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How Will the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan Affect the Countries of Central Asia? Interview with Jennifer Murtazashvili

“It is certainly possible for Russia, China and the United States to cooperate given their shared goals in the region. But this would probably not entail a large US military presence in the region, as both China and Russia perceive this military presence in Central Asia as a threat to their own national security,” says Professor Jennifer Murtazashvili in an interview to CABAR.asia analytical platform.


Jennifer Murtazashvili. Photo from personal archive

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili is the Director of the Center of Governance and Markets and Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Her research focuses on political economy, governance, and foreign policy in Central Eurasia. She is the author of several books, including Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan, and Land, The State, and War: Property Institutions and Political Order in Afghanistan (with Ilia Murtazashvili).

CABAR.asia: The United States is withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan by the fall of 2021. What has been the American military contingent lately in this country? How real is the US leaving this country? (Will there be private American military companies, various trainers and consultants, etc.?)

The US military is leaving Afghanistan and there is little sign that US military forces will remain in the country in any substantial capacity. Withdrawal is not only a demand of the Taliban (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia. – Ed.), with whom the US have negotiated an agreement, but it is an increasingly a demand of American voters who have grown weary of this military intervention.

Last week, we learned that the US withdrawal would include all military contractors are as well. All individuals involved in training and supporting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which include the army and the police, are supposed to leave the country. I think we can assume that aid contractors and NGOs (who are part of the development and humanitarian assistance programs) can remain but those associated with the military effort will not be able to stay.

Last week the US revealed that 650 Marines would remain in the country to guard the US Embassy in Kabul. It is not unusual for Marines to guard US Embassies around the world. This is considered separate from the US war effort.  I assume that this is allowed under the agreement between the US and the Taliban (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia. – Ed).  

At the recent meeting between Presidents Biden and Ghani in Washington last week, the US has promised substantial military and development assistance to Afghanistan. It is unclear how this aid will be distributed or overseen. It does appear that the US military is leaving Afghanistan—at least for now.

Afghan and US Presidents Ashraf Ghani and Joe Biden at the White House in Washington DC on June 25, 2021. Photo: Susan Walsh / AP

There is a lot of talk now that the Taliban will try to regain power after the withdrawal of American and coalition forces. Some draw analogies with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. How can further events unfold? Are there any differences between the Taliban of the 1990s and the current Taliban with an office in Doha and participating in the international conferences? How consolidated are they? Are there other significant intra-Afghan actors besides the government and the Taliban?

So much is uncertain about the future of Afghanistan that it is impossible to say. While it is easy to make comparisons between the past and the present, I think the situation in Afghanistan is very different than it was thirty years ago when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan was a very different country thirty years ago. While there are certain parts of the international project that were certainly imported to Afghanistan, we cannot underestimate the local support for participation, accountability, education, and voice. I would argue that the insurgency rages today because the international intervention was not able to deliver these elements to citizens. Those outside of Kabul (and many insides of the city) became disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the international project. In other words, while the Taliban (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia. – Ed) may have an easy time seizing districts and even cities in the coming weeks, we should expect enormous challenges to them as they seek to control these territories over long periods of time if they are unable to govern effectively. Governance and holding territory will be a huge challenge for the Taliban.

Second, The Taliban is certainly different than it was 20 years ago—it has changed is tactics and strategy, but not its goal. It has not seemed to change its goals at all. It seeks the establishment of an Islamic Emirate. But the tactics of the Taliban have changed quite dramatically. For example, it is far more willing to engage with the international community and appear in public than it had before under Mullah Omar. Recall, that Mullah Omar had only been seen in public once during his reign. He remained an elusive figure, which in turn made the Taliban quite illusive.  Today, the Taliban embrace social media and media attention. They also engage with the international community to a much greater extent than they had in the past. In fact, they are very eager to keep international engagement in Afghanistan on the table after the US withdraws as they desire international aid to keep flowing into the country after the military withdraws.

While the Taliban have become far more media savvy and willing to engage with the rest of the world, this does not mean it has changed the foundational tools of coercion it has used to gain compliance of populations. The Taliban has not relinquished the use of coercion or violence as a tool to gain quiescence of local populations.

The Taliban have come to understand that they cannot govern long relying on sticks alone, but they must provide public services to citizens in order stay in power. For this reason, international assistance becomes very useful for them as they seem content to contract out service provision to the international community to aid on its behalf. This Taliban has been cooperating with development and humanitarian agencies throughout Afghanistan in recent years. Many aid agencies are willing to work with the Taliban because they believe the development and humanitarian outcomes they can achieve to be more important than the legitimacy they bestow up on the Taliban through such collaboration.

It is unclear how the future will unfold. What we are seeing right now is a collapse in support of the government and great uncertainty take hold of the Afghan military around the country. This uncertainty may be short lived. Afghanistan has changed greatly during the past twenty years. It will be very difficult for the Taliban to rule unilaterally as they had in the past. It is difficult to imagine them governing cities without serious contestation.

