In a collaborative initiative on October 12, 2023, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting’s Central Asia Representative Office and the European Center for Security Studies (CESS) convened an international expert panel examining the ramifications of Russian propaganda in Central Asian nations. Esteemed researchers from both the Central Asian states and Ukraine provided critical insights into the formation of Russian propaganda narratives within the region and their subsequent reception by its populace.
The meeting was opened by Mr. Abakhon Sultonazarov, Director of the Central Asia Representative Office of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, who emphasized the importance of dialogue between analysts and journalists in their efforts to provide objective analysis of what is happening in the region. He also stressed that this meeting is part of a series of expert events within the framework of the project “Amplify, Verify, Engage: Information for Democratization and Good Governance in Eurasia” funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway. Mr. Sultonazarov wished the participants and speakers a productive discussion.
The moderator and first speaker of the meeting was Dr. Rashid Gabdulhakov, Assistant Professor at the Centre for Media and Journalism Studies at the University of Groningen and EUCAM Research Fellow. Dr. Gabdulhakov presented a paper written by the research team of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and the EUCAM program of the Center for European Security Studies (CESS). In the paper, the authors examined the main channels of information and media used by the Russian Federation through which it communicates with citizens of Central Asian (CA) countries. Such channels included television, online media, and newspapers, information from which was analyzed using the ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis program. The researchers also conducted focus groups in three regions of Kyrgyzstan – in Osh in Russian and Kyrgyz, in Naryn in Kyrgyz, and in Bishkek in Russian. The main conclusions of the study:
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- Russia has a clear line of information pressure on the region and Kyrgyzstan. Its essence is that any attempt by Central Asian states to distance themselves from Russia, attempts to “desovietize” or support the growing movement of “decolonization” of public consciousness will be perceived by Russia as a threat. In turn, Russia’s reaction to such manifestations is also a threat of the “Ukrainian scenario” for those who are trying to build constructive relations with the West.
- The demonization of the “collective West” – Soviet Cold War rhetoric is making a comeback. Russia presents a distorted view of the West, appealing to “spirituality” and “traditional values” as a moral reference point for itself as opposed to Western “immorality”. It is noteworthy that focus group respondents reproduced mantras learned from the Russian media about the “corrupt and immoral West”.
- Russia as a guarantor of security in the region. Russia presents itself in the media space as an actor that provides CA states with various resources – financial, material, as well as a country that can pardon the national debt or migrant workers of one of the CA countries (“Russia as a giver and forgiver”).
- Actualization of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) as the central structure of Russia’s influence on the region. The politically dead foreign policy construct is presented by Russia as an effective mechanism of interaction between the countries of the former Soviet Union in the media.
Dr. Gabdulhakov stressed the importance of an objective approach to the way questions were asked of survey respondents in order to avoid the research team’s own subjectivism. One of the first questions was “How and from where do you consume information?”. And here the important conclusion was how television is still the most important tool for informing and shaping the attitudes of the population in CA, along with social networks. The mechanism of “infotainment” is also extremely relevant when complex political information is presented in an entertaining style, or when entertainment programs are interrupted by news blocks.
One of the most important aspect of Dr. Gabdulhakov’s presentation was the role of algorithms in social media and their influence on the objective perception of what is happening. “There is a great risk of getting stuck in “information echo chambers” and one’s own social bubbles, when both at work and at home, and in the online space you are surrounded by the picture of the world that corresponds to your perceptions” – stated the researcher.
Concluding his presentation, the researcher emphasized the fact of total dominance of Russian media in the information space of Kyrgyzstan, be it traditional media or social media. Russian media are actively represented on all platforms and are professional and have their own country offices in Kyrgyzstan. It is also important how Russian media instrumentalize the state language – Kyrgyz – by presenting positions that are understandable to a wide range of readers, something that some independent media still have some difficulties with. Summarizing the results, the speaker returned to the issue of algorithm formation – how news algorithmic mechanisms can potentially present an alternative picture of the world to the audience.
Kamila Smagulova spoke on changing narratives and increasing polarization in Kazakhstan’s society in the context of the panel’s topic. She emphasized the role of grassroots initiatives in combating propaganda. An important point was that the speaker noted the lack of systematic research on the impact of Russian propaganda and media consumption in the Republic of Kazakhstan (RoK).
The researcher noted the formation of two antagonistic narratives in the Kazakh public sphere – the movement towards decolonization and the position of pro-Russian citizens. Referring to specific examples, Ms. Smagulova spoke about the systemic imbalance between Russian and Kazakh in favor of the former – the majority of Kazakhstani people still consume information in Russian. Knowledge of Russian also gives more privileges in society.
The polarization that has affected different segments of society divides citizens on a variety of topics, from the holding of parades in the capital and the wearing of the St. George’s ribbon on May 9 to the narrative of “friendship of nations” during the Soviet period, which is actively demythologized by activists and researchers of the decolonization movement. Attempts by Russian online media to stigmatize the use of the state Kazakh language by Kazakhstan’s independent media and to categorize this process as “nationalism” are also being actively reinforced.
