In an interview for CABAR.asia, Dr. Schenk discussed recent migration patterns from Central Asia to Russia and some of the COVID-19 implications on migration in the Eurasian region.
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Dr. Caress Schenk is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nazarbayev University. Her research expertise includes politics of immigration and national identity in Eurasia. Up until very recently she has been focusing on migration through the lenses of Russian politics. Currently, Dr. Schenk is conducting research on politics of COVID-19 in Kazakhstan and how that relates to migration.
Which countries within Central Asia do you find most intriguing for conducting research on labor migration and why?
This is an important question because each country has very different dynamics when it comes to labor migration, especially from the perspective of studying migration to Russia. We fall into the trap of treating all Central Asian countries the same, and they are not. There are such different dynamics among sending countries, which come from relationships to religion and government authority. We often think of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as being the major donor countries to Russia but they are different in terms of why migrant go, how free they are to go, and how they are treated when they come back.
Comparatively Kyrgyzstan is much more politically free than Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and that impacts migrants in Russia. For example, female migrants from Kyrgyzstan are coming from a freer political system and that shows up in the ways that they are able to reach their goals when they are in Russia as well. When it comes to Tajikistan, often issues of religious revival, which my colleague Dr. Helene Thibault has written about, create problems when migrants return to Tajikistan. There is fear that migrants are radicalized or have been influenced by external forces. When it comes to Uzbekistan, we see a huge shift in the political system from the Karimov regime that was very tightly controlled, to the Mirziyoyev regime which is comparatively more open.
For the past decade would you describe either an upward or a downward trend in regional migration to Russia? Is this pattern consistent cross-nationally and throughout the time or not?
I think there is a definitely an upward trend in migration to Russia. It is a little bit tricky because data does not show such a trend in a linear way. If we look at trends of migration to Russia, we see variation. Numbers go up for a while and then dip down. Often those dips come when there is either an economic crisis or a policy change in Russia. There was a big change in 2007 that allowed many more legal migrants to be recorded officially. In 2008, we saw a dip after the financial crisis and then in 2014-2015 after the ruble crisis. We also see lower numbers of migrants in the official data when Russia changes its policies. It is pretty safe to say though that there are not fewer migrants as a result of changes made to migration policy in 2015. But those migrants that go to Russia are not recorded by the official data. Hence, I think that there is an upward trend even if there are small dips because of economic contractions.
Over the last five years CA countries have absolutely eclipsed other donor countries in terms labor migrants to Russia. If in the past we’ve seen a lot of migration from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, we see now much more from CA. I think that reflects the economic dynamics of Russia as a reliable place for migrants to go and earn money.
What is the governmental position on this phenomenon among Central Asian Republics? Are they supportive of migration to Russia? Why/why not?
I think, in general, many of the Central Asian countries see migration as inevitable, especially since the Kyrgyz and Tajik GDPs are so dependent on the money from migrant earnings in Russia. Uzbekistan is less remittance dependent because its economy is stronger. Even if the governments of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan see migration as inevitable, it is interesting to observe their orientation towards migrants and especially the degree of support that they are willing to give migrants as they are migrating. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have developed migration services that are oriented towards issues that migrants might face. Uzbekistan is less developed on this front. During the Karimov regime there was no official support because migrants were seen as traitors. Mirziyoyev has a different perspective of migration more as an inevitable process.
Recently, we’ve had a colleague Izzat Amon, who was a Russian citizen of Tajik decent for 25 years. His citizenship was recently revoked, he was deported to Tajikistan and then immediately arrested once he arrived to Dushanbe. This episode shows the orientation of the Tajik and Russian governments. Presumably, the Russian side identified Amon as a threat because of his work and advocacy for migrants’ rights, while Tajikistan accused him of government criticism. This is a disturbing development that shows that migration in some cases can be quite sensitive and even attracts the attention of the top government officials, unfortunately.
What is the perception of the local populations in CA? How do social media platforms discourage or encourage such migration behavior?
Many of the local populations see migration as a way of life. In Kazakhstan there is more anxiety over brain drain. In other CA republics, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, migration is seen as a way of life. There are a number of websites where migrants can go and read news on the latest migration legislation and what the major trends are. I think this is helpful as it gives migrants a good information about how best to migrate, since it can be often difficult to get the right documents. Social media is a great tool for migrants, where they can access other migrants informally to help them navigate the difficult legal waters in Russia. It is the reality of the Russian migration system that there are many legal migrants but also many undocumented ones. So there is an important social function of migrant networks through social media to help solve practical and legal problems.