It will be very difficult for the Taliban Taliban (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia. – Ed) to rule unilaterally as they had in the past.

The other players to keep in mind in this equation in addition to the Taliban and the government are commanders associated with the so-called Northern Alliance. One of the great achievements of the past twenty years was the integration of many of these militias into the Afghanistan National Security and Defense Forces (ANDSF).

The leaderships of the Central Asian countries have always treated with concern the threats emanating from Afghanistan. How can the withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan affect the countries of Central Asia? To what extent is the threat of terrorism and extremism from Afghanistan real for these countries? Isn’t there an excessive exaggeration of the problem in order to distract from internal problems, securitization, tightening the screws, etc.?

Insecurity in northern Afghanistan has created a window for diverse groups of Central Asian fighters to engage in the region, causing concern among Central Asian republics – especially from Tajikistan and Afghanistan. There is an older generation of Central Asian fighters who once fought alongside the Taliban (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia. – Ed) who have now splintered into a range of different groups including some affiliated with the Islamic State—Khorasan Province (ISKP) among others. Alongside these Central Asian fighters, there appears to be a new wave of fighters from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan inside Afghanistan. Unlike previous Central Asian fighters who were swept out of Pakistan, these fighters are coming directly from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, having left their countries recently, with some bringing their families with them.

President Rahmon of Tajikistan instructed his government to ensure security and strengthening of the state border defenses. There are reports of Tajik nationals joining the Taliban ranks in battles with the Afghanistan government in Badakhshan. In December 2020, fighters from Tajikistan claiming allegiance to Jamaat Ansarullah played a major role in the capture of Maymay District Centre in Badakhshan. In February 2021, the Tajik government, out of concern for a deterioration of the security situation in the north, warned its citizens living on the border with Afghanistan to begin patrolling the border themselves.  The government appears to be concerned not about Taliban infiltration into Tajikistan but instead about their own citizens returning home from Afghanistan.

There has been a constant level of repression in Central Asia that has been motivated by threats of terrorism and extremism. Afghanistan was initially a source of concern, but over the years threats from Iraq and Syria also loomed large in these attitudes. There is certainly a threat of terrorism that could come from Afghanistan to Central Asia. The threat of terrorism is a very real one: it plagues Afghanistan daily. It will be interesting to watch how Uzbekistan approaches these issues. With the largest population in the region, it has made shifts towards greater religious and civic expression in recent years. It is unclear whether this opening will last and to what extent a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan will play into its ability to maintain this openness.

Recently, news has been circulating about the possible deployment of American military bases in Central Asia in connection with the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. How real are these rumors? Is it possible to theoretically locate in one of the countries regions? How much has the political situation in Central Asia changed compared to the 2000s, when US and NATO troops were stationed in the countries of the region?

There is little doubt that the United States would like a military presence in Central Asia or Pakistan after it departs from Afghanistan. It is theoretically possible to locate in the region, but it is not feasible from a political perspective. The political environment is radically different from what it was in the early 2000s when US and NATO troops were stationed in the region. In the early 2000s, countries in Central Asia were equally as scared of terrorism coming from Afghanistan as the United States. They viewed the US as a source of protection against growing terrorist threats.

The domestic political environment in the United States has changed significantly since that time and this affects international relations in Central Asia. Politics in the United States has become more insular and less willing to accept military adventures overseas. This is one reason why a new base in Central Asia may not be politically acceptable to the current domestic political environment. It is also important to recall that US military basing in Central Asia may have served short term goals but was also entwined with controversy. The US military base in Qarshi-Khanabad was closed in 2005 when President Karimov became angered by US criticism of his handling of Andijon. There have been allegations that US military personnel who served in Qarshi may have been exposed to toxic materials during their stay there. The US withdrew from its base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan in 2014 because of pressure from Russia as well as constant allegations that contracts from Manas fueled corruption.

The geopolitical atmosphere in Central Asia has also changed significantly since 2001, especially with regards to Russia and China. At that time, both were willing to support US efforts in Afghanistan and gave their blessing for the US to host troops in Central Asia. With growing animosity towards the United States and NATO from China and Russia, it is no longer clear that they would tolerate such a base in Central Asia.

Finally, domestic attitudes in Central Asia have shifted away from the United States. Given US military track record in the region over the past twenty years, it is unlikely that these countries see US military presence as a source of stability. Instead, they seem as bringing instability with them. Twenty years ago, victory in Afghanistan seemed inevitable. Today, the US looks as it is leaving the region a defeated power. Finally, diplomats and political analyst from Central Asia have told me that they no longer see the US as a reliable power. If it welcomes the US, it is welcoming uncertainty. Who needs uncertainty?