An important event in the public life of Kazakhstan was the cancellation of the so-called “Z artists” from Russia, whose tour was canceled due to the reaction of the Kazakh civil society. Polarization in Kazakhstani society was fueled by Russian media, which presented this event as an unfriendly act and a manifestation of “Kazakh nationalism”. The use of Soviet choronyms (Kirghiziya instead of Kyrgyzstan), oikonyms (Alma-Ata instead of Almaty) and urbanonyms is also a typical example of polarization, where local activists in Kazakhstan oppose such names, while pro-Russian media adhere to the Soviet names of cities and countries, which exacerbates social contradictions. The unveiling of the monument to Alexander Nevsky with the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church is another event that was received ambiguously by different parts of society.
Regarding the question of how grassroots initiatives and activists fight against manifestations of propaganda, the expert noted the creation of online petitions as an important tool, for example, in an attempt to respond to the analytical school of the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Support Foundation, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Russian government in general. Notably, in 2022, the foundation was placed on the European Union (EU) sanctions list for promoting anti-state propaganda against Ukraine.
A separate narrative of Russian propaganda is to spread hatred towards LGBT people, values and the feminist movement in Kazakhstan. Propaganda work is carried out according to the molds of internal Russian agitations and methodologies. The same influence, according to the expert, is also exerted on internal political processes in Kazakhstan. For example, the recently published register of persons and organizations receiving funding from abroad was perceived by part of Kazakhstan’s civil society as an imitation and forerunner of Russia’s aggressive legislation on ‘foreign agents’. Importantly, this register does not include any public organization or person receiving funding from the Russian Federation. Ms. Smagulova concluded her presentation with a call for an in-depth study of the influence of Russian propaganda in Kazakhstan.
The third speaker was Galina Petrenko, Head of the NGO “Detector Media” (Ukraine, Kyiv). Ms. Petrenko shared her analysis of Russian propaganda in terms of interference in elections in democratic societies and how it can be countered in the context of the upcoming elections in the EU and the United States. In more detail, she described how during the parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Russia used narratives, mainly spread through social media, about “provocation of Russia by the West and responsibility for the outbreak of war”, “potential use of nuclear weapons in case of Ukraine’s victory”, “uselessness and danger of Slovakia’s membership in NATO”, “blind following of Washington by the EU” and others.
An important feature of disinformation dissemination was the use of artificial intelligence in the creation of complex deep fakes. For example, a video was simulated of a conversation between the leader of a pro-European party and a well-known Slovak TV presenter on how to buy Roma votes in Slovakia. In Poland, Russian propaganda is capitalizing on the long-standing fears of the local population against Ukrainian producers of goods that will “take away jobs” and “destroy the economy,” etc. In the opposite direction, Russian propaganda is actively pushing rumors that Poland intends to take its former territories away from Ukraine.
An effective response to such behavior is to create a common front to counterbalance aggressive misinformation. It is also important to develop joint approaches and rules for the use of artificial intelligence in the media and in the academic space. It is necessary to collect and analyze not only the narratives of Russian propaganda, but also to study the mood of the audience – what do consumers of Russian propaganda feel? What are they thinking about? What is their attitude toward Russian propaganda? These are the central questions.
The experience of Ukrainian colleagues in terms of grassroots initiatives in social media through personal connections with large IT giants, through which volunteers try to help those independent public figures who have been blocked, for example, on Facebook, is interesting.
The last speaker of the meeting was Dr. Mariëlle Wijermars, Assistant Professor in Cyber-Security and Politics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASoS), Maastricht University. The focus of her research was Yandex and the formation of algorithms for censoring information in the Russian Internet and media space. The researcher identified two main approaches in spreading state propaganda on the one hand and narrowing the field of activity for independent journalism in Russia on the other. The first approach consists of classical methods of intimidation of independent journalists. The second approach consists in controlling the dissemination of information. And here it is remarkable how information is consumed by the audience through applications on mobile devices. The evolution of news recommendation algorithms in online media, such as Yandex, has gradually squeezed independent media out of the sight of the general audience, which is why this process is also called “invisible censorship”.
The presentations were followed by a question-and-answer session, during which participants and audience members exchanged views on the most important features and techniques of Russia’s successful propaganda in Central Asia. For example, aspects of the cultural proximity of Russian media to the Central Asian context and its impact on the success of Russian propaganda were discussed. They also discussed how Russia’s propaganda has changed since the war against Ukraine began. The experts noted more aggressive rhetoric of propaganda, lack of halftones, dehumanization of the Ukrainian side, its political class, defamation of President Zelensky personally, and others. The listeners were also interested in the formats of propaganda, what media products are most popular among a wide audience of Central Asian citizens. Halyna Petrenko shared her experience of quota of national media in the state language in Ukraine, media literacy education campaigns with state support.