriate the policy discourse ‘in the political rather than critical intellectual domain’[23]. Citizens are also not educated to critically discuss such topics in any of the schools or university curricula. As a result, the government loses another potential feedback channel. This problem, however, also has an additional dimension at the societal level, when individual citizens do not know how to deal with potential ethnic tensions or with the cases of ethnicity-based discrimination / hate / violence. Furthermore, the lack of education on the topic could also make society very vulnerable to potential propaganda from the ethnic national populists, thus, undermining the country’s stability.
Finally, the last barrier is the weak but relatively rigid institutional setting of the Assembly of the People. While the Assembly is infrastructurally developed and present all over Kazakhstan[24], it does not have a significant political or societal profile. Ever since the early days of its foundation, it has remained a mere consultative body. The Assembly was severely criticized in the aftermath of the 2020-2021 ethnic conflicts for its inability to respond, as well as prevent similar incidents in the future. Alas it lacks a strong legal mandate to act independently and become a platform for open discussions of any problems related to questions of ethnic politics. Furthermore, the Assembly’s activities are still not coherently connected to the educational programs in Kazakhstani schools and universities at national, regional, and especially local levels. After the 2020 tragedy in Masanchi, even Nursultan Nazarbayev admitted that the Assembly must be institutionally strengthened to be able to act preventively at the local level in co-ordination with municipal and law enforcement agencies[25].
Opportunities and recommendations
Despite the challenges, there are also future opportunities for improvement. As of 2021, Kazakhstan remains a multicultural and multiethnic society with around 30% of ethnically non-Kazakh population (see Figure 1 and Table 1 above). Furthermore, according to the 2020 study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, there is an almost universal consensus among all Kazakhstanis (94%) for them to live in a multiethnic/multicultural society in the future[26]. Moreover, there is also a political window of opportunity for change on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the country’s independence as the current president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has pledged to continue mass-scale socio-political reforms to make the system of governance more democratic and flexible.
Specifically, three recommendations could help to address the challenges above. First, the government must establish a comprehensive evaluative framework for regular ethnic policy review. This approach is considered a standard good practice for public policy in many Western countries[27]. The review mechanism could include an annual ethnic policy barometer, as well as less regular but more complex policy impact evaluations. The responsibility could be delegated to the Institute of Applied Ethnopolitical Research, Institute for Strategic Studies, Presidential Administration, the Assembly of People, or even to private contractors through open tenders.
Secondly, structured education on the topics of ethnic tolerance and multiculturalism should be embedded in school/university education. Ideally, it should be integrated as one of the key competences in the already existing syllabi (e.g., sociology; history; languages) rather than a separate subject. It could be further complemented by extracurricular activities. For example, creating linkages between the Assembly’s activities and public education could also improve the system’s efficiency and coherence. In the long run, this will ensure that citizens of Kazakhstan can lead a healthy debate on the topics of ethnic policy.
Finally, a legislative proposal should be made that would strengthen the institutional and legal capacity of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. Greater institutional independence and additional resources could help the Assembly to address the reasons and consequences of conflicts more openly, rather than turning a blind eye. At the same time, stricter evaluative requirements should be put on the Assembly’s projects and policy implementation activities in the light of the first recommendation. This will help the Assembly to become an open discussion forum, especially since president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev aims to conduct further democratization reforms.
To conclude, questions of ethnic policy are going to remain relevant in the coming decade especially in the light of both domestic and foreign policy challenges. Domestically, as the country is going through the process of political transition, it will become increasingly important for the government to ensure effective (ethnic) conflict prevention. Internationally, the question of treatment of ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan is becoming particularly toxic in bilateral Kazakhstani-Russian relations, where politicians from both countries try to play a nationalist card to gain political points. That is why, building a more effective institutional framework for ethnic policy will be essential for Kazakhstan’s future as it marks the 30th anniversary of its independence.
[1] I. Daminov (2020). Reassessing classification of Kazakhstan’s ethnic management model: A comparative approach. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 11(2).
[2] Eurasia Net (2021). Kazakhstan: Rampage follows interethnic brawl, available at: https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-rampage-follows-interethnic-brawl
[3] Lim V. (2021). Interethnic Conflicts in Kazakhstan: Causes and Context. Available at: https://cabar.asia/en/interethnic-conflicts-in-kazakhstan-causes-and-context
[4] Ibid.
[5] Daminov. Reassessing classification.
[6] Derived from I. Daminov (2020). Reassessing classification of Kazakhstan’s ethnic management model: A comparative approach. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 11(2) and updated with 2021 data from “The population of the Republic of Kazakhstan by individual ethnic groups at the beginning of 2020”, Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at: https://www.stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=ESTAT355258
[7] Ibid.
[8] D. A. Lake & D. Rothschild (1996). Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. International Security, 21(2), 59–60.