What we should expect to see is expanding cooperation between the United States and military forces in Central Asia. This would take the form of various kinds of training and technical assistance that we have seen in the past. In this way, the US could try to provide military support indirectly through these partners.

Uzbekistan promotes its platform for negotiations with the Taliban, the authorities of Turkmenistan also met with the Taliban in Doha, Tajikistan is regularly visited by the official authorities of Afghanistan. How legitimate is the negotiation and establishment of ties with the Taliban (which is considered a terrorist organization)? Can the Central Asian countries be independent and effective mediators in the inter-Afghan negotiations?

Regional dynamics in Central Asia are changing very quickly. Perhaps faster than at any time in recent history in Central Asia. A lot of this is driven by the US withdrawal alongside reforms in Uzbekistan. While domestic reforms in Uzbekistan seem to have stalled, Uzbekistan has embraced a much more open foreign policy.  Uzbekistan is emerging as an important regional player as its borders touch on all five countries in the region and its large population and economy give it leverage over its neighbors. Recently, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov said that Afghanistan is part of Central Asia and an integral part of the region. This is a true departure from previous eras where Uzbekistan saw Afghanistan as a pariah and a country that they seemed to want to isolate from the region.

Increasingly, all countries in the region are having a dialogue with the Taliban. In this way, the Taliban has become a legitimate political force. If the Taliban were to take power in Kabul, then Central Asian countries would be prepared to deal with this government. Uzbekistan has maintained that it will work with the Taliban under the condition that Afghanistan remain a republic and not turn into an Islamic Emirate. It may be saying this to assuage the concerns of the Ghani government in Kabul, which does not seem very excited to see Uzbekistan hosting Taliban delegations and negotiating with them directly.

Taliban delegation in Tashkent in 2019. Zabehulah_M33 / Twitte

Although this open political relationship between the Taliban and Uzbekistan makes the Kabul government uneasy this could play an important role for future regional economic cooperation and stability. Tashkent is hoping that economic cooperation projects will continue regardless of who is in power in Kabul. These projects include gas pipelines (TAPI) and railways that can connect Central Asia to the rest of the world. So I do not see Central Asia efforts to speak to the Taliban as efforts to negotiate peace alone, I see them as part of an insurance policy for Central Asian countries who do not want to be further isolated should the Taliban take over the government in Kabul.

How do you assess the role of Russia in ensuring stability in Afghanistan? Russia has military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; Uzbekistan also cooperates with the Russian Federation in the military sphere. Will Russia be able to replace the US role in ensuring security and stability both in Afghanistan and in the Central Asian region?

This is a big question and one that I cannot answer. It is difficult to say what Russia’s intentions are towards greater US cooperation in Central Asia. We are unlikely to see one foreign power emerge and dominate the security landscape in the region. While many are focused on a security vacuum in the region, it is also important to remember that Russia has maintained thousands of troops in Central Asia and over the past several years they have become increasingly prepared to deal with the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the region. Russian forces are a bulwark against military incursions across the border, but it I do not think that a kind of military invasion is likely from Afghanistan into Central Asia. Russia has always seen itself as a guardian of security in Central Asia and along the Afghan border.  I do not think this will change. The question is whether it will accommodate US presence in the region. Right now, that looks unlikely.

Are the approaches of the United States and Russia different on the future of Afghanistan? Is military cooperation between Moscow and Washington possible to achieve common goals in Afghanistan? What about China?

Despite public posturing, it is still possible for Russia, China, and the United States to find common ground in Afghanistan. The US, Russia, and China have all come to agreement that a defeat of the Taliban (terrorist movement banned in Central Asia. – Ed) is no longer possible. Instead, they are trying to work with the group to ensure that it behaves in a way that does not violate their interests. The primary interest in all three countries in Afghanistan is the prevention of international terrorism and Afghanistan being used as a heaven for terrorists. This is true for Uzbekistan as well. All seem to have received assurances from the Taliban that they are only interested in controlling Afghanistan but have no designs on regional countries. This is a significant departure from the days after September 11, 2011, when it was not clear whether the Taliban would support military attacks against Muslim neighbors that hosted American troops.

It is still possible for Russia, China, and the United States to find common ground in Afghanistan.

While Russia initially welcomed US presence in Central Asia, it grew tired of it. It had helped Uzbekistan lobby for the ouster of US troops from Uzbekistan in 2005 and constantly put pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close Manas. Russia has been concerned with the Taliban and rising levels of violence in Afghanistan for some time.

It is certainly possible for Russia, China and the United States to cooperate given their shared goals in the region. But this would probably not entail a large US military presence in the region, as both China and Russia perceive this military presence in Central Asia as a threat to their own national security. So, if US troop presence is off the table, there are probably significant areas where the three countries can find common ground. But this seems to be a big “if” for now.

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