Kyrgyzstan: CSTO and intelligence agencies should change the approach to the fight against terrorism

“If radicalism and extremism have a political nature and derive their strength from the socio-economic and political problems in the country, it raises a question of expediency of the measures undertaken by the government to prevent radicalism. Don’t those measures act as unwitting catalysts for further growth of discontent and searing social injustice, and as a consequence, for the radicalization of society?”, asksZamira Isakova, an expert in security issues, Master of the OSCE Academy, in her article written for cabar.asia.

The growing influence of the ISIS in the countries of Central Asia has become one of the key issues on the agenda of the September meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Dushanbe.1 That, however, is not surprising, given the growing threat of international terrorism worldwide. The more that, according to the official statistics, the number of adherents of the ISIS lately has been replenished with people from Central Asia. The security of the region largely affects the security of Russia, which plays a key role in the CSTO. If radical adherents of the ISIS in the region get more successful, Central Asia will become a supplier of a threat to Russia.

The leaders of the states-members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization clearly identified the threat of terrorist and extremist organizations that feed the political, religious and social radicalism.2 Taking into consideration and understanding the consequences of the problem, the member-states of the Organization “continue to coordinate foreign policy positions, make joint statements…, build support for efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems….”3 How big is the potential of the CSTO and the law enforcement agencies of the Member States of the Organization, particularly the Central Asian countries, in confronting today’s threats? The detailed analysis will help find an objective answer to these questions.

 Action = inaction?

The Collective Security Treaty Organization was created in 2002 on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty, signed in 1995. The CSTO member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Despite the noble goal “to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability…”4, the CSTO is often perceived as an ineffective organization established only in opposition to NATO and having an unflattering epithet – “club of dictators”.

The Organization has earned this assessment due to a passive position during the acute need for providing assistance and the small number of actual results in ensuring security and conflict resolution. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the CSTO is associated with inaction of the Organization in 2010, during the violent inter-ethnic clashes in the south. According to Valentin Bogatyrev, “a response to the desperate appeal the head of the provisional government… was the statement of the then President Medvedev … that the question of the intervention of the CSTO cannot be considered, as such reactions are not provided by the charter of the organization or by any agreements”5 However, the situation regarding the appeal of Kyrgyzstan is called ambiguous, taking into account the illegal seizure of power and the status of provisional government,6 so the assistance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in such circumstances would mean supporting an illegitimate regime change.

The policy of non-interference of the CSTO was also used during the protests in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, in December 2011, and during the conflict in the north of Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan in 2012. But it is fair to note that only Kyrgyzstan sent an official appeal for help to the CSTO in 2010, in other cases, the countries decided to resolve the unstable situations in their territories themselves.

When the organization is criticized, CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha replies that the Collective Security Treaty Organization was created to respond to external threats, not internal.7 But the events in southern Kyrgyzstan taught the Organization certain lessons, in particular that the Collective Security Treaty Organization “should aid the leadership – the leadership de facto, not de jure, at that time”8 In spite of these arguments and help of the CSTO provided after the settlement of the tensions in the south of the Kyrgyz republic by its own forces in 2010, the Kyrgyz almost put the stigma of the organization’s incapability in ensuring security.

What keeps the CSTO…

However, as noted by David Lewis, lately, Russia has been seeking to fill an existing gap and to respond to modern challenges and threats through strengthening the capacity of the CSTO.9 In view of the Afghan problem, the CSTO enhances the potential of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which were created following the example of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF, 2001). CRDF was initiated to counter the forces that threaten the countries of Central Asia and in response to the invasion of a group of religious extremists on the territory of Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000. In the case of sudden attack of groups of armed extremists, potential of CRDF in the face of 4-thousand army will be used to confront them and to protect Central Asia.10

In 2009, it was decided to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of the CSTO. CRRF is a response of the CSTO to modern military threats and the only institution of the CSTO, which is designed to ensure the collective security of the member states. Its strengthening is the only possible activities of Member States to ensure security and counter threats. CRRF consists of 20,000 well-trained soldiers, ready to repel virtually all threats, except for inter-state conflicts. Each year, the CRRF participate in practical exercises, which, among other things, have a demonstrative character.