How are migrants perceived in Russia both on the governmental and societal levels? How might you describe a Central Asian migrant identity?
We have opinion polls that show us trends over time especially on the question: Do you see Russia as a country for Russians? This is a typical question that is used to measure xenophobia in Russia. We can see over time that this measure rises and falls. Even when levels of xenophobia are measured as high, I would say most often sentiment towards migrants is very passively held on the part of Russian citizens. There is anxiety about migrants’ effect on the labor market, but people are also increasingly understanding that country needs migrants in order for the economy to survive. If Russia is xenophobic against migrants, these xenophobic trends are held in tension with other social and economic needs.
What major factors can account for migration to Russia?
I think migration is predominantly economically driven in the Eurasian sphere. But it is not necessarily survival driven. Sometimes we have this image of migrants going to earn money abroad because they do not have opportunities at home; they are so poverty stricken. In some cases, that is true in the Eurasian migration system. But that is not the only story. There are many migrants that go to Russia to access money quickly for lifestyle enhancements. Part of that has to do with social structures and social expectations in some CA countries, whether it is wedding or funerals, building homes or purchasing cars. Again, some of the anthropological and ethnographic research is demonstrating complicated and socially embedded factors that cause migrants to go to Russia. These things are not purely economic. It is not a matter of survival, it is a social status. It is a matter of earning for the family, not entirely for luxury goods, but for attainment of social status. We also see quite a lot of student migration. I think Russia is seen as a way of getting your foot in the door to higher education and career path.
How have the migration patterns changed since the emergence of EAEU from a legal perspective? Has it affected regional migration from Central Asian countries?
It was seen as an opportunity for migrants when Kyrgyzstan joined EAEU in 2015, since Kyrgyz were one of the largest groups going to Russia. But the reality has been underwhelming, in part because data on Kyrgyz labor migrants have completely disappeared. The Russian government does not collect data on Kyrgyz migrants working legally through the provisions of the EAEU. I think that is because the data collection is focused so much on migrants that need to buy patent in order to work. A patent is the document that migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan must have, and the Russian governments sell those in millions every year. Kyrgyz migrants do not need patents because of their status in EAEU. If we see data on Kyrgyz labor migrants occasionally, it is only at the regional level. It is not issued at the national level, and essentially that means that we do not know how many Kyrgyz workers there are in Russia. Kyrgyz labor migrants often work unofficially because it is difficult to get labor contracts. Employers often want to save money by hiring informally. So the EAEU has not helped Kyrgyz migrants or given them leverage in the labor market in the way the people thought that it might.
How has migration to Russia been affected by the COVID situation? How does the pandemic resonate with respect to both Russia and Central Asian countries?
In some ways, the pandemic has enormously effected migration. But on some level it has not affected Eurasian countries any more than it affected the rest of the world. The pandemic created problems when Russia closed its borders. Migration is by nature a mobile process, and when you close borders, migration theory tells us that patterns of migration become more permanent. In the Russian context, we did not see floods of migrants going back home, even though they had the opportunity to repatriate back to their countries. This bears out migration theory that closed borders create more permanent migrant populations.
The other major impact is that economy in Russia shut down in March, April, and May of last year because of quarantine and lockdown procedures. Many migrants, and people all around the world, found themselves in difficult situations because they did not have economic opportunities. However, as soon as the Russian economy started up again, we saw an immediate rebound in remittances and employment. Now we even see gigantic demand by employers lobbying the Russian government to let the migrants come back because they desperately need the workers, especially in the construction and agricultural sectors. We see that migrants have been severely affected by COVID-19, but the more we come out of the pandemic, the more migrants start to rebound and come back to normal.
In 2020, around 145,000 people from Central Asia became full-fledged citizens of the Russian Federation. This slight growth was due to Tajik migrants. How can this trend affect the EAEU? Does it indicate the policy of the Russian Federation towards Tajikistan in terms of involving Dushanbe into the EAEU?
In terms of EAEU, this could be an interesting pressure point between Russia and Tajikistan. I think it has been clear since 2016 that the EAEU is available to Tajikistan. But they know that it comes with potential costs for autonomy and pressure from Russia. Many scholars think of the EAEU as a “Russian imperial project.” I do not necessarily see it that way, and I think the fact that Tajikistan has held off for so long shows that countries in CA do have leverage against Russia, both inside and outside the context of EAEU.
When Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU, they were able to negotiate over the issue of migration in a fairly substantial way. They were able to negotiate for Kyrgyz citizens who had been denied entry into Russia to return there. How ongoing or constant this type of leverage is on the part of CA countries is a different question. I think these issues are quite episodic; they come up over conflict situations and then die away. We should keep our eye on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan joining the EAEU, especially in terms of how much leverage they will have, but also seeing whether there will be improvements for migrants as a result of this access to easier labor migration. If we look at the experience of Kyrgyzstan, the picture is not an entirely positive one. I would expect it to be similar if Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also join.
In the context of Covid-19, how might migration patterns reveal the state capacity of regional actors? Are there any obstacles to collecting regional data on Covid-19 in relation to labor migration right now?
Migration demonstrates many different types of state capacity in concrete but complex ways. Migration shows the lack of state capacity of CA countries to care for citizens, provide social services and distribute emergency cash influxes.
Coercive capacity is also important. Coercion is demonstrated when Russia deports certain migrants, makes laws so restrictive that it is difficult for migrants to legalize, or when officials try to extract money when migrants do not have documents. All of these things we can broadly conceive as coercive capacity, which we can measure through deportations or encounters with law enforcements.
In terms of information capacity, I think both Russia and CA have a real deficit. It is interesting because the foundations of the Soviet system were very bureaucratic and information oriented. But how current governments collect and release data to the public has developed unevenly across countries. Russian information capacity is the highest of the Eurasian countries, but even so, they are selective in what they release to the public. When it comes to CA, governments do not necessarily utilize their capacity to produce relevant data. In all countries, bureaucrats are the ones collect data through their interactions with migrants in the migration services or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bureaucrats are collecting all sorts of data, but whether that data give us a clear picture of the migration situation is a different question. Because sometimes categories of data do not much up with the actual lived experience of migrants.
How do you think migration will be affected by Covid-19 in the short and long terms? Will Russia require vaccination from incoming migrants in future?
Migration will rebound. It will go back to normal as much as the world will go back to normal. However, Russia is always reinventing its migration policy and putting into place new restrictions. But any new restrictions will only decrease legal migration; migrants will still come to Russia regardless of their legal status.
In terms of vaccines, it is relatively rare for countries to require vaccines for travel. However, the COVID-19 era has seen government policies that have been so extreme and unprecedented that it is difficult to predict whether things will go back to normal or whether there will be new expectations of how border regimes will operate.
In the West, vaccine rights have always been entangled with the freedom of conscience. What is interesting is that we also see robust protections of vaccine choice in Eurasia, but it doesn’t originate out of the same liberal tradition. Last summer, for example, there was a debate in the Kazakhstani majilis about whether to make vaccines mandatory or not. In the end they decided to maintain voluntary vaccination. But even after a great deal of debate, I’m not sure that we can frame the process as one that was driven by considerations of individual rights or the freedom of conscience.
It is much easier to make vaccines mandatory for travelers than for your own citizens. The tension point will come for Russia if they cannot get enough migrants to come without vaccinating. Will required vaccination be something like current regulations for medical insurance or medical certificates that are required but do not mean anything? I would not be surprised if it became possible to buy a vaccine card without getting a vaccine. This is a theoretical possibility, but these are still all are very open questions.
Apart from Covid-19, what other challenges do you anticipate in relation to regional migration in the future? In general, do you expect the migration trend to decline or not?
Often the challenges that arise are unpredictable. There were challenges related to Ukrainian migrants coming to Russia after the 2014 conflict. Many Ukrainians went to Russia either long term or short term, and we couldn’t necessarily predict that. In the same way, there are sometimes diplomatic scuffles that affect migration. This happened in 2008 with Georgia. There was also an argument between Russia and Tajikistan over pilots that were detained in 2011. These diplomatic scuffles come and go, and they are hard to predict. In terms of long term patterns, I do not think even if Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were to join EAEU, it would dramatically affect labor migration to Russia. Even if the situation went in the completely opposite direction and Russia started requiring visas for Central Asian migrants, migration patterns would remain resilient enough and migrants would figure out how to make things work. Even though migration might sometimes be unpopular for domestic audiences, it is so necessary for the Russian government and economy that there will always be give and take that will allow migration patterns to return to normal even when governments try to reduce it.
This material has been prepared as part of the Giving Voice, Driving Change – from the Borderland to the Steppes Project. The opinions expressed in the article do not reflect the position of the editorial board or the donor.