[9] KazInform (2010). 15th Anniversary of the People’s Assembly [Бүгін - Қазақстан халқы Ассамблеясының құрылғанына 15 жыл Барлық құқықтар қорғалған. inform.kz белсенді сілтемені пайдаланыңыз], available at: https://www.inform.kz/kz/bugin-kazakstan-halky-assambleyasynyn-kurylganyna-15-zhyl_a2243285]. Available at: https://www.inform.kz/kz/bugin-kazakstan-halky-assambleyasynyn-kurylganyna-15-zhyl_a2243285 (accessed: 06.12.2021)
[10] Sibom (2021). Visualisation on WikiMedia based on the data from KazStat. Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Казахи_в_Казахстане.png (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[11] V. Lim (2021). Interethnic Conflicts in Kazakhstan: Causes and Context. Available at: https://cabar.asia/en/interethnic-conflicts-in-kazakhstan-causes-and-context (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[12] The Astana Times (2021). Unity in Diversity is Our Fundamental Principle to Preserve National Unity, Says Tokayev. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2021/10/unity-in-diversity-is-our-fundamental-principle-to-preserve-national-unity-says-tokayev/ (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[13] Azattyq (2020). By the side of the "Russian bear": how people live and what they fear in Northern Kazakhstan [Под боком у «русского медведя»: как живут и чего боятся на севере Казахстана], available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-petropavlovsk-north-kazakhstan-reportage/31024024.html (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[14] M. Laruelle (2014). The three discursive paradigms of state identity in Kazakhstan: Kazakhness, Kazakhstanness, and transnationalism. In Omelicheva, M. Y. (Ed.), Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, dynamics, and directions, pp. 16–17.
[15] See e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbP4Oz3UaL4 or Burkhanov, A. (2017). Kazakhstan's national identity-building policy: Soviet legacy, state efforts, and societal reactions. Cornell Int'l LJ, 50, 1.
[16] Azattyq (2021). Kazakhstani government refuses to acknowledge ethnic conflicts. What could the consequences be? [Власти Казахстана не признают этнические конфликты. К чему может привести замалчивание проблем?] Available at: https://rus.azattyq.org/amp/the-kazakh-authorities-do-not-recognize-ethnic-conflicts-/31001861.html (accessed 06.12.2021)
[17] Chatham House (2019). Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-11-27-Kazakhstan-Tested-By-Transition.pdf pp. 76-88. (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[18] D. Kudaibergenova (2016). The use and abuse of postcolonial discourses in post-independent Kazakhstan. Europe-Asia Studies, 68(5), 917–935.
[19] N. Nazarbayev (2021). Article Commemorating the 30th Anniverasry of Kazakhstan’s Independence. Available at: https://elbasy.kz/ru/news/2021-12/statya-pervogo-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-elbasy-nnazarbaeva-uroki-nezavisimosti?fbclid=IwAR0MhUyVtpNm5OSVHdeSpzjizGQjGx8p8udn9MQMSdm4L3hbVjNEXKB86E8 (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[20] Lim V. (2021). Interethnic Conflicts in Kazakhstan: Causes and Context. Available at: https://cabar.asia/en/interethnic-conflicts-in-kazakhstan-causes-and-context (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[21] L. Cerna (2013). The Nature of Policy Change and Implementation: A Review of Different Theoretical Approaches, available at: https://www.oecd.org/education/ceri/The%20Nature%20of%20Policy%20Change%20and%20Implementation.pdf (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[22] B. Mukhamedzhanov & A. Jusupova. (2011). Kazakhstan in the eyes of citizens and experts [Казахстан в глазах граждан и экспертов], Fund of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
[23] Kudaibergenova. The use and abuse of postcolonial discourses.
[24] Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2017). Cohabitation of ethnic groups in Kazakhstan [Сосуществование этнических групп в Казахстане]. Available at: https://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefportal/Publications/mkaiser_download_Ru%20Studie%20Zusammenleben%20der%20ethnischen%20Gruppen%20final%20(180016564).pdf(accessed: 30.11.2021)
[25] Vlast (2021). Assembly Councils must act preemptively and prevent inter-ethnic conflicts [Советы АНК должны работать на опережение и не допускать межнациональных конфликтов – Назарбаев], available at: https://vlast.kz/novosti/42517-sovety-ank-dolzny-rabotat-na-operezenie-i-ne-dopuskat-meznacionalnyh-konfliktov-nazarbaev.html (accessed: 30.11.2021)
[26] Friedrich Ebert Foundations (2020). Values of the Kazakhstani society in sociological dimension [Ценности казахстанского общества в социологическом измерении], p. 30.
[27] See for example, the European Commission’s Better Regulation Toolbox, which is available at the https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/document-library/better-regulation-toolbox-european-commission_en (accessed: 30.11.2021)