The CSTO member states have high hopes for the potential of the CRRF, which has become “an important factor of security in the CSTO zone of responsibility, including the containment of extremist and terrorist activities…”11 This year, the CRRF withstood the sudden test of strength and were transferred to the territory of Tajikistan during two and a half days.12 This was mentioned in the report Bordyuzha, which he declared at the September meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The report says about the operation “Channel” within which there was carried out the work to combat drug and weapon trafficking. In 2014, the Working group on the fight against terrorism and extremism (composed of members of the Defence Council and representatives of relevant agencies of CSTO member states),13 which should strengthen the coordination mechanism of the Organization. Joint activities under the code name “PROXY” contributed to information security. More than 50 thousand extremist sites have been detected and blocked since the beginning of 2015.14

So what’s the problem …

Despite all of the above achievements, the CSTO is assessed as a not very strong organization. There are two main reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of the organization:

First, geopolitical confrontation between world powers and their strategy of luring small players. As the editor of the political magazine “Center of Asia” Sultan Akimbekov notes, this policy of enticement and, as a consequence, the inconsistency of the Central Asian countries does not allow the Collective Security Treaty Organization acting quickly in the modern world.15

Secondly, the internal problems of the CSTO, which are based on the statutory relations, in particular, the ill-conceived mechanism for mandatory adoption of a consensus on providing assistance can significantly inhibit the timely response of the CSTO. In an interview, Nikolai Bordyuzha said about such difficulties in making operational decisions on the provision of assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2010.16 According to some Russian analysts, there may have been an “overestimated assessment by some States in the region of their national sovereignty”17

Existing internal divisions did not allow the CSTO to demonstrate its capacity, when such an opportunity was provided. Thus, the missed opportunities to show the real power of the Organization, as a structure, which aims to ensure security, made a great contribution to the existing image of the organization.

The opportunity to increase the authority of the organization, both on the domestic and on the international arena, depends entirely on how the Organization behaves in an emergency, although it is unlikely that the CSTO will assist, if extremist groups will be formed from the citizens of the Organization itself. According to Alexei Nikiforov, CSTO adviser, “if some groups, composed mainly of former citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who fled to Afghanistan or Pakistan, break into these countries, it is unlikely that the CSTO will send military help to those countries”18 In case of successful performance, the organization could improve its image and establish itself on the world stage as a real preventive and reactive mechanism to counter any threats. However, the Organization needs to reconsider its concept of “non-assistance until being officially asked it” and make appropriate adjustments to the existing basic documents of the CSTO.

Summarizing, we can conclude that the CSTO has a certain potential for rapid response to modern challenges, including terrorism and extremism. And the common strategic goal of all the CSTO member states is the main strength of the Organization. However, as noted by CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Organization should “pay special attention to improving the developed mechanisms … of collective security”.19

What’s at the local level?

A recent publication of the Eurasian Council of Foreign Affairs, it is written about the growing role of Central Asia in the fight against terrorism and emphasized that the countries in the region should increase their capacity in combating armed extremism and radicalism. 20

The destruction of the terrorists in Atyrau in 2011, a special operation of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) in Kyrgyzstan this summer, prevention of “terrorist attacks” by neutralization of the rebellious general Abduhalim Nazarzoda by special services of Tajikistan, the prosecution of fugitive criminals in Kyrgyzstan who were reportedly associated with banned religious movements, two recent “small act of terrorism” in Tashkent21 indicate not only a surge of activity of the so-called terrorists, but also show the seriousness of the intentions of the leaders of the Central Asian states in the fight against them.

The sincerity of these intentions, however, is subject to great doubt on the part of the expert community, which is concerned about the haste labeling “terrorists and radicals” without sufficient evidence. In academic circles, there is a question whether the threat of radicalism, armed extremism and terrorism in Central Asia is real. Currently, most analysts are inclined to believe that the problem as such is too much exaggerated, and it is done deliberately.According to Erica Marat, people in power often use the horror stories of “Islamic extremism” in order to suppress the opposition.22 The Diplomat in article “Central Asia and the phantom of ISIS” also argues that the threat is exaggerated and used to justify harsh measures against the those who think differently.23 The authors of the report of the Polish Institute of International Affairs are also sure in the absence of interest of the ISIS in the region. The report’s authors believe that the leaders of the five countries will try to use the phenomenon for personal gain, such as increasing the capacity of the security services and the receipt of funds for the strengthening of border posts. The main source of these benefits is likely to be Russia, and this is due to the fact that the majority of emigrants from Central Asia who take part in military operations in Syria have been recruited in Russia.24 John Heathershow and David Montgomery also believe in the “mythical” origin of religious extremism, and its rather political influence.25

The destruction of General Nazarzoda and his associates in Tajikistan is given as an example of the use of term radicalism for political purposes by the authorities of the republic.26 According to Arkady Dubnov in an interview for TheDiplomat, Tajik authorities want to show that the country is a kind of outpost in the fight against ISIS and bears considerable damage because of the terrorists. Tajik leadership is trying to use the exaggerated threat of ISIS in such a non-trivial way as an excuse/ explanation of its actions to the international community.27

Mankurtization and the response by state security services

The leaders of the Central Asian republics unanimously claim that radicalism exists and the people of these countries are victims of manipulation and influence of extremist groups. So, Almazbek Atambayev said that “behind the general Islamization, there is the idea of turning the Kyrgyz to mankurts”28 Thus, the head of the republic warns people that the Islamization of the population is used by some actors to deprive the population of its roots. After analyzing the public statements of the leaders of the countries, we can conclude that in their speeches, heads of the republics don’t distinguish between Islamization, radicalization, extremism and terrorism, often using them as synonyms.

As a result, law enforcement bodies of the republic have begun large-scale witch-hunt, prohibiting from wearing religious attributes, praying and wearing beards. Such methods have been used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The case of a 23-year-old student Umar Bobojonov in Vahdat (Tajikistan) was widely publicized. He was detained for wearing a beard. According to the Tajik news services, he was severely beaten and died.29 Thus, the criminalization and outlawing everything “non-traditional” have become the main tactic to counter radicalism. Anyway, any act is governed by the laws of the republic. So it makes sense to get acquainted with the mechanisms of solving the problem, established in laws of the three CSTO member states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Kazakhstan is guided by the law “On Countering Extremism”, adopted in 2005, which highlighted the interaction of all actors as the most important instrument in the fight against extremism. This emphasis is seen in the “State program on combating religious extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2013-2017”, too. Relatively speaking, the cooperation of public services with foreign and international organizations is a recipe for prevention in Kazakhstan. Kazakh special services passed the test for readiness to resist the destructive forces back in 2011 (the activity of terrorist groups in Atyrau). Many were found the measures taken by law enforcement authorities effective. According to Lieutenant Colonel, lead investigator of the 10^th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Interior (MIF) of Kyrgyzstan Ratbek Turusbekov, the actions of Kazakh law enforcement agencies led to a large outflow of extremist groups from the country30 In 2014, Nazarbayev signed a new Criminal Code, according to which the responsibility for the manifestation of extremism, terrorism and the spread of radical ideas has been tightened. 31

Extremism in Kyrgyzstan is recognized as one of the main threats to security. In this connection, there have been adopted a number of laws, including the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On countering extremist activities” of 2005. According to this law, the fight against extremism is the prerogative of the government agencies, but the relevant departments can fight extremism jointly with religious organizations, public associations and others. Countering extremism is also highlighted in the “Concept of National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic”, adopted in 2012. In the article “Islam in Kyrgyzstan: increase in diversity”, Franco Galdini writes about the problematic wording of the threat in the Concept. According to the author, the document identifies the Islamization as radicalization that can be considered a kind of provocation.32 Unclear definition of the problem poses unclear objectives for intelligence agencies of the republic in the fight against radicalism, thus they persecute all “informal” followers who preach “non-traditional Islam”33In order to stop the spread of “non-traditional Islam” and its negative impact, there was made a Decision of the Council of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the state policy in the sphere of religion” in 2014. The decision is more advisory in nature for all stakeholders, including religious organizations.

Tajikistan has long been considered an example of peaceful coexistence between the secular power and political Islam. But on August 28 this year, the authorities decided to ban the activities of the Islamic Revival Party.

Kyrgyzstan: CSTO and intelligence agencies should change the approach to the fight against terrorism

“If radicalism and extremism have a political nature and derive their strength from the socio-economic and political problems in the country, it raises a question of expediency of the measures undertaken by the government to prevent radicalism. Don’t those measures act as unwitting catalysts for further growth of discontent and searing social injustice, and as a consequence, for the radicalization of society?”, asks Zamira Isakova, an expert in security issues, Master of the OSCE Academy, in her article written for cabar.asia.

 The growing influence of the ISIS in the countries of Central Asia has become one of the key issues on the agenda of the September meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Dushanbe.1 That, however, is not surprising, given the growing threat of international terrorism worldwide. The more that, according to the official statistics, the number of adherents of the ISIS lately has been replenished with people from Central Asia. The security of the region largely affects the security of Russia, which plays a key role in the CSTO. If radical adherents of the ISIS in the region get more successful, Central Asia will become a supplier of a threat to Russia.

The leaders of the states-members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization clearly identified the threat of terrorist and extremist organizations that feed the political, religious and social radicalism.2 Taking into consideration and understanding the consequences of the problem, the member-states of the Organization “continue to coordinate foreign policy positions, make joint statements…, build support for efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems….”3 How big is the potential of the CSTO and the law enforcement agencies of the Member States of the Organization, particularly the Central Asian countries, in confronting today’s threats? The detailed analysis will help find an objective answer to these questions.

Action = inaction?

The Collective Security Treaty Organization was created in 2002 on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty, signed in 1995. The CSTO member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Despite the noble goal “to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability…”4, the CSTO is often perceived as an ineffective organization established only in opposition to NATO and having an unflattering epithet – “club of dictators”.

The Organization has earned this assessment due to a passive position during the acute need for providing assistance and the small number of actual results in ensuring security and conflict resolution. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the CSTO is associated with inaction of the Organization in 2010, during the violent inter-ethnic clashes in the south. According to Valentin Bogatyrev, “a response to the desperate appeal the head of the provisional government… was the statement of the then President Medvedev … that the question of the intervention of the CSTO cannot be considered, as such reactions are not provided by the charter of the organization or by any agreements”5 However, the situation regarding the appeal of Kyrgyzstan is called ambiguous, taking into account the illegal seizure of power and the status of provisional government,6 so the assistance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in such circumstances would mean supporting an illegitimate regime change.

The policy of non-interference of the CSTO was also used during the protests in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, in December 2011, and during the conflict in the north of Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan in 2012. But it is fair to note that only Kyrgyzstan sent an official appeal for help to the CSTO in 2010, in other cases, the countries decided to resolve the unstable situations in their territories themselves.

When the organization is criticized, CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha replies that the Collective Security Treaty Organization was created to respond to external threats, not internal.7 But the events in southern Kyrgyzstan taught the Organization certain lessons, in particular that the Collective Security Treaty Organization “should aid the leadership – the leadership de facto, not de jure, at that time”8 In spite of these arguments and help of the CSTO provided after the settlement of the tensions in the south of the Kyrgyz republic by its own forces in 2010, the Kyrgyz almost put the stigma of the organization’s incapability in ensuring security.

What keeps the CSTO…

However, as noted by David Lewis, lately, Russia has been seeking to fill an existing gap and to respond to modern challenges and threats through strengthening the capacity of the CSTO.9 In view of the Afghan problem, the CSTO enhances the potential of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which were created following the example of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF, 2001). CRDF was initiated to counter the forces that threaten the countries of Central Asia and in response to the invasion of a group of religious extremists on the territory of Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000. In the case of sudden attack of groups of armed extremists, potential of CRDF in the face of 4-thousand army will be used to confront them and to protect Central Asia.10

In 2009, it was decided to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of the CSTO. CRRF is a response of the CSTO to modern military threats and the only institution of the CSTO, which is designed to ensure the collective security of the member states. Its strengthening is the only possible activities of Member States to ensure security and counter threats. CRRF consists of 20,000 well-trained soldiers, ready to repel virtually all threats, except for inter-state conflicts. Each year, the CRRF participate in practical exercises, which, among other things, have a demonstrative character.

The CSTO member states have high hopes for the potential of the CRRF, which has become “an important factor of security in the CSTO zone of responsibility, including the containment of extremist and terrorist activities…”11 This year, the CRRF withstood the sudden test of strength and were transferred to the territory of Tajikistan during two and a half days.12 This was mentioned in the report Bordyuzha, which he declared at the September meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The report says about the operation “Channel” within which there was carried out the work to combat drug and weapon trafficking. In 2014, the Working group on the fight against terrorism and extremism (composed of members of the Defence Council and representatives of relevant agencies of CSTO member states),13 which should strengthen the coordination mechanism of the Organization. Joint activities under the code name “PROXY” contributed to information security. More than 50 thousand extremist sites have been detected and blocked since the beginning of 2015.14

So what’s the problem …

Despite all of the above achievements, the CSTO is assessed as a not very strong organization. There are two main reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of the organization:

First, geopolitical confrontation between world powers and their strategy of luring small players. As the editor of the political magazine “Center of Asia” Sultan Akimbekov notes, this policy of enticement and, as a consequence, the inconsistency of the Central Asian countries does not allow the Collective Security Treaty Organization acting quickly in the modern world.15

Secondly, the internal problems of the CSTO, which are based on the statutory relations, in particular, the ill-conceived mechanism for mandatory adoption of a consensus on providing assistance can significantly inhibit the timely response of the CSTO. In an interview, Nikolai Bordyuzha said about such difficulties in making operational decisions on the provision of assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2010.16 According to some Russian analysts, there may have been an “overestimated assessment by some States in the region of their national sovereignty”17

Existing internal divisions did not allow the CSTO to demonstrate its capacity, when such an opportunity was provided. Thus, the missed opportunities to show the real power of the Organization, as a structure, which aims to ensure security, made a great contribution to the existing image of the organization.

The opportunity to increase the authority of the organization, both on the domestic and on the international arena, depends entirely on how the Organization behaves in an emergency, although it is unlikely that the CSTO will assist, if extremist groups will be formed from the citizens of the Organization itself. According to Alexei Nikiforov, CSTO adviser, “if some groups, composed mainly of former citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who fled to Afghanistan or Pakistan, break into these countries, it is unlikely that the CSTO will send military help to those countries”18 In case of successful performance, the organization could improve its image and establish itself on the world stage as a real preventive and reactive mechanism to counter any threats. However, the Organization needs to reconsider its concept of “non-assistance until being officially asked it” and make appropriate adjustments to the existing basic documents of the CSTO.

Summarizing, we can conclude that the CSTO has a certain potential for rapid response to modern challenges, including terrorism and extremism. And the common strategic goal of all the CSTO member states is the main strength of the Organization. However, as noted by CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Organization should “pay special attention to improving the developed mechanisms … of collective security”.19

What’s at the local level?

A recent publication of the Eurasian Council of Foreign Affairs, it is written about the growing role of Central Asia in the fight against terrorism and emphasized that the countries in the region should increase their capacity in combating armed extremism and radicalism. 20

The destruction of the terrorists in Atyrau in 2011, a special operation of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) in Kyrgyzstan this summer, prevention of “terrorist attacks” by neutralization of the rebellious general Abduhalim Nazarzoda by special services of Tajikistan, the prosecution of fugitive criminals in Kyrgyzstan who were reportedly associated with banned religious movements, two recent “small act of terrorism” in Tashkent21 indicate not only a surge of activity of the so-called terrorists, but also show the seriousness of the intentions of the leaders of the Central Asian states in the fight against them.

The sincerity of these intentions, however, is subject to great doubt on the part of the expert community, which is concerned about the haste labeling “terrorists and radicals” without sufficient evidence. In academic circles, there is a question whether the threat of radicalism, armed extremism and terrorism in Central Asia is real. Currently, most analysts are inclined to believe that the problem as such is too much exaggerated, and it is done deliberately.

According to Erica Marat, people in power often use the horror stories of “Islamic extremism” in order to suppress the opposition.22 The Diplomat in article “Central Asia and the phantom of ISIS” also argues that the threat is exaggerated and used to justify harsh measures against the those who think differently.23 The authors of the report of the Polish Institute of International Affairs are also sure in the absence of interest of the ISIS in the region. The report’s authors believe that the leaders of the five countries will try to use the phenomenon for personal gain, such as increasing the capacity of the security services and the receipt of funds for the strengthening of border posts. The main source of these benefits is likely to be Russia, and this is due to the fact that the majority of emigrants from Central Asia who take part in military operations in Syria have been recruited in Russia.24 John Heathershow and David Montgomery also believe in the “mythical” origin of religious extremism, and its rather political influence.25

The destruction of General Nazarzoda and his associates in Tajikistan is given as an example of the use of term radicalism for political purposes by the authorities of the republic.26 According to Arkady Dubnov in an interview for TheDiplomat, Tajik authorities want to show that the country is a kind of outpost in the fight against ISIS and bears considerable damage because of the terrorists. Tajik leadership is trying to use the exaggerated threat of ISIS in such a non-trivial way as an excuse/ explanation of its actions to the international community.27

Mankurtization and the response by state security services

The leaders of the Central Asian republics unanimously claim that radicalism exists and the people of these countries are victims of manipulation and influence of extremist groups. So, Almazbek Atambayev said that “behind the general Islamization, there is the idea of turning the Kyrgyz to mankurts”28 Thus, the head of the republic warns people that the Islamization of the population is used by some actors to deprive the population of its roots. After analyzing the public statements of the leaders of the countries, we can conclude that in their speeches, heads of the republics don’t distinguish between Islamization, radicalization, extremism and terrorism, often using them as synonyms.

As a result, law enforcement bodies of the republic have begun large-scale witch-hunt, prohibiting from wearing religious attributes, praying and wearing beards. Such methods have been used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The case of a 23-year-old student Umar Bobojonov in Vahdat (Tajikistan) was widely publicized. He was detained for wearing a beard. According to the Tajik news services, he was severely beaten and died.29 Thus, the criminalization and outlawing everything “non-traditional” have become the main tactic to counter radicalism. Anyway, any act is governed by the laws of the republic. So it makes sense to get acquainted with the mechanisms of solving the problem, established in laws of the three CSTO member states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Kazakhstan is guided by the law “On Countering Extremism”, adopted in 2005, which highlighted the interaction of all actors as the most important instrument in the fight against extremism. This emphasis is seen in the “State program on combating religious extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2013-2017”, too. Relatively speaking, the cooperation of public services with foreign and international organizations is a recipe for prevention in Kazakhstan. Kazakh special services passed the test for readiness to resist the destructive forces back in 2011 (the activity of terrorist groups in Atyrau). Many were found the measures taken by law enforcement authorities effective. According to Lieutenant Colonel, lead investigator of the 10^th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Interior (MIF) of Kyrgyzstan Ratbek Turusbekov, the actions of Kazakh law enforcement agencies led to a large outflow of extremist groups from the country30 In 2014, Nazarbayev signed a new Criminal Code, according to which the responsibility for the manifestation of extremism, terrorism and the spread of radical ideas has been tightened. 31

Extremism in Kyrgyzstan is recognized as one of the main threats to security. In this connection, there have been adopted a number of laws, including the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On countering extremist activities” of 2005. According to this law, the fight against extremism is the prerogative of the government agencies, but the relevant departments can fight extremism jointly with religious organizations, public associations and others. Countering extremism is also highlighted in the “Concept of National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic”, adopted in 2012. In the article “Islam in Kyrgyzstan: increase in diversity”, Franco Galdini writes about the problematic wording of the threat in the Concept. According to the author, the document identifies the Islamization as radicalization that can be considered a kind of provocation.32 Unclear definition of the problem poses unclear objectives for intelligence agencies of the republic in the fight against radicalism, thus they persecute all “informal” followers who preach “non-traditional Islam”33In order to stop the spread of “non-traditional Islam” and its negative impact, there was made a Decision of the Council of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the state policy in the sphere of religion” in 2014. The decision is more advisory in nature for all stakeholders, including religious organizations.

Tajikistan has long been considered an example of peaceful coexistence between the secular power and political Islam. But on August 28 this year, the authorities decided to ban the activities of the Islamic Revival Party.